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Summary of "Missiles for Asia?"

Core Content

This report analyzes the potential military and strategic implications of deploying conventional land-based theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) in the Pacific region, particularly in response to China's military modernization and the uncertainty surrounding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It evaluates whether the U.S. should pursue this option, weighing its military benefits against the risks to regional stability, arms control, and crisis management.

Main Findings

• INF Treaty Uncertainty: The U.S. Department of State concluded in 2014 that Russia violated the INF Treaty, casting doubt on its future. However, the U.S. has not yet decided to withdraw from the treaty, and the process of reviving it may take years.
• China's Military Modernization: China is rapidly modernizing its military, especially its land-based missile capabilities, which could threaten U.S. forces in the region.
• Potential Benefits of TBMs: TBMs could provide:
  • Negotiating Leverage: To encourage China into new arms-control discussions.
  • New Military Capability: For high-intensity conflict, particularly against advanced adversaries like China.
  • Survivability and Speed: TBMs are fast, hard to intercept, and can be deployed in mobile configurations.
  • Lower Development Risk: Compared to other high-speed strike systems.
  • Large Magazine Capacity: Land-based systems can carry more missiles than submarine or air-based systems.
• Potential Risks of TBM Deployment:
  • Strategic Stability: TBMs could be perceived as a threat, potentially leading to a destabilizing arms race.
  • Regional Access: Hosting TBMs in the Pacific would require new access agreements, which may be difficult to secure.
  • Cost and Deployment Speed: TBMs are more expensive than cruise missiles and may be slow to deploy in fast-evolving crises.
  • Proliferation Concerns: The development of TBMs could lead to their proliferation to other countries, increasing regional tensions.

Key Arguments

1. Why the Pacific?

• The INF Treaty was originally designed for the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance in Europe. In the Pacific, the distinction between "theater" and "strategic" weapons is less clear, as China and India could view TBMs as strategic weapons.
• China's "counterintervention" doctrine and A2/AD capabilities pose a significant threat to U.S. forces in the region, especially in scenarios like a conflict over Taiwan.
• The U.S. has lost some long-range strike capabilities with the elimination of the Pershing II MRBM, and TBMs could help restore this balance.

2. Deploying TBMs in the Pacific

• TBMs could be used to:
  • Impose Costs on China: By targeting air bases, TELs, and other critical infrastructure.
  • Suppress Air Bases: Through precision strikes on runways and aircraft.
  • Conduct Counterforce Attacks: On mobile missile launchers to reduce their effectiveness.
  • Long-Range Sniping: To strike fleeting targets of opportunity.
• These capabilities would require extensive infrastructure, including dispersed launch sites, secure communications, and logistics support.

3. Comparative Analysis with Cruise Missiles

• Cruise missiles like the JASSM-ER are more cost-effective and could also perform counter-air missions.
• However, TBMs may offer greater range and speed, making them more effective in certain scenarios.
• The report emphasizes the need for a detailed operational analysis to determine the relative effectiveness of TBMs versus other strike systems.

Conclusion

The report concludes that while TBMs may offer significant military advantages, especially in countering China's A2/AD capabilities, the U.S. should not yet withdraw from the INF Treaty or commit to deploying TBMs in the Pacific without a thorough analysis of their strategic implications. The U.S. Army is encouraged to begin evaluating the operational value of TBMs in the Pacific, but the decision to field them should be based on a comprehensive understanding of their potential risks to stability and arms control. The U.S. must also consider the broader geopolitical context, including the security dynamics of the region and the possibility of proliferation.