2012年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Proposed_Steps_to_Address_Excessive_Delays_in_the_Completion_of_Article_IV_Consultations_13页_326kb

Summary of "Preliminary Considerations of Options to Address Excessive Delays in the Completion of Article IV Consultations"

I. Introduction

The document outlines preliminary considerations for addressing excessive delays in completing Article IV consultations with IMF members. These consultations are essential for effective surveillance, which is a mandatory obligation for both the Fund and its members. While the Fund has historically relied on a cooperative approach, recent delays have raised concerns about the enforceability of this obligation. The paper does not propose immediate Board decisions but aims to elicit Directors' views on possible options to enhance timeliness.

II. Legal Background

A. Member's Obligation to Consult with the Fund

• Article IV, Section 3(a) requires the Fund to oversee compliance with its obligations.
• Article IV, Section 3(b) mandates "firm surveillance" over exchange rate policies and requires members to consult on relevant issues.
• The obligation to consult is triggered when the Fund requests it, typically under the 2007 Surveillance Decision.
• Members must provide the Fund with necessary information for surveillance, and the Fund delineates the issues to be discussed.

B. Periodicity

• The Fund has not imposed firm deadlines on Article IV consultations, relying instead on expectations.
• A clear legal framework is needed to define the circumstances under which a member could be found in breach of the obligation.
• The Fund must ensure that members are aware of potential consequences of noncompliance and that the process is transparent and uniform.

III. Broad Options Going Forward

Three broad options are proposed to address excessive delays:

A. Option 1: Informal Mechanisms

• Maintains the current cooperative approach.
• Assumes non-cooperation is rare and can be resolved through informal engagement.
• Pros: No additional burden on staff, Board, or members.
• Cons: May raise reputational concerns and risk of contagion if non-cooperation is not addressed.

B. Option 2: Formal Steps Within the Existing Framework

• Introduces concrete actions, such as letters from the Managing Director and staff reports based on available information.
• Delays over 18 months are highlighted as a threshold for public reporting.
• Pros: Increases transparency and provides a structured approach to non-cooperation.
• Cons: May cause discomfort to members with legitimate delays and could be perceived as a substitute for formal consultations.

C. Option 3: Obligation-Based Framework

• Establishes a formal framework with mandatory deadlines and procedures for determining breaches.
• Includes a process for remedial measures, escalating from censure to compulsory withdrawal.
• Pros: Provides a clear signal of the Fund's commitment to timely consultations.
• Cons: Represents a significant departure from the current system and may introduce legal and operational complexities.

IV. Issues for Discussion

• Whether excessive delays in Article IV consultations undermine the Fund's surveillance mandate.
• Directors' views on the three broad options for addressing delays.
• The need for a legal framework that ensures due process and uniform treatment in cases of non-cooperation.

Annex I: Possible Elements of an Obligation-Based Framework

• Mandatory Deadline: A later deadline than the expected one, set uniformly and calculated from the expected completion date.
• Finding of Breach: The Board would assess whether the delay was due to the member's control. If not, the member would be found in breach.
• Remedial Measures: Escalating actions such as censure, suspension of Fund resources, voting rights, and eventually compulsory withdrawal.
• Transitional Arrangements: A lag period (e.g., one year) would be introduced to allow members time to adjust before the new framework applies.

Key Information

• Figure 1: Shows the average delay of delayed consultations, indicating that recent delays are exceptionally long.
• Figure 2: Highlights that no more than 7 members have had delays over 18 months in the past ten years.
• Table 1: Provides a summary of past breaches and remedial actions under data provision and financial obligations, showing that such actions are rare.

Conclusion

The paper emphasizes the importance of maintaining a cooperative approach while exploring ways to enhance the timeliness of Article IV consultations. It proposes a range of options, from informal engagement to a more formal obligation-based framework, and suggests that further discussion among Directors is necessary to determine the most appropriate course of action.