战略与国际研究中心-A-New-Generation-of-Homeland-Missile-Defense-Interceptors_117页_8mb
报告摘要
Summary of GAO-17-381: Mission Defense
Core Content
The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) since 2002, with a total of approximately $123 billion already spent and an additional $37 billion planned through fiscal year 2021. The system includes a command and control system, radars, and intercepting missiles designed to detect, track, and defeat enemy ballistic missiles.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was tasked with assessing MDA's progress in meeting its fiscal year 2016 testing and delivery goals, ensuring transparency in test schedules and costs, and establishing a sound business case for future efforts. GAO reviewed the MDA's BMDS Accountability Report (BAR) and other program documentation, as well as conducted interviews with DOD and MDA officials.
Main Findings
1. Progress in Fiscal Year 2016
- MDA conducted 10 flight tests, including one major operational test, but some tests were delayed, limiting the knowledge gained.
- MDA delivered new interceptors, upgraded fielded interceptors, and five BMDS level capabilities.
- However, testing revealed that the delivered BMDS level capabilities are unlikely to provide the robust defense as planned.
2. Testing Schedule and Cost Transparency
- MDA's integrated test schedule remains aggressive, leading to frequent changes in testing plans from year to year.
- The lack of clear tracking of these changes reduces traceability of test objectives and requirements.
- MDA requests over $1 billion annually for testing, but cost estimates are inconsistent and lack transparency.
- GAO identified that MDA's scheduling practices do not fully align with best practices for reliable scheduling, and cost estimates do not meet leading cost estimating practices.
3. Business Case for Future Efforts
- MDA has incorporated several elements of a sound business case, such as using mature technologies and realistic cost estimates.
- However, the process lacks warfighter-approved requirements and sufficient input from DOD components.
- Some design approaches prioritize speed and cost over performance, potentially compromising the system's ability to defeat future threats.
- MDA's emphasis on its own judgment and preferences may reduce DOD-wide support for future efforts.
Key Recommendations
GAO made four recommendations to the Department of Defense (DOD) to improve transparency and acquisition strategies:
- Improve the traceability of test schedules and the transparency of associated costs.
- Ensure that test schedules reflect best practices for reliable scheduling.
- Align cost estimates with leading cost estimating practices.
- Incorporate warfighter-approved requirements and increase input from DOD components in the requirements development process.
DOD concurred with part of the first recommendation but did not concur with the remaining parts or the other three recommendations. GAO maintains that these recommendations are valid and should be implemented to enhance the BMDS program's effectiveness and accountability.
Key Elements of the BMDS
The BMDS consists of several key elements, each with specific roles and capabilities:
| Element | Description |
|---|---|
| Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Weapon System | A system that includes ship- and land-based capabilities using radar, command and control, and SM-3 interceptors. |
| Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB | Capable of identifying, discriminating, and tracking objects to defend against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. |
| Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA | Upgraded version with increased range, more sensitive seeker technology, and an advanced kill vehicle. |
| Aegis Ashore | A land-based version of Aegis BMD, using SM-3 interceptors and capabilities, with three locations: one test site and two operational sites. |
| AN/TPY-2 | A transportable X-band radar used for tracking ballistic missiles in both forward-based and terminal modes. |
| Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) | A globally deployed system linking and integrating individual BMDS elements for operation planning and sensor management. |
| Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) | A ground-based system using interceptors with a booster and kill vehicle to defend against intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. |
| Targets and Countermeasures | Provides realistic targets for BMDS testing, though these are not operationally fielded. |
| Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) | A mobile, ground-based system using interceptors, launchers, radar, and fire control systems to defend against short- and medium-range threats. |
Conclusion
While MDA has made some progress in delivering capabilities and conducting tests in fiscal year 2016, significant challenges remain in ensuring transparency in testing schedules and costs, and in establishing a robust business case for future developments. GAO's recommendations aim to improve these areas and ensure better alignment with DOD's acquisition goals and best practices.
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