欧洲央行-企业所有权与激励性泄漏的宏观经济学（英）-2025_74页_2mb

Summary

This paper investigates the role of institutional structures in mitigating market power distortions in a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition. The core concept is "incentive leakage," defined as the unproductive transfer of monopoly profits as lump-sum payments, which reduces efficiency by discouraging factor provision. To address this, the paper proposes zero-leakage institutional arrangements, specifically entrepreneurial shareholder (ES) and entrepreneurial worker (EW) firms, where entire firm revenue is allocated to tied-factor providers proportionally to their contribution.

The analysis shows that these structures eliminate incentive leakage by fostering within-firm competition for tied factors, leading to oversupply and higher output, which generates positive aggregate demand externalities. Under a Cobb-Douglas technology, ES firms exhibit stronger capital accumulation incentives, closing both the monopoly gap (relative to RBC-MC) and part of the patience gap (relative to perfect competition RBC), thereby outperforming both in steady-state welfare. EW firms close part of the monopoly gap but not the patience gap. Both structures leverage monopoly profits to enhance incentives, improving long-run welfare by harnessing market power.

The paper highlights the contrast between managerial and decentralized organizational outcomes and suggests that policies targeting firm structure—such as tax incentives for profit-linked factor incentives—could yield superior long-run welfare effects compared to traditional competition policies limiting monopoly.

This work provides a foundational analysis of zero-leakage firms, demonstrating their potential to enhance aggregate welfare while offering avenues for further exploration under heterogeneous agents and factor market frictions.