战略与国际研究中心-The-Great-Iraqi-Missile-Mystery_16页_302kb

Summary of the Great Iraqi Missile Mystery

Core Content

This document analyzes the Iraqi missile program in the context of UN Security Council Resolutions, particularly Resolution 687 (1991) which limited the range of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to 150 kilometers. It highlights the complexity of identifying and verifying Iraqi missile systems, especially due to the use of cover names and the difficulty of distinguishing between different missile types and their capabilities.

Key Missile Programs

Ababil-100

• Type: Free rocket, not a missile.
• Range: Estimated at 130–140 km.
• Warhead: Capable of dispensing 300 antitank bomblets and 25 antitank minelets.
• Deployment: Uncertain; may not have been fully flight-tested or deployed.
• Concealment: Iraq used "Ababil" as a cover name for other programs, including the J-1 and Fahad, which were in violation of the 150 km range limit.
• Status: Not considered a proscribed system by Blix, as it is not among the SRBMs that may violate the range limit.

Al Samoud II

• Type: Liquid-fueled SRBM.
• Range: Tested up to 183 km, exceeding the 150 km limit.
• Diameter: Increased to 760 mm, allowing for more propellant and greater range.
• Status: Clearly in violation of the range limit.
• Payload: Can carry a 300 kg warhead, which can be upgraded with chemical or biological payloads.
• Deployment: At least 50 missiles are believed to be in the field, with a total of around 100 produced.
• Technical Background: Based on the SA-2 surface-to-air missile, modified with Scud technology. It was developed after the Gulf War, and its production was not fully declared to UNSCOM.

Al Fatah

• Type: Solid-fueled SRBM.
• Range: Uncertain, but likely over 150 km.
• Status: Uncertain; requires clarification of data before full assessment.
• Technical Background: Derived from the SA-2 and J-1 programs. May be identical to the Fahad missile, which was destroyed by UNSCOM in 1991.
• Importation: Iraq illegally imported 380 SA-2 engines after Resolution 1441 was passed.

Badr-2000

• Type: Two-stage solid propellant missile.
• Range: Estimated at 750–1,000 km.
• Status: In violation of the UN Security Council resolutions.
• Background: Part of the CONDOR-2 program with Argentina and Egypt. Iraq declared it was destroyed in 1992, but reconstituted casting chambers suggest ongoing development.
• Implication: Indicates Iraq is working on a long-range missile capable of carrying chemical, biological, or nuclear payloads.

Main Points and Analysis

• Cover Names: Iraq used "Ababil" as a cover name for multiple programs, including the J-1 and Fahad, leading to confusion in intelligence and media reports.
• Technical Capabilities: The Al Samoud II and Al Fatah are capable of exceeding the 150 km range limit, which is a key concern for UNMOVIC.
• Concealment and Deception: Iraq has a history of concealing missile development by hiding components, falsifying documentation, and melting hardware after project abandonment.
• Importation of Components: Iraq has imported restricted missile components, including SA-2 engines, despite UN sanctions, indicating continued efforts to develop prohibited systems.
• Potential for Long-Range Missiles: The Badr-2000 program suggests Iraq may be developing missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, which would require advanced payloads for military effectiveness.
• Strategic Importance: Even minor range increases have significant military implications, allowing for greater payload capacity and improved targeting options. This is especially relevant given Iraq's limited airpower and the need for long-range strike capabilities.

Key Information

• UNMOVIC's Role: The agency is tasked with verifying Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions, but faces challenges due to the lack of transparency and the complexity of missile technology.
• CIA and British Intelligence Reports: Both indicate that Iraq has been developing SRBMs beyond the 150 km limit and is working on long-range systems.
• Historical Context: Iraq's missile development predates the Gulf War and has continued in secret despite international scrutiny and sanctions.
• Unverified Claims: Iraq's declarations are often unverified, and the Commission has not found sufficient documentation to confirm compliance with resolution 687.
• Military Significance: The ability to develop longer-range missiles poses a threat to coalition forces and underscores the importance of continued monitoring and verification efforts.

Conclusion

The Iraqi missile program, particularly the Al Samoud II, Al Fatah, and Badr-2000, remains a subject of concern due to its potential to violate the 150 km range limit. The use of cover names, the illegal importation of components, and the lack of transparency have made it difficult for UN inspectors to assess the true scope of Iraq's capabilities. The document emphasizes the need for continued vigilance and technical analysis to determine the extent of Iraq's missile development and ensure compliance with international resolutions.