1999年-世界发展银行全球_Rail_and_Subway_Concessions_in_Rio_de_Janeiro_8页_583kb

Rio de Janeiro Rail and Subway Concessions Summary

Core Content

The document outlines the process and outcomes of the rail and subway concessions in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region, focusing on the Metro and Flumitrens systems. The reforms were initiated in 1995 to address a budgetary crisis by selling or concessioning loss-making state-owned enterprises to the private sector. The transport sector, which required annual subsidies of US$363 million, was a key target, with the Metro and Flumitrens accounting for 80% of these subsidies.

The goal of the concessions was to improve service quality, reduce the need for subsidies, and address maintenance and investment backlogs. The state used international examples, such as the Santiago subway and Buenos Aires suburban rail, as models for designing the contracts and bidding processes.

Main Points and Key Information

Concessions Overview

• Metro: Concessed in December 1997 to a consortium led by an Argentine company and a local investment bank.
• Flumitrens: Concessed in July 1998 to a Spanish-Brazilian consortium.
• Concession Terms:
  • Metro: 20-year term, renewable for another 20 years.
  • Flumitrens: 25-year term, renewable for another 25 years.
• Investment Funding:
  • Metro's investment of US$620 million was funded by a loan from Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDES).
  • Flumitrens's investment of US$373 million was to be financed by the World Bank, though the loan had not yet been signed at the time of the concession.

Concession Design Strategy

• The state initially aimed to follow the Argentine model, where concessionaires execute investment plans and receive declining subsidies.
• However, the Metro was structured as a positive concession (no operating subsidies) due to:
  • The state funding all investment.
  • The concessionaire taking over existing extensions and additional rolling stock.
  • Staff rationalization expected to be more aggressive than projected.
  • Tariff increases aligned with inflation.
• For Flumitrens, the state opted for a positive concession despite projections of an operating subsidy for 3–4 years, due to political pressure and the desire to avoid negative concessions.

Bidding Process

• Both concessions followed a two-step bidding process:
  1. Prequalification: Assessing bidders’ experience.
  2. Cost Proposal Evaluation: Based on net present value (NPV) of the offer.
• The Metro bidding process was completed without delays, while the Flumitrens process faced delays due to political timing and poor preparation.
• The state used the Rio stock exchange for bid presentation and evaluation, which increased transparency and was respected locally, though not in line with World Bank guidelines.

Results

• Metro:
  • The winning bid was 10 times the minimum price.
  • No official protests, but some from runners-up.
  • No strikes or inventory destruction.
  • No operating subsidies, but the concessionaire had to pay the agreed price.
• Flumitrens:
  • The winning bid was 6 times the minimum price.
  • The concessionaire had an out-of-pocket cost of only the minimum price and materials in inventory.
  • The rest of the bid involved rehabilitating the fleet and civil works, with no direct payment to the state.
  • The concessionaire would deliver rehabilitated trains and completed civil works.

Lessons Learned

• Political Commitment: The state's political will was crucial in achieving a positive concession without subsidies.
• Transparency: Using the Rio stock exchange increased public trust and transparency.
• Anti-Cartel Measures: Delays in the bidding process helped prevent cartels.
• Regulatory Coordination: The state must ensure modal integration between different transport services, including subway, rail, ferry, and bus.
• Severance Payments: The state failed to adequately address the issue of redundant staff, leaving nearly 3,000 employees without support at a monthly cost of US$6.3 million.
• Performance Monitoring: Strict enforcement of performance targets is essential to ensure service quality and avoid failure in concessions.

Challenges and Next Steps

• Severance Payments: The state must either reallocate redundant staff or find additional funding.
• Modal Integration: A multimodal ticketing system (e.g., smart card) and revenue sharing agreements are needed to integrate services.
• Regulatory Coordination: The state must bring intercity buses under the same regulatory framework as rail services to prevent unfair competition.
• Tariff Adjustments: The state allows tariff increases for improvements like air conditioning, which incentivizes better service.

Conclusion

The Rio de Janeiro rail and subway concessions were successful in attracting private investment and improving service quality without requiring significant operating subsidies. The state's approach emphasized transparency, political commitment, and careful design of the concession model. However, challenges remain in staff redundancy management, regulatory coordination, and ensuring consistent performance across all transport modes.