美联储-致力于增长：东德的私有化与企业动态（英）-2023.11-67页_6mb

Abstract and Introduction

The paper analyzes a unique policy implemented in East Germany after reunification, which required new owners of privatized firms to commit to employment targets during privatization. This policy aimed to mitigate immediate labor market disruptions by enforcing employment levels with penalties, affecting over 18,000 contracts covering more than 900,000 workers. The study investigates how these commitments influenced firm dynamics, including employment, productivity, and market exit rates (Akcigit et al., 2023). Previous research on industrial policies often lacks empirical evidence on dynamic effects, making this policy a novel case study for understanding state interventions in privatization.

Methodology

A dynamic economic model is developed to explore how binding employment targets impact firm behavior. The model incorporates three key channels: static labor decisions (upward distortion in employment), dynamic effects through increased productivity investment, and exit effects due to reduced profitability from penalties. Empirical identification is achieved using instrumental variables based on privatizer preferences, which exploit heterogeneity and quasi-random assignment of contracts. Data from German archives, including contract-level employment targets and firm productivity measures, support causal estimates.

Empirical Findings

Empirical results confirm that binding employment contracts foster higher growth: firms with binding targets exhibit a 22% annual employment growth rate, a 14% annual productivity increase, and a 3.6% higher exit probability. These effects are robust to alternative specifications and identified through an IV approach addressing non-random assignment issues. The findings suggest that employment targets act as a constraint, pushing firms to grow or face penalties, but this comes with trade-offs in terms of business survival.

Quantitative Analysis

Counterfactual simulations calibrated to the model demonstrate that without employment targets, aggregate employment would decline by about 15% after 10 years, highlighting the policy's significance in labor market dynamics. Dynamic effects drive most of this employment growth, whereas alternative policies like investment subsidies, though less effective short-term, could yield higher permanent employment but at substantial cost (approximately 5% of output).

Conclusion and Contribution

The policy illustrates that while constraints on firms through employment targets can accelerate productivity gains and employment growth, they may also increase market exit rates. The study contributes to industrial policy literature by emphasizing the dynamic effects of such interventions. The policy's unique blending of constraints and incentives offers new insights for managing transitions in post-socialist economies.

Keywords from the Paper

Industrial policy, privatizations, productivity, size-dependent regulations, firm dynamics, empirical identification