2015年-世界发展银行全球_Global_Supply_Chains_and_Trade_Policy_Responses_to_the_2008_Crisis_27页_229kb

Summary of "Global Supply Chains and Trade Policy Responses to the 2008 Crisis"

Core Content

This paper examines the trade policy responses of seven large emerging market countries to the 2008 financial crisis, comparing them to the protectionist tendencies observed during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The main question is why the 2008 crisis, which caused significant trade contraction, did not lead to widespread protectionism, unlike the Great Depression.

Main Views

• The 2008 Crisis and Trade Collapse:

  • The trade collapse during the 2008 crisis was more severe than that of the Great Depression in many countries.
  • However, it did not trigger the same level of protectionism, which is a key contrast with the 1930s.

• Factors Preventing Protectionism:

  • Global Value Chains (GVCs): The rise in vertical specialization, or participation in GVCs, is identified as a key factor that deters protectionism. This is because protectionism would raise the costs of downstream domestic firms that rely on imported intermediates.
  • Institutional Discipline: The World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and institutions have played a critical role in limiting protectionist measures. These rules raise the cost of using trade policies and have contributed to the stability of the multilateral trading system.

• WTO Commitments and Policy Latitude:

  • Most developing and emerging market countries have significant policy latitude to increase tariffs without violating their WTO commitments.
  • The difference between bound tariff rates (WTO negotiated maximums) and applied MFN (Most-Favored-Nation) rates indicates this "water" in the tariff, allowing for more flexibility in trade policy.

• Empirical Evidence:

  • The trade collapse in the 2008 crisis did not lead to a substantial increase in tariffs across the seven countries.
  • The average applied tariffs for these countries either remained stable or slightly decreased, with only a few exceptions.
  • The use of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and contingent protection measures (such as antidumping duties) was also limited, suggesting that protectionism did not become widespread.

Key Information

Table 1: Tariff Data for Seven Countries

• Bound Tariff Rates (tBND): These are significantly higher than applied MFN rates, indicating the potential for increasing protection without violating WTO rules.
• Import-Weighted Tariff Averages: These are generally lower than simple averages, as they account for the volume of imports and thus provide a more accurate reflection of actual trade policy impacts.

Vertical Specialization and Intra-Industry Trade

• Vertical Specialization (VS): The paper introduces a new interest-based explanation for trade policy behavior, emphasizing the role of vertical specialization in global value chains.
• Intra-Industry Trade (IIT): This is measured using the Grubel-Lloyd index and is correlated with VS and %IntermediateUse. It reflects the intensity of trade in differentiated products within the same industry.

Economic Implications

• Intermediate Use: The use of intermediate goods in production is a strong deterrent to protectionism, as it increases the costs of downstream firms.
• Lobbying Effects: Downstream industries lobby against protectionism to reduce input costs, while upstream producers may have less incentive to do so if they are integrated into global supply chains.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that the combination of global value chain integration, institutional discipline under the WTO, and the economic structure of trade (with a focus on intermediate goods) has played a significant role in preventing protectionism during the 2008 crisis. The empirical analysis using an instrumental variables strategy supports the idea that participation in GVCs reduces the incentive for countries to raise tariffs in response to trade shocks.

The findings suggest that trade policy responses are influenced by both economic interests (such as vertical specialization) and institutional constraints (such as WTO rules). These factors together explain the limited protectionist behavior observed in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, even in the face of severe economic contraction.