2011年-IMF国际货币组织全球_United_Kingdom_Observance_by_CREST_of_the_CPSS_50页_799kb

Summary of the United Kingdom: Observance by CREST of the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems

Core Content

This report provides a detailed assessment of the United Kingdom's observance of the Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (RSSS) by the Crest Securities Settlement System (CREST), operated by Euroclear U.K. & Ireland Limited (EUI). The assessment was conducted in the context of the IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in 2011 and evaluates the effectiveness and compliance of CREST with the CPSS-IOSCO guidelines.

Main Findings

Legal Framework (Recommendation 1)

• CREST operates under a consistent and transparent legal framework in the United Kingdom.
• The legal foundation supports settlement and custody activities and is in line with European directives.
• The UK's implementation of European regulations provides a solid statutory basis for netting, set-off, and securities lending.
• CREST is designated under the Settlement Finality Directive (SFD) in the UK and Ireland.

Pre-settlement Risk (Recommendations 2–5)

• Most trades are confirmed and settled on a rolling settlement cycle, with equities settled by T+3 and debt instruments by T+0 to T+1.
• The UK has well-developed securities lending and repo markets, which are supported by law, regulation, and tax systems.
• There is no specific regulatory regime for these markets, which are governed by contractual arrangements and codes of practice.

Settlement Risk (Recommendations 6–10)

• Money market instruments are fully dematerialized, which is a significant achievement.
• Equities and gilts are not fully dematerialized, with at least 15% of equities and 1% of gilts still in paper form, resulting in operational costs.
• Delivery versus Payment (DvP) is achieved in CREST through model 1 for sterling and euro, and model 2 for U.S. dollars.
• For U.S. dollar settlements, bilateral netting occurs after the settlement day, leading to interbank credit risk.
• Irish, Jersey, Guernsey, and Isle of Man securities may be subject to revocation in the first two hours after settlement, but this is limited by regulation and the volume of such transactions is small.
• The UK government has not prioritized dematerialization due to a lack of consensus among stakeholders, though it could consider mandatory dematerialization for efficiency and European harmonization.

Operational Risk (Recommendation 11)

• CREST is reliable, secure, and has adequate, scalable capacity.
• Contingency plans and backup facilities are in place, but compulsory contingency testing is not conducted for its largest participants.
• A third IT backup site would be beneficial for such a core market infrastructure, with a business case being developed for implementation in 2012.

Custody Risk (Recommendation 12)

• The Central Securities Depository (CSD) uses a "direct holding" system, where securities are registered in the name of the legal owner.
• Lehman Brothers International (LBIE) failure highlighted the need for stronger protection of customers' securities from custodian creditors.
• However, no issues arose from assets registered in EUI, indicating effective protection.

Other Issues (Recommendations 13–19)

• The CSD is user-owned, and its governance reflects the interests of shareholders, users, and the public.
• Access criteria and participant exit procedures are clearly defined and publicly disclosed.
• There is a potential for veto power by existing settlement banks over new applicants.
• The CSD regularly reviews its pricing, fees, and costs, benchmarking against other systems and conducting user satisfaction surveys.
• Self-assessment reports and publicly available rules are in place.
• The role of public authorities is clearly defined and transparent.
• Supervision is risk-based and has been strengthened since the financial crisis.
• Hiring and retaining expertise remains a challenge for regulators.

Key Recommendations

• Implement alternative U.S. dollar payment arrangements (such as exposure limits, guarantee funds) to reduce credit risk.
• Conduct compulsory contingency testing for the largest participants.
• Establish a third IT backup site to enhance operational resilience.
• Monitor the concentration of settlement activities in two commercial banks.
• Consider mandatory dematerialization for equities and gilts to align with European practices.
• Ensure transparency in the CSD's access criteria and participant exit procedures.
• Strengthen the legal framework to protect customers' securities against custodian creditors' claims.

Authorities' Response

• The UK government is planning to transfer CCP regulation to the Bank of England (BoE) by the end of 2012.
• The BoE and FSA have strengthened their oversight of CREST and other settlement systems since the financial crisis.
• An MOU exists between the BoE, FSA, and HMT to coordinate the oversight of payment and settlement systems.
• The Euroclear Group has a joint College of Regulators with representatives from member countries, including the UK, to ensure a coordinated regulatory approach.

Summary of Observance

Conclusion

CREST is a reliable and effective securities settlement system in the UK, providing real-time gross settlement (RTGS) in sterling and euro, and bilateral netting in U.S. dollars. While it generally complies with the RSSS, there are areas for improvement, particularly in credit risk mitigation, operational resilience, and dematerialization. The regulatory framework is robust, with risk-based supervision and coordinated oversight among authorities. The UK government is moving toward a more centralized regulatory approach, with the BoE taking over CCP regulation by 2012.