斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-The-European-Union-its-overseas-territories-and-non_12页_579kb

Summary of "THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS OVERSEAS TERRITORIES AND NON-PROLIFERATION: THE CASE OF ARCTIC YELLOWCAKE"

I. Introduction

The European Union (EU) has 26 overseas countries and territories (OCTs), primarily small islands, with constitutional ties to EU member states. These territories have historically been the focus of development aid, but the EU's approach is shifting towards sustainable development and global issues such as poverty eradication, climate change, and human rights. However, the EU's non-proliferation principles, outlined in its 2003 WMD Strategy, have not been fully integrated into the EU-OCT relationship, creating a gap in policy and hindering the modernization of these territories.

The paper argues that including non-proliferation in the EU-OCT framework is essential for addressing current legislative and regulatory gaps and for aligning the EU's security and environmental policies with its OCTs. The case of Greenland, with its potential for uranium mining, is used to highlight the importance of incorporating non-proliferation principles into the EU-OCT relationship.

II. Overview of the EU's Overseas Territories

• Geographical Spread: OCTs are spread across the world, from the Arctic to the Antarctic and from the Caribbean to the Pacific.
• Population Size: Varies greatly, from as few as 48 to over 250,000.
• Political Status: Most are non-sovereign, with varying degrees of autonomy from their EU-linked member states.
• EU Law Applicability: OCTs are not part of the EU and not directly subject to EU law, while outermost regions (ORs) are fully integrated into EU law with possible derogations.
• Historical Context: OCTs were included in the EEC Treaty in 1957, with France pushing for special provisions. The 1991 Overseas Association Decision marked a shift towards a new partnership model.
• Current Framework: The 2011 Greenland Decision and the Fisheries Partnership Agreement define current EU-OCT relations, which expire in 2013. These relations are still similar to the EU-ACP model, but the Green Paper (2008) and subsequent communications call for modernization and a more sustainable development approach.

III. Greenland: A Special Case

• Political Structure: Greenland is part of the Danish Realm, with home rule since 1979. It is the only OCT in the Realm.
• Economic Dependence: Relies heavily on fishing, but is increasingly looking to develop its mining sector, including uranium.
• Non-Proliferation Policy: Greenland has historically maintained a 'zero tolerance' policy on uranium mining, influenced by global anti-nuclear sentiment and domestic concerns.
• Legal Status: Greenland is not a party to the EU's non-proliferation treaties, and its export controls are separate from the EU's, raising concerns about compliance and transparency.
• Recent Developments: In 2012, Greenland began to allow the inclusion of radioactive elements in exploration for rare earth elements (REEs), signaling a shift in policy. The Kvanefjeld Project could supply 20% of global REE demand, with uranium as a by-product.

IV. Non-Proliferation and the EU-OCT Relationship

• Current Gaps: The EU-OCT relationship lacks non-proliferation objectives, unlike the EU-ACP relationship, which includes the WMD clause from the 2003 Strategy.
• Need for Integration: Including non-proliferation principles in EU-OCT negotiations would help align security and environmental policies with development goals.
• Recommendations:
  • Modernize the EU-OCT framework to include non-proliferation.
  • Develop a training center for nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.
  • Use the EU's WMD Strategy as a tool to promote transparency and multilateral cooperation.
  • Address the mixed legal framework within the Danish Realm, where non-proliferation obligations vary between Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.

V. The Kingdom of Denmark's Mixed Safeguards

• Treaty Ratifications: Denmark and the Faroe Islands are parties to all major non-proliferation treaties, including the NPT, CWC, and BWC.
• Non-Applicability to Greenland: Greenland is not a party to the NPT safeguards (INFCIRC/193) or the Additional Protocol, despite having ratified the NPT in 2004.
• Legal Disparities: Denmark's export control lists are managed from Brussels, while Greenland is responsible for its own dual-use exports. This creates a fragmented legal and regulatory landscape.
• Euratom's Potential Role: As the EU's oldest non-proliferation institution, Euratom could help harmonize non-proliferation and foreign policies across the Danish Realm and other non-nuclear metropoles.

VI. Conclusion

The paper underscores the importance of integrating non-proliferation principles into the EU-OCT relationship, especially in light of the growing economic and strategic significance of OCTs like Greenland. The absence of such principles not only hampers the EU's ability to mainstream its non-proliferation policies but also limits the sustainable development and international trade potential of these territories. A renewed partnership that includes non-proliferation objectives is essential for ensuring the security, transparency, and long-term development of OCTs.