战略与国际研究中心-Quality-of-Competition-for-Defense-Contracts-under--Better-Buying-Power-_8页_714kb

Summary of "Quality of Competition for Defense Contracts under 'Better Buying Power'"

Core Content

This document analyzes the trends in effective competition within U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) contracting from 2008 to 2013, focusing on the impact of the Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0 and 3.0 initiatives. It highlights the importance of competition in defense procurement as a means to improve efficiency and value for money under constrained budgets. The study uses data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and provides a detailed breakdown of competition rates across DoD components and contract types.

Main Points

• Effective Competition Definition: CSIS defines "effective competition" as contracts that received two or more offers, excluding those with only one offer. This definition is aligned with DoD's own standards.
• Overall Trends: The rate of effective competition in DoD contracting has remained relatively stable between 48% and 50% over the past six years. However, the share of contracts with three or more offers has increased, while those with only two offers have decreased, indicating a potential increase in real competition.
• DoD Component Trends:
  • Army: Effective competition rates have increased significantly, reaching 57% in 2013. This is attributed to a shift towards services contracts, which have higher competition rates.
  • Navy: Effective competition rates have declined from 43% to 34%. The decline is linked to a shift in spending towards products, which are often awarded on a sole-source basis.
  • Air Force: Effective competition rates have declined from 41% to 32% in 2012, with a slight recovery to 35% in 2013. The decline in services competition is broad-based, affecting most categories, including ERS (Equipment-Related Services) and PAMS (Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services).

Key Findings

• Contradiction in Data Interpretation: While some reports claim that competition has declined under BBP, CSIS argues that the decline in single-offer contracts may actually reflect better alignment with market realities, rather than a true reduction in competition.
• Product vs. Service vs. R&D:
  • Products have the lowest effective competition rates due to the limited number of suppliers for major defense platforms.
  • Services have the highest effective competition rates, with the Army and Navy performing better than the Air Force.
  • R&D shows moderate effective competition, with some improvement in the Navy and Air Force in recent years.
• Policy Implications: The study suggests that policymakers should focus on improving competition in services and R&D, while recognizing the challenges in product competition due to market constraints.

Conclusion

Despite the overall stability in effective competition rates, the Air Force has seen a significant decline, particularly in services contracts, which may be due to internal policy or practice changes. The Army and Navy have shown improvement, primarily driven by shifts in procurement priorities. CSIS recommends further investigation into the drivers of competition decline and continued analysis of defense contracting trends.

References

• BBP 2.0 and 3.0 initiatives by Frank Kendall
• Government Accountability Office (GAO) and outside analysts
• CSIS analysis using FPDS data
• DoD's "Performance of the Defense Acquisition System—2014 Annual Report" (2014)

Figures Mentioned

• Figure 1: Overall effective competition rate in DoD contracting (2008–2013)
• Figure 2: Effective competition rates by DoD component
• Figure 3: Effective competition rates by contract area (products, services, R&D)
• Figure 4: Army effective competition by contract area
• Figure 5: Navy effective competition by contract area
• Figure 6: Air Force effective competition by contract area