2007年-世界发展银行全球_Decentralization_and_Local_Governance_in_MENA___A_Survey_of_Policies_Institutions_and_Practices_65页_833kb

Summary of Report No. 36516-MNA: Decentralization and Local Governance in MENA

Core Content

This report provides an in-depth analysis of decentralization and local governance in eight Middle East and North Africa (MNA) countries: Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. It examines the legal, institutional, and fiscal frameworks that govern local governments and evaluates their capacity to deliver public services effectively.

Main Findings

1. Decentralization Patterns

• MNA countries are aware of and, in some respects, responsive to the global trend of decentralization.
• Political/electoral measures have been the most significant steps taken, with all surveyed countries having held local elections in the recent past.
• Decentralization in MNA is more about deconcentration than outright devolution of power, with central governments retaining significant control.
• Jordan and Morocco have made notable progress, with Jordan revising its municipal law to include provisions for women’s representation and Morocco implementing a more decentralized municipal structure through its 2002 Communal Charter.

2. Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

• Most MNA countries have outdated and complex legal frameworks that hinder effective local governance.
• Legal ambiguity and overlapping regulations often lead to confusion and inefficiency in local service delivery.
• Legal reforms are needed to align the current frameworks with modern governance practices and to ensure clarity and consistency in responsibilities.

3. Power Sharing Structures

• Hybrid electoral/administrative structures exist, with some countries having elected councils and appointed executives, while others have both elected and central government representatives.
• Central governments can suspend or dissolve local governments, as seen in Iran and Jordan.
• The intermediate tier of government (e.g., governorates, provinces) is largely deconcentrated and controlled by appointed officials.

4. Fiscal Relations

• Local government expenditure constitutes a small share of total public expenditures, indicating high fiscal centralization.
• Local governments in most MNA countries have limited authority over expenditure, often relying on central government decisions.
• Investment expenditures are very low, with Egypt at the higher end (around $12 per capita) and Jordan at the lower end (around $6 per capita).
• Local governments lack own-source revenues, and taxation and spending are often disconnected.

5. Revenue Assignment and Collection

• LGs have few independent revenue sources and are heavily reliant on central government-defined taxes and fees.
• Collection of key taxes like property tax is often managed by central ministries, leading to inefficiencies and lack of accountability.
• Central governments impose collection fees without effective incentives for efficient revenue collection.

6. Budgeting Capacities

• Local government budgeting systems are not effective in most MNA countries.
• Budgets are typically annual by-products of central or regional budgets and do not reflect local priorities.
• There is limited local ownership and use of budgets as management tools.

7. Borrowing and Financial Autonomy

• Sub-national borrowing is legally possible but subject to central government oversight.
• Local governments in Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia are active borrowers, but the systems are not well-regulated.
• In other countries, borrowing is limited due to administrative constraints and low creditworthiness.

8. Intergovernmental Transfers

• Intergovernmental transfers are common but often lack transparency and predictability.
• Transfer pools are frequently dependent on volatile sources like oil and customs revenues.
• These transfers are not rule-based and are subject to political influences, creating perverse incentives and soft budget constraints.

9. Governance and Accountability

• Public accountability is weak in MNA-8 countries compared to other regions.
• Governance indices are higher in countries with more local government involvement (e.g., Morocco, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza).
• Central government oversight and regulatory capacity need strengthening to ensure accountability at the local level.

10. Incentive Structures

• Central government control over local employment decisions weakens performance incentives.
• Civil service appointments are often based on personal connections rather than merit, leading to poor performance and promotion correlation.

11. Public Disclosure and Transparency

• Information disclosure and public access to local government data remain limited.
• Citizens lack awareness of local government performance, undermining their ability to exercise accountability during elections.

12. Opportunities for Autonomy

• There is potential for increasing local government autonomy, which could improve service delivery and reduce central budget burdens.
• Examples include effective local governance in Iran, Egypt, and the West Bank and Gaza, despite limited legal frameworks.

Key Recommendations

• Legal Reforms: Update outdated legal and regulatory frameworks to clarify responsibilities and enable effective governance.
• Fiscal Decentralization: Increase local government expenditure and revenue authority to align with political representation.
• Budgeting Systems: Develop effective, transparent, and locally owned budgeting systems that reflect local priorities and are based on forecasting and mid-term planning.
• Strengthen Oversight: Enhance central government oversight and regulatory capacity to ensure accountability and performance.
• Improve Revenue Systems: Encourage local governments to develop own-source revenues and ensure efficient tax collection.
• Promote Transparency: Improve public disclosure of information, particularly budgets, to enhance external accountability.
• Support Local Autonomy: Encourage greater autonomy in decision-making and resource mobilization for local governments.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, there are signs of progress in decentralization and local governance in the MNA region. The report emphasizes the need for a more balanced approach to power sharing and fiscal systems that allow local governments to respond effectively to the needs of their communities. A consultative and participatory approach is necessary to ensure sustainable and equitable reform.