2005年-世界发展银行全球_Reassessing_Conditional_Cash_Transfer_Programs_24页_649kb
报告摘要
Reassessing Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Summary
Core Content
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs have gained significant attention in both research and policy circles over the past decade for their role in increasing investment in human capital. These programs typically provide financial assistance to low-income households, contingent upon certain behaviors such as school attendance or health service utilization. The article explores the rationale, effectiveness, and challenges of CCTs, emphasizing their dual purposes: improving efficiency by addressing market failures and enhancing equity by targeting resources to the poor.
Main Purposes of CCT Programs
CCT programs are primarily used for two purposes:
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Improving Efficiency
- When individual decisions do not align with societal preferences, CCTs provide incentives to alter behavior.
- They can address externalities, both physical and learning, that lead to underinvestment in beneficial activities.
- Examples include deworming programs in Kenya and school enrollment programs in Brazil and Bangladesh.
-
Improving Equity
- CCTs are used as screening mechanisms to ensure that resources are directed to the poor.
- By imposing conditions, they encourage self-selection among eligible groups.
- Means-tested criteria such as income, land ownership, or employment are used to target poor households.
Key Findings from Evaluations
| Study | Program | Main Findings | Issues Covered |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alaii et al. (2003) | Western Kenya ITN trial | Perceived private benefits from bednet use are low; positive externalities affect child health and mortality | Implementation, physical externalities |
| Alderman and Lindert (1998) | Food subsidies (Tunisia) | Self-targeting through commodity choice is effective | Targeting, redistribution, political economy of aid |
| Behrman and Hoddinott (2001) | Progresa (Mexico) | Nutritional interventions improve child growth and stunting | Household bargaining, fungibility |
| Bourguignon et al. (2002) | Bolsa Escola (Brazil) | Increased school enrollment, especially for poor households | Implementation, targeting, redistribution |
| Cardoso and Souza (2003) | Bolsa Escola (Brazil) | No impact on child labor but positive on enrollment | Targeting, fungibility, efficiency |
| Galasso and Ravallion (2003) | Plan Jefes y Jefas (Argentina) | Well targeted to the poor, significant impact on poverty reduction | Targeting, redistribution, equity-efficiency tradeoff |
| Galasso and Ravallion (forthcoming) | Food for Education (Bangladesh) | Mildly pro-poor | Targeting, efficiency |
| Jacoby (1997) | Nutribun and Milk Program (Jamaica) | Poorest households receive the largest benefits; significant deadweight loss | Targeting, redistribution, efficiency |
| Jacoby (2002) | School Feeding Program (Philippines) | Children's caloric intake increases on school days; effects weaker for poorer households | Fungibility, redistribution |
| Khandker et al. (2003) | Female Stipend Program (Bangladesh) | Girls' secondary education increases; boys' education decreases in some cases | Implementation, equity-efficiency tradeoff, fungibility |
| Kremer and Miguel (2003) | Western Kenya Deworming Project | Negative social learning effects; free-riding due to externalities | Learning externalities |
| Miguel and Kremer (2003) | Western Kenya Deworming Project | School participation increases in control groups due to externalities | Implementation, physical externalities, cost-effectiveness |
| Miguel and Kremer (2004) | Western Kenya Deworming Project | Small price increase leads to large drop in take-up; health education fails | Implementation, cost-effectiveness of program compared with alternative counterfactuals |
| Ravallion and Wodon (1999) | Food for Education (Bangladesh) | Program increases schooling more than it reduces child labor | Implementation, equity-efficiency tradeoff, fungibility |
| Schultz (2001) | Progresa (Mexico) | Positive impact on school attainment; wealth effect for most rural families | Implementation, equity-efficiency tradeoff, fungibility |
| Stifel and Alderman (2003) | Vaso de Leche (Peru) | Well targeted to the poor with minimal leakage; no impact on child height | Targeting, fungibility, implementation |
Challenges and Trade-offs
- Participation is crucial for the success of CCT programs. If the transfer amount is too low or the condition too costly, participation may be limited.
- Fungibility is another challenge. When the conditioned-on good has close substitutes, households may reallocate their spending, reducing the program's effectiveness.
- There is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. While CCTs can improve efficiency by addressing market failures, they may inadvertently benefit the rich if not properly designed.
Economic Perspective
From an economic standpoint, CCTs are less efficient than unconditional cash transfers in most cases, as they distort consumption choices. However, they can be effective in correcting market failures due to externalities or bargaining within households. The effectiveness of a CCT program depends on how well it aligns with the intended behavioral outcomes and how it is structured to minimize unintended consequences.
Conclusion
Conditional Cash Transfer programs have shown promise in increasing human capital investment and targeting resources to the poor. However, their success hinges on addressing externalities, ensuring high participation, and managing the fungibility of the conditioned-on goods. Policymakers must carefully balance efficiency and equity objectives to maximize the overall social welfare impact of these programs.
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