2005年-世界发展银行全球_Applications_of_Negotiation_Theory_to_Water_Issues_47页_427kb

Summary of "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues"

Core Content

This paper reviews the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to water-related issues, focusing on formal models of negotiation. It explores how negotiation theory can be used to analyze and improve the allocation of water resources, particularly in cases involving multiple stakeholders and uncertain supply conditions. The goal is to support policymakers in designing effective "rules of the game" that can lead to fair and efficient outcomes in water management.

Main Views

The paper highlights several key aspects of negotiation theory applied to water issues:

• Noncooperative Bargaining Models: These models are used to understand how agreements are formed in situations where binding contracts are not possible. The process is approximated through an offer and counteroffer mechanism, similar to the Rubinstein (1982) model.
• Strategic and Political Considerations: Water allocation is not only an economic issue but also a strategic and political one. The models take into account power asymmetries, incomplete information, and social feasibility.
• Equity and Efficiency: The paper discusses how negotiation models can address both efficiency and equity in water allocation, particularly when traditional market-based approaches fail to account for non-user values and externalities.
• Uncertainty in Water Supply: Stochastic variations in water supply complicate resource management. The paper examines how groundwater and reservoirs can act as buffers against uncertainty, and how precautionary behavior can emerge in dynamic settings.

Key Information

2.1 Groundwater Management

• Groundwater is an open-access resource with significant externalities.
• Non-cooperative, optimal, and collusive solutions are compared in terms of welfare outcomes.
• The myopic solution leads to suboptimal results due to lack of consideration for future impacts.
• Open-loop solutions yield higher payoffs than the myopic solution but still fail to account for strategic responses.
• Closed-loop solutions incorporate both stock and strategic externalities, leading to the lowest welfare outcomes.
• Trigger strategies can sustain cooperation if players can observe each other’s actions and have a low discount rate.
• The critical discount factor for maintaining trigger strategies is 0.53 (for a discount rate of 0.89).
• Differential games are used to model dynamic resource exploitation and its sustainability.

2.2 Allocation Among Sectors

• Water allocation involves multiple sectors (agriculture, urban, environment) and is often a multi-issue negotiation.
• The Rausser-Simon model is used to simulate multi-player, multi-issue negotiations with a finite time horizon.
• The model assumes unanimity is required for an agreement, and players have access probabilities that reflect their political effectiveness.
• The disagreement policy is imposed if no agreement is reached by the terminal time, and it is assumed to be strictly Pareto dominated by a negotiated policy.
• Sub-game perfect equilibrium is characterized by players accepting proposals that yield at least as much utility as the expected continuation payoff or their disagreement payoff.
• Bargaining power is influenced by both political weight and default strength (utility derived from disagreement).
• Within-group heterogeneity and issue space affect the final outcome of negotiations.

3. Negotiation Support System (NSS) Tools

• Negotiation Context Support Systems model the structure of the negotiation process, including group formation and issue linkage.
• Negotiation Process Support Systems focus on the dynamics of the bargaining process, such as the sequence of proposals and the impact of different strategies.
• Despite the potential of NSS, they are not yet widely used in real-life negotiations, indicating a gap in practical application.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that while noncooperative bargaining models provide valuable insights into water allocation, they are not yet fully integrated into real-world policy-making. The key challenges include the complexity of multi-party negotiations, the role of uncertainty, and the need for socially and politically acceptable compromises. The study emphasizes the importance of developing more robust and realistic models that can guide the design of water policies and support the negotiation process.

Gaps in the Literature

• There is limited application of formal negotiation theory to water issues.
• The role of incomplete information and sub-coalitions is not well addressed in existing models.
• Negotiation Support Systems remain underdeveloped in practical use.
• The strategic behavior of players and the feasibility of compromises require further exploration.

References

• Booker, J. and Young, J. (1994)
• Dixon, J. (1999)
• Provencher, M. and Burt, G. (1993, 1994)
• Rausser, G. and Simon, L. (1992)
• Thoyer, S. et al. (2001)
• Simon, L. et al. (2003)
• Tsur, Y. (1990, 1991)
• Tsur, Y. and Zemel, E. (1995)
• Zeitouni, A. (2004)

The paper is part of a broader study on "Stable arrangements for allocation of water among competing uses under stochastic supply conditions", funded by DECRG.