战略与国际研究中心-Multilateral-Cooperation-on-Export-Controls_12页_101kb

Multilateral Cooperation on Export Controls Summary

Core Content

This document discusses the evolution and challenges of multilateral export control regimes, particularly focusing on the Wassenaar Arrangement and the CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls). It highlights the decline in effectiveness of these regimes and the need for reform in the context of global technological diffusion and shifting international relations.

Main Points

1. The Problem with the Unilateral System

• The U.S. unilateral export control system is criticized for harming national competitiveness and failing to protect security.
• Alliances often bypass U.S. restrictions, leading to a loss of control over technology exports.
• The U.S. denies permission for certain sales, but allies make the same sales, undermining U.S. strategic interests.

2. Multilateral Export Control Regimes

• Four major multilateral regimes govern export controls: Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement.
• Wassenaar focuses on information technology (IT), including telecommunications, encryption, microprocessors, and computers.
• Unlike nonproliferation regimes, Wassenaar deals with commodity-level items that are part of normal commerce.

3. Decontrol of Information Technology

• There has been a trend toward decontrolling IT in Wassenaar, with Germany, France, Japan, and others pressuring the U.S. to relax controls.
• Encryption was decontrolled in 1998 and 2000, despite U.S. objections.
• Microprocessors and computers are now widely available and traded, making multilateral control increasingly difficult.

4. The MTOPS Metric

• MTOPS (Million Transistors per Second) was a performance metric used in CoCom to classify computers for export control.
• It is now outdated and ineffective due to rapid technological advancements.
• MTOPS fails to account for networked systems and software capabilities, which are critical in modern warfare and defense.

5. U.S. National Security Concerns

• The U.S. faces new security risks from network vulnerabilities rather than from high-performance computers.
• Adversaries seek to disrupt U.S. military capabilities through cyber means, not necessarily by acquiring advanced hardware.
• U.S. military software and sensor capabilities remain a unique advantage, which should be protected.

6. The Role of EPCI (Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative)

• EPCI is a "catch-all" control mechanism that allows the U.S. to stop exports to proliferation-related entities.
• EPCI includes three elements:
  1. Stopping exports for proliferation purposes.
  2. Informing exporters about entities that require licenses.
  3. Screening potential sales to avoid transfers to WMD programs.
• EPCI is essential for addressing non-military-related proliferation risks, especially when multilateral controls fail.

7. Challenges in EPCI Implementation

• The Entity List is insufficient and lacks comprehensive information on proliferators.
• Interagency coordination is a major issue, with the Intelligence Community and State Department having conflicting priorities.
• The "is informed" process is limited, often only informing the company that made the inquiry, not all potential exporters.

8. Recommendations for Reform

• The U.S. should propose the elimination of MTOPS-based controls in Wassenaar to regain credibility.
• A broader reexamination of remaining IT controls is needed to align with current technological realities.
• Improved information sharing with exporters, including using Web-based tools and trade associations, could enhance the effectiveness of EPCI.
• The U.S. should consider adopting a positive list of items and countries for proliferation screening.

Key Information

• CoCom was a Cold War-era regime focused on military and dual-use technologies.
• Wassenaar Arrangement succeeded CoCom and continues to control IT, but its effectiveness is questioned.
• Japan has requested the termination of its bilateral supercomputer agreement with the U.S., citing a lack of strategic relevance.
• EPCI remains a critical tool for the U.S. to address non-military proliferation risks.
• The U.S. must adapt to the new reality of global technology diffusion and focus on network and software security rather than hardware control.

Conclusion

The U.S. faces significant challenges in maintaining effective multilateral export controls due to technological change, international competition, and lack of strategic consensus. The MTOPS metric is outdated, and Wassenaar has shifted from controlling hardware to focusing on production equipment and technical expertise. While EPCI remains a vital tool, it requires improvements in information sharing and coordination to be more effective. The U.S. must consider reforming its export control policies to align with modern security threats and global trade realities.