2011年-IMF国际货币组织全球_2011_Review_of_Conditionality_and_the_Design_of_Fund_7页_464kb

2011 Review of Conditionality and the Design of Fund-Supported Programs Summary

I. Introduction

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) regularly reviews conditionality in its supported programs, with the next formal review planned for 2011. This paper summarizes past assessments, outlines the proposed approach for the 2011 review, and seeks early feedback from Directors. Since the 2004-05 review, several key developments have influenced conditionality, including:

• Streamlining and focusing: Conditionality has become more tailored to countries' policy performance.
• Discontinuation of Structural Performance Criteria (SPCs): SPCs were discontinued in March 2009, with a shift to review-based monitoring.
• Introduction of new facilities and instruments: These were introduced or revamped under the General Resource Account (GRA) and Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT).
• Ex-ante conditionality: A more systematic use of this approach has been adopted.
• Global financial crisis impact: The crisis has increased the complexity of program design and implementation due to unexpected shocks and spillover effects.

The 2011 review aims to evaluate the impact of these changes and developments, with a broader scope than previous reviews, including a more comprehensive analysis of program indicators and performance assessments.

II. Earlier Assessments of Conditionality

The 2004-05 review analyzed both program design and conditionality application, covering programs from 1995-2000 and those from 2001 through mid-2004. Key findings included:

• Program design:

  • Programs were tailored to country circumstances and objectives.
  • Middle-income countries focused on medium-term debt sustainability, often with abrupt adjustments.
  • Low-income countries emphasized long-term growth and balance of payments stability, rather than immediate current account improvements.

• Formal conditionality:

  • Structural conditionality focused on critical measures, with clearer conditions.
  • Fewer program interruptions, stable waiver rates, but improved implementation.
  • Conditionality could not replace program ownership.

Following the 2004-05 review, the operational guidance on conditionality was revised in 2006. The 2007 Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) review further prompted changes, emphasizing parsimony, criticality, and country ownership. The discontinuation of SPCs in 2009 marked a significant shift towards review-based monitoring.

III. Key Issues for the Forthcoming Review

A. Content and Application of Program Conditionality

• The review will assess quantitative and qualitative aspects of conditionality for programs approved from 2002 to 2010.
• It will analyze the content, evolution, and breakdown of conditionality across:
  • Policy areas (fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, financial, etc.)
  • Country-income groups
  • Instrument/facility types
  • Level of access
• The assessment will ensure alignment with the five principles of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines: ownership, parsimony, tailoring, coordination, and clarity.
• The review will include an analysis of prior actions (PAs), indicative targets (ITs), and qualification criteria for the Flexible Credit Line (FCL).

B. Program Design and Implementation

• The review will examine how program design has addressed country-specific needs while aligning with IMF policy.

• It will assess the balance between adjustment and financing, especially in exceptional access cases, to determine if it supports sustainable economic recovery.

• The review will also explore:

  • Adaptation to evolving country circumstances
  • Evenhandedness across the Fund membership
  • Consideration of macro-financial linkages and international spillovers
  • Fiscal adjustment composition and social impact of policies
  • Integration of the 2009 SDR allocation into program design

• The review will evaluate implementation trends, focusing on whether recent policy changes have improved program flexibility and effectiveness.

C. Outcomes of Fund-Supported Programs

• The review will analyze macroeconomic outcomes such as GDP growth, inflation, current account balance, fiscal balance, reserves coverage, and money growth.
• It will compare these outcomes with relevant benchmarks based on income groups, facility types, and access levels.
• Social outcomes will be explored through intermediate indicators like public expenditure in priority areas.
• The review will also compare outcomes across programs with different objectives, such as those addressing capital account crises, traditional current account crises, or balance-of-payments needs in low-income or transition countries.

IV. Issues for Discussion

The IMF staff proposes the following questions for Executive Directors to consider:

• Do Directors agree with the general approach of the review, including the inclusion of conditionality, program design, implementation, and outcomes?
• Are there other areas that should be addressed?
• What are Directors' views on the types of facilities and instruments to be included?
• Do they have opinions on outreach to external stakeholders, including the proposed surveys?
• Are there other concerns or issues the review should examine?

The review will also benefit from the Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) database and country case studies, including Ex-Post Evaluations and Assessments.