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CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE: POLICY OUTLOOK SUMMARY

Core Content

This document is a policy outlook from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, authored by Jessica T. Mathews, analyzing the failure of the U.S. military surge in Iraq. It provides a critical assessment of the political and economic situation in Iraq, emphasizing that the surge was not a success in achieving its stated political objectives.

Main Points

1. Failure of the U.S. Military Surge

• The U.S. military surge, launched in January 2007, has failed to achieve its political goals.
• President Bush acknowledges the lack of political progress but seeks more time, focusing on fears of withdrawal consequences rather than positive reasons to continue.
• The surge was intended to create a secure environment that would allow the Iraqi government to make political and economic progress, but this has not materialized.

2. Political Regression in Iraq

• Moderate Sunnis have left the government, and Shia unity has broken down.
• Kurds and Shia are less willing to share power with Sunnis, leading to further fragmentation.
• Seventeen of 38 cabinet ministers have resigned, indicating a deepening political crisis.

3. Military Strategy and Its Limitations

• The surge was initially framed as a means to enable political reconciliation, not just to reduce violence.
• However, the political regression has made this linkage obsolete.
• Admiral Michael Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, emphasizes that security alone cannot solve the political and economic issues in Iraq.

4. Economic and Social Crisis

• Unemployment in Iraq is estimated at about 60%, severely undermining the economic base of the government.
• The situation in Basra, once a relatively peaceful city, has deteriorated into lawlessness and violence due to warring Shia militia and fundamentalist clerics.
• The International Crisis Group warns that Basra's fate could be Iraq's, describing the country as a "failed state" with collapsed institutions and national cohesion.

5. Root Causes of Political Disintegration

• The political disintegration stems from the unwillingness of minority Sunnis to accept a diminished political status.
• This resistance has persisted for four years and is unlikely to change without exhausting conflict.
• The violence has created a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons, with over 4 million Iraqis affected.

6. The Nature of the Conflict

• The conflict in Iraq is not a war that the U.S. can win or lose, but an inevitable struggle for power in a political vacuum created by Saddam's overthrow.
• Al Qaeda in Iraq exploits the chaos, but this is a sideshow to the larger political struggle.

7. U.S. Strategy and Its Implications

• The U.S. strategy since 2004 to impose a power-sharing plan has failed.
• The choice is not to continue the military effort without a clear end or to withdraw immediately, but to consider alternative strategies with slim chances of success.
• Continuing the same strategy without change is futile and risks asking American troops to fight for a government that is already in decline.

Key Information

• Author: Jessica T. Mathews, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
• Date: 2007.
• Organization: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization founded in 1910.
• Document Purpose: To analyze the failure of the U.S. military surge in Iraq and the broader implications for U.S. strategic interests.

Conclusion

The document concludes that the U.S. should not continue the same strategy without change, as it is unlikely to yield positive results. Instead, it advocates for a more nuanced understanding of the conflict and the need for a fresh, comprehensive approach to address the political and economic challenges in Iraq.