2012年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Israel_Detailed_Assessment_of_Observance_of_Basel_Core_Principles_for_Effective_Banking_Supervision_107页_1mb
报告摘要
Summary of Israel's Observance of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
Core Content Overview
This report provides a detailed assessment of Israel's observance of the Basel Core Principles (BCPs) for effective banking supervision as of March 2012. The assessment was conducted as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Update mission to Israel, which took place in November 2011. The report highlights the current state of Israel's banking sector, its regulatory and supervisory framework, and areas for improvement.
Key Findings
Institutional and Macro-Prudential Setting
- The main financial institutions in Israel are banks and insurance companies.
- The non-bank financial sector has grown significantly due to the Bachar reform, which forced banks to divest non-commercial activities.
- Banks remain central to the financial system, with assets amounting to approximately 140% of GDP.
- The banking and insurance sectors are highly concentrated.
- Financial supervision is shared among several agencies, including the Bank of Israel (BOI), Israel Securities Authority (ISA), and the Commissioner of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Savings (CCMIS).
Compliance with Basel Core Principles
| Core Principle | Grading | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Objectives, independence, powers, transparency, and cooperation | Compliant | A comprehensive legal framework exists, but some provisions need more flexibility. |
| 1.1 Responsibilities and objectives | Largely Compliant | Banking laws have not been updated as quickly as needed. |
| 1.2 Independence, accountability and transparency | Largely Compliant | BOI has de jure and de facto independence, but MOF's influence on salary scales raises concerns. |
| 1.3 Legal framework | Compliant | The Banking Ordinance, 1941, and related laws provide a satisfactory legal framework. |
| 1.4 Legal powers | Compliant | The Supervisor of Banks has sufficient legal powers to enforce compliance. |
| 1.5 Legal protection | Compliant | Adequate legal protections exist for supervisors. |
| 1.6 Cooperation | Compliant | A framework for cooperation and information exchange exists with other regulators and foreign supervisors. |
| 2. Permissible activities | Largely Compliant | The legal framework is clear, but requires broad interpretation to accommodate new products. |
| 3. Licensing criteria | Compliant | Legal, policy, and procedural frameworks are in place for evaluating bank license applications. |
| 4. Transfer of significant ownership | Compliant | Ownership transfer is well defined, but controlling interests are defined in policy rather than law. |
| 5. Major acquisitions | Largely Compliant | The law is restrictive in allowing banks to acquire non-bank financial companies. |
| 6. Capital adequacy | Largely Compliant | Based on international standards for credit, market, and operational risk. |
| 7. Risk management process | Compliant | The regulatory framework is comprehensive, though dense and complex. |
| 8. Credit risk | Compliant | Credit risk is closely monitored, but there is room for more comprehensive regulation. |
| 9. Problem assets, provisions, and reserves | Compliant | Detailed directives and supervisory guidance ensure close scrutiny. |
| 10. Risk-weighted assets | Compliant | Banks use a standardized approach to determine risk weights. |
| 11. Interest-rate risk | Largely Compliant | Regulatory attention is growing, but there is a need for more formal frameworks. |
| 12. Market risk | Largely Compliant | Close supervision exists, but more needs to be done in terms of formal frameworks. |
| 13. Liquidity risk | Largely Compliant | The BOI is working on improving liquidity risk management. |
| 14. Supervision of securities-related activities | Largely Compliant | There are gaps in the supervision of certain securities-related activities. |
| 15. Prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing | Materially Noncompliant | The legal framework lacks sufficient provisions for preventing money laundering. |
| 16. Information sharing with foreign supervisors | Materially Noncompliant | There is a lack of formal mechanisms for information sharing with foreign supervisors. |
| 17. Management of bank risks | Compliant | Banks are subject to close scrutiny of their risk management practices. |
| 18. Corporate governance | Compliant | Corporate governance is regulated by the Companies Law and the Securities Law. |
| 19. Methods of ongoing banking supervision | Compliant | A risk-based approach is implemented with a mix of on-site and off-site supervision. |
| 20. Accounting and disclosure | Compliant | Disclosure requirements are strict, and external auditors are used. |
| 21. Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors | Compliant | The BOI has the necessary powers to enforce corrective actions. |
| 22. Consolidated and cross-border supervision | Compliant | A satisfactory program of consolidated supervision exists. |
| 23. Supervision of foreign banks | Compliant | The BOI supervises foreign banks operating in Israel. |
| 24. Information sharing with foreign supervisors | Materially Noncompliant | There is a lack of formal mechanisms for information sharing. |
| 25. Resolution of problem banks | Compliant | The BOI has the necessary powers to resolve problem banks. |
Areas for Improvement
- Regulation and supervision of interest-rate, market, and liquidity risks.
- Supervision of certain securities-related activities.
- Flexibility and autonomy in personnel management and budgets to attract and retain financial sector experts.
- Formal mechanisms for information sharing with foreign supervisors.
- Updating of banking laws to reflect new financial instruments and practices.
Main Recommendations
- Enhance the legal framework to better address money laundering and terrorist financing.
- Develop more formal mechanisms for information sharing with foreign supervisors.
- Update banking laws to improve transparency and responsiveness to new financial products.
- Encourage more comprehensive regulation of credit risk, including the development of internal ratings systems.
- Improve the regulatory framework for the acquisition of non-bank financial institutions.
- Strengthen the independence of the BOI, particularly in relation to salary scales and MOF influence.
- Expand the scope of prudential regulation to include more formal frameworks for interest-rate, market, and liquidity risk management.
- Improve the implementation of Pillar II requirements to ensure more systematic and formalized risk management processes.
Conclusion
Overall, Israel's banking sector regulation and supervision are in line with international standards, with a proactive and stability-oriented approach. The implementation of supervision is generally good, though there are areas where the legal and regulatory framework could be improved to better meet the objectives of the Basel Core Principles. The report recommends further reforms to enhance transparency, independence, and effectiveness of banking supervision in Israel.
试读结束,高清完整版pdf/doc/ppt,请点下载