2022-07-21-IMF-Sudden_Stops_and_Optimal_Policy_in_a_Two-agent_Economy_54页_1mb
报告摘要
Summary
- Introduction
- Provides context on sudden stops and their role in financial crises.
- Highlights a novel contribution: introducing heterogeneity between workers and entrepreneurs in a Fisherian model to study optimal policy in sudden stop episodes.
Model Economy
- Two Agent Types
- Entrepreneurs: Manage production, investment, and borrow against capital; own firms.
- Workers: Supply labor; receive wages.
- Fisherian Deflation Setup
- Occasional binding collateral constraints amplify crises.
- Prices adjust externally, creating pecuniary externalities.
Optimal Policy
- Policy Tools
- Distortionary Borrowing Tax: Address pecuniary externality from collateral.
- Distortionary Payroll Tax: Tackle distributive externality via redistribution.
- Policy Roles
- Ex Ante (Tranquil Times): Borrowing tax disincentivizes credit growth.
- Ex Post (Crisis Times): Payroll tax redirects resources to entrepreneurs to stabilize asset prices.
Key Findings
-
Distributive Externality
- Heterogeneity introduces a redistribution motive absent in representative-agent models.
- Marginal utilities differ, and crisis dynamics amplify the need to support entrepreneurs.
-
Payroll Tax Role
- Useful for redistribution and indirectly stabilizing asset prices.
- Can be positive or negative depending on the redistributive goal.
-
Quantitative Outcomes
- Heterogeneity slightly reduces crisis probability and severity.
- Welfare gains are substantially higher with redistribution tools.
- Labor supply shocks propagate differently, affecting redistribution timing.
Conclusion
-
Policy Implications
- Optimal policy must use both macroprudential borrowing taxes (ex ante) and payroll taxes (ex post).
- Allowing redistribution during crises mitigates Fisherian deflation and improves welfare.
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Key Insight
Even minimal heterogeneity (workers vs. entrepreneurs) enriches policy design, addressing aggregate proxies for agent distribution in more comprehensive models.
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