战略与国际研究中心-Fact-Sheet-on-the-Iraqi-Elections_4页_341kb

Summary of Iraqi Elections (2005)

Core Content

Iraqi elections for a 275-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and provincial elections were scheduled for January 30, 2005, with the Kurdish region also holding regional elections on the same day. Despite security concerns and calls for delay from various groups, the elections proceeded as planned under the leadership of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).

Main Points

Election Schedule and Organization

• The TNA elections were originally planned to have 30,000 polling stations, but this number was reduced to 5,000 due to security concerns.
• Voter registration began on November 1, 2004, and was tied to the Food Distribution Program.
• Eligible voters are estimated at 14 million, with up to 1 million additional voters overseas.
• Expatriate registration was initially scheduled for January 17–23, but was extended to January 25 due to low turnout.

Security Concerns

• Security issues were a major concern, with several insurgent attacks reported, including the assassination of key officials and bombings of political party offices.
• The IEC moved to the International (formerly Green) Zone, making it difficult for candidates to access information.
• To mitigate risks, the government implemented strict security measures, such as:
  • Banning private vehicles and travel between cities.
  • Imposing a curfew.
  • Closing airports and borders.
  • Shutting down telephone networks to disrupt insurgent communication.

Independent Electoral Commission

• The IEC was established by the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division and consists of seven members (one resigned).
• Responsibilities include:
  • Setting up polling places and infrastructure.
  • Hiring and training 150,000 poll workers.
  • Drawing up political party rules.
  • Conducting voter education.
• The UN has deployed 30 election experts in Iraq, with the rest stationed in Amman, Jordan.

Candidate Eligibility

• Candidates must have a secondary school diploma or equivalent.
• Must have a "good reputation" and not be convicted of moral turpitude.
• Cannot have been a member of Saddam Hussein's secret police, persecuted citizens, or illegally enriched the state.
• Candidates who were former Baathists must renounce membership.
• 500 signatures from eligible voters are required for candidacy, and the IEC must certify them.

Political Coalitions

• Political parties formed alliances to strengthen their positions.
• The United Iraqi Alliance (228 candidates), led by SCIRI and Shiite Dawa Party, includes Ahmed Chalabi.
• The Independent National Elites and Cadres (180 candidates) is led by Fateh al-Sheik, an ally of Muqtada al-Sadr.
• Muqtada al-Sadr remains independent but has ties to the Independent National Elites and Cadres.
• Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi leads the Iraqi National Accord with a 240-candidate list.
• Interim President Ghazi al-Yawer leads a Sunni secular party with 80 candidates.
• The Kurdistan Alliance includes the KDP and PUK, along with six smaller Kurdish groups.

Sunni Boycott

• Sunni political organizations boycotted the elections, citing low voter turnout and security concerns.
• The Iraqi Islamic Party withdrew from the election on December 27, 2004.
• Same-day registration was allowed in Anbar and Mosul, but not in other provinces.
• The boycott is expected to lead to low turnout in Sunni areas, potentially underrepresenting them in the TNA.

Muqtada al-Sadr

• Sadr participated in the elections only if they were fair and under UN supervision.
• He is not officially part of any alliance but has strong ties to the Independent National Elites and Cadres.
• His influence is strongest in urban slums and among young, poor Shiites.
• He may exert influence in the TNA if the election is perceived as a success.

Iran's Influence

• There were claims that Iran was influencing the election through funding Shiite groups.
• However, most Shiite parties do not want to appear controlled by Iran.
• Sunnis may be using Iran as a scapegoat for their concerns about the election's fairness.

Long-Term Implications

• The TNA is expected to be dominated by Shiites, which may affect the selection of the prime minister and constitution drafting.
• Sunnis may be excluded from the TNA, leading to concerns about their representation in the permanent constitution.
• Some Sunni leaders may engage in the political process post-election to ensure a meaningful role in future governance.

Key Information

• Election Date: January 30, 2005
• Number of Seats: 275
• Voter Registration: Tied to the Food Distribution Program
• Security Measures: US troop increase, border closures, vehicle bans
• IEC Structure: 7 members (1 resigned), UN-led
• Candidate Requirements: Education, good reputation, no criminal past
• Political Coalitions: United Iraqi Alliance, Independent National Elites and Cadres, Iraqi National Accord, Kurdistan Alliance
• Sunnis' Role: Boycott expected, low turnout, possible exclusion from TNA
• Muqtada al-Sadr: Independent but influential, tied to Shiite groups
• Iran's Role: Suspected influence, but not widely accepted by Shiite parties
• Constitution: To be drafted by TNA and ratified by referendum by October 15, 2005

Conclusion

The January 30, 2005 elections marked a significant step in Iraq's post-war political transition. Despite security challenges and a Sunni boycott, the elections proceeded with the aim of establishing a transitional government and laying the groundwork for a permanent constitution. The dominance of Shiite parties in the TNA raises concerns about representation and political stability, particularly in the Sunni-majority areas. The outcome of these elections will have lasting implications for Iraqi politics and national reconciliation.