2004年-世界发展银行全球_New_Tools_for_Studying_Network____________Industry_Reforms_in_Developing_Countries__The____________Telecommunications_and_Electricity_Regulation_Database_46页_346kb

Summary of "New Tools for Studying Network Industry Reforms in Developing Countries: The Telecommunications and Electricity Regulation Database"

Core Content

This working paper by Wallsten et al. (2004) introduces the Telecommunications and Electricity Regulation Database, a comprehensive dataset aimed at improving empirical research on regulatory frameworks in developing countries. The paper highlights the importance of regulatory institutions in shaping the outcomes of infrastructure reforms, particularly in the telecommunications and electricity sectors, which have undergone significant structural changes during the 1990s.

The authors emphasize that while privatization has been the primary focus of reforms in developing and transitional economies (DTEs), regulatory policies and structures are equally crucial in determining the success of these reforms. Regulatory agencies are necessary to protect consumers, attract investors, and promote competition. However, prior research has largely overlooked the complexity of regulation, often treating it as a binary variable (presence or absence of a regulator).

The paper outlines the design of a survey aimed at capturing detailed data on both regulatory governance and regulatory content. The database includes 45 countries for telecommunications and 20 for electricity, with the former having a more extensive dataset due to higher response rates.

Main Points

• Infrastructure Reforms in DTEs:

  • Infrastructure sectors (telecom, electricity, etc.) underwent significant changes in the 1990s, with hundreds of privatization transactions occurring.
  • These reforms included privatization, market liberalization, unbundling, and new regulations.
  • Despite these changes, regulatory frameworks were often underdeveloped or given less attention compared to privatization itself.

• Role of Regulation:

  • Regulation is essential for managing the transition from state control to private operation, especially in sectors that are not natural monopolies.
  • Regulatory agencies must ensure accountability, transparency, and capacity to function effectively.
  • The independence of regulators is a key concern, with many believing it is necessary for effective regulation. However, no regulator is entirely independent, and the degree of independence varies across areas.

• Survey Design and Objectives:

  • The survey was designed to collect detailed, comparable, and consistent data on regulatory governance and content.
  • It includes questions on budget sources, appointment processes, regulatory independence, price regulation, licensing, interconnection, and universal service obligations.
  • The dataset allows for deeper empirical analysis of how regulation interacts with industry performance and economic development.

• Country Selection and Response Rates:

  • The survey targeted all developing countries with regulatory agencies that had contact information.
  • Telecommunications regulators had a higher response rate than electricity ones, reflecting the more advanced nature of reforms in the telecom sector.
  • The final dataset includes 178 variables for telecom and 374 variables for electricity, with the telecom dataset covering 45 countries and the electricity dataset covering 20.

Key Information

Telecommunications Regulation Survey

• Countries Covered: 45 countries (Table 2).
• Data Collected:
  • Regulatory laws and their impact on the sector.
  • Structure and independence of regulatory bodies.
  • Financial and performance data collection.
  • Licensing and market structure.
  • Price regulation methods and frequency.
  • Universal service obligations.
• Response Highlights:
  • Most countries regulate fixed-line, domestic, and international calls.
  • About 40% still regulate mobile prices.
  • Regulatory independence is measured through budget sources, appointment mechanisms, and the ability of executives to influence regulators.

Electricity Regulation Survey

• Countries Covered: 20 countries (Table 3).
• Data Collected:
  • Regulatory frameworks and governance structures.
  • Market structure (e.g., vertical integration, competition at different levels).
  • Licensing and unbundling processes.
  • Price regulation and subsidies.
• Response Highlights:
  • Only about 25% of the sample countries retain fully vertically integrated electricity companies.
  • Slightly more than half allow wholesale competition, but only 15% allow retail competition.
  • The dataset provides a more detailed understanding of electricity regulation than previous studies.

Conclusion

The paper underscores the need for better empirical analysis of regulatory frameworks in developing countries, as these institutions play a critical role in the success of infrastructure reforms. While the data collected may not match the depth of information available in industrialized nations, it represents a significant step forward in understanding the interactions between regulation, industry structure, and economic development in DTEs. The datasets are intended to support future research and policy analysis in the field of network industry reforms.