2014年-世界发展银行全球_Pension_Risk_and_Risk_Based_Supervision_in_Defined_Contribution_Pension_Funds_29页_683kb

报告摘要

Summary of "Pension Risk and Risk Based Supervision in Defined Contribution Pension Funds"

Core Content

This paper examines the application of Risk Based Supervision (RBS) in Defined Contribution (DC) pension funds, highlighting its limitations and the need for a more outcome-focused approach. It contrasts the traditional use of RBS in banking and insurance sectors with its implementation in pension systems, particularly DC schemes, and discusses the implications of this approach on pension adequacy and member outcomes.

Main Goals of Pension Systems

The primary goal of any pension system is to ensure adequate retirement income for members.
Defined Benefit (DB) plans guarantee a specific pension income, whereas DC plans accumulate assets that are later converted into retirement income, which is not pre-determined.
Without a clear regulatory framework, DC plans often focus on short-term asset accumulation rather than long-term retirement income security.

Risk Based Supervision (RBS) in Banking and Insurance

RBS in banking and insurance is based on three pillars: capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline.
Basel II and Solvency II frameworks emphasize the alignment of capital with risk, requiring entities to assess and manage their risks.
Capital requirements in these sectors are designed to ensure that entities can absorb potential losses, thus aligning risk management with financial stability.

RBS in the Pension Sector

In the pension sector, RBS has been adopted but not fully adapted for DC schemes.
Capital requirements are not effective in DC systems because the investment risk is borne by contributors, not the pension fund itself.
Pension risk—the risk that actual retirement income differs from a target—is the key concern for DC schemes, but is often not considered in RBS frameworks.

Limitations of RBS in DC Pension Systems

RBS in DC systems tends to focus on operational risks rather than investment risks.
This approach may misalign incentives and fail to address the long-term adequacy of pensions.
Higher capital requirements in emerging economies may discourage small PFMCs, and could reduce fund performance by increasing fees without improving outcomes.
Some countries, such as Kazakhstan, have imposed risk-weighted capital requirements, which have led to conservative investment strategies and low replacement rates.

RBS Objectives and Pension Outcomes

The International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS) defines RBS as a structured approach to identify and assess risks to pension plans and funds.
The goal of pension supervision should be to protect member outcomes, not just processes.
Pension risk is the central risk in DC systems, yet it is not quantified or explicitly addressed in most systems.
Explicit pension targets and investment strategies could help reduce pension risk, but are not commonly used in DC systems.

Risks Outside Supervisors' Control

Many macro-political risks in DC systems are outside the scope of pension supervisors:
- Nationalization risks: As seen in Poland, Hungary, Argentina, and Bolivia, mandatory funded pension schemes may be dismantled.
- Fiscal risks: In countries like El Salvador, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Russia, and Romania, contribution rates are used to adjust fiscal revenues.
- Related party risks: In Colombia, PFMCs are often owned by large companies that also invest in pension funds, limiting supervisory influence.
- Transition risks: In Mexico and Colombia, retirees may receive substantially lower pensions than those not in the system.

Conclusion and Recommendations

RBS in DC pension systems has limited effectiveness due to the lack of clear outcome objectives.
Supervisors should focus on pension risk, not just operational risk.
Benchmarks and outcome-based objectives could help align RBS with the goal of adequate retirement income.
Capital requirements may be counterproductive in DC systems, as they do not ensure better investment outcomes.
Supervision should be outcome-focused, with an emphasis on member protection and long-term adequacy.
Transition risks and macro-political issues must be addressed for pension reforms to succeed.

Key Takeaways

RBS is not well-suited for DC pension systems due to the lack of quantifiable pension promises.
Pension risk—the risk of not achieving a target retirement income—should be the primary focus of supervision.
Capital requirements in DC systems may increase fees without improving pension outcomes.
Emerging economies often face systemic risks that are beyond the control of pension supervisors.
Outcome-based supervision and clear pension objectives are essential for effective RBS in DC systems.