2015年-世界发展银行全球_Raising_and_Sharing_Revenues_from_Natural_Resources___A_Review_of_Country_Practices_43页_1mb

Summary of "Raising and Sharing Revenues from Natural Resources: A Review of Country Practices"

Core Content

This discussion paper explores the international practices of raising and sharing natural resource revenues (NRR) among different levels of government, focusing on the implications for conflict, governance, and public welfare. It emphasizes the role of intergovernmental sharing and the use of fiscal instruments in the management of NRR and examines how these practices can be adapted to different institutional contexts.

Main Viewpoints

• Natural resources bring both opportunities and challenges. They are often linked to negative outcomes such as economic decline, corruption, and conflict, especially when concentrated in specific regions.
• Intergovernmental sharing is prevalent. Most countries share NRR with subnational governments in producing areas, as a means of compensating them for the environmental, social, and economic costs of resource extraction.
• Volatility of NRR is a major concern. Central governments are generally better equipped to manage revenue fluctuations, and stabilization funds can help mitigate the risks of volatility for subnational governments.
• Factor mobility can lead to inefficiencies. Subnational governments may attract migration due to higher fiscal benefits, potentially creating imbalances and inefficient spatial distribution of labor.
• Misuse and corruption of NRR are significant risks, especially in small and weakly institutionalized subnational units. However, the presence of multiple stakeholders can increase public scrutiny and transparency.
• Political systems and institutions influence NRR sharing. Recent constitutions in post-democratic countries often favor decentralization, while some countries have seen a trend toward recentralization, especially with rising commodity prices.

Key Information

1. Allocation of NRR Among Levels of Government

• Normative arguments against subnational allocation:

  • Revenue volatility: Central governments are better at managing fluctuations in NRR.
  • Factor mobility: Can lead to inefficient labor distribution and attract migration to resource-rich areas.
  • Misuse and corruption: Especially in small, weakly institutionalized subnational governments, leading to inefficiencies in public spending.

• Practices of intergovernmental sharing:

  • Most countries share NRR with subnational governments, particularly in non-federal systems.
  • Federal systems often share more broadly, with some allocating to all levels of government.
  • Offshore resources are typically centralized, while onshore resources are more likely to be shared with local governments.
  • The Barnett formula in the UK and infrastructure projects in Norway are examples of how subnational governments are compensated.
  • Some countries, like Indonesia, Bolivia, and Colombia, share NRR with non-producing areas as well.

2. Instruments for Extraction of NRR

• Legal regimes:

  • Most countries use concession regimes for oil and gas exploration and production.
  • Some, like Bolivia, use national oil company (NOC) contracts with national oil companies (NIOCs).

• Fiscal instruments:

  • Include export taxes, corporation income tax, royalties, and signature bonuses.
  • These instruments are usually under central government control, which influences the allocation of NRR to subnational units.

• Recentralization trends:

  • Some countries have moved toward centralizing NRR, particularly with rising international prices.
  • This trend is observed in countries like Bolivia, Brazil, and Canada, where new fiscal instruments are introduced rather than increasing tax rates.

3. Direct Transfers to Individuals

• Direct transfers are an alternative to intergovernmental sharing and can improve public welfare.
• They may enhance public scrutiny of NRR use and reduce the risk of conflict by distributing benefits more widely.
• However, they are less common and often used as a complement to intergovernmental allocation rather than a substitute.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that while intergovernmental sharing is the most common practice, it must be carefully designed to account for revenue volatility, administrative capacity, and the risk of corruption. The allocation of NRR to subnational governments can help reduce inequalities and mitigate conflict, but it requires robust legal and fiscal frameworks. In countries with weak institutions, the risk of misuse is higher, and alternative mechanisms like stabilization funds and direct transfers may offer more transparent and accountable ways of distributing NRR. Ultimately, the paper argues that the design of revenue-sharing mechanisms must be context-sensitive and informed by both theoretical and empirical evidence.

Table Summary (Table 1)

Implications for Policy

• The paper suggests that the allocation of NRR to subnational governments is an effective way to reduce local grievances and conflict.
• Stabilization funds and fiscal instruments can help manage the risks associated with NRR volatility.
• Direct transfers may offer an alternative to intergovernmental sharing, especially in countries with weak institutions.
• Legal frameworks must be robust and transparent to ensure equitable and efficient allocation of NRR.
• Recentralization can be a viable option in some contexts, particularly when commodity prices are high, but it should not come at the expense of subnational equity and transparency.