战略与国际研究中心-Shaping-a-Conditions_13页_460kb

Summary of "Shaping a 'Conditions-Based' Strategy and Plan for Staying in Iraq"

Core Content

This document, authored by Anthony H. Cordesman on April 17, 2008, presents a critical analysis of the U.S. strategy and planning for its involvement in Iraq. It argues that the U.S. has failed to provide a clear, defined, and realistic plan for the future of the Iraq War, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the Afghan War. The author emphasizes the need for a "conditions-based" strategy that is grounded in Iraqi progress and self-sufficiency, rather than vague or undefined commitments.

Main Views

• Lack of a Defined Strategy and Plan: The U.S. administration has not provided a clear path for future involvement in Iraq, leading to increased political polarization and a lack of public and congressional support.
• Moral and Ethical Responsibility: The author asserts that the U.S. bears significant responsibility for the instability and suffering in Iraq, which was exacerbated by the invasion and occupation. He argues that the U.S. should acknowledge its role and be held accountable for its actions.
• Need for Leadership and Realistic Expectations: The U.S. should lead by setting clear conditions for its continued presence, such as fair elections and effective governance, but also allow Iraq to take ownership of its future.
• Iraqi Government's Readiness: The current Iraqi government is seen as weak, uncoordinated, and lacking in legitimacy and competence, making it difficult to implement effective policies or meet U.S. conditions.
• Conditions for U.S. Stay: The U.S. should remain in Iraq only if it sees progress toward political accommodation, security, and governance, and if the Iraqi government is not aligned with Iran. Specific conditions include the conduct of fair and open elections, protection of Kurdish rights, and the reduction of Iranian influence.

Key Information

Conditions for U.S. Presence

• Provincial and Local Elections: Fair and open elections by early 2009, with clear representation.
• National Elections: Legitimate and transparent national elections in 2009, not controlled by current elites.
• Kurdish Autonomy: Protection of Kurdish rights, but not support for independence or expansion beyond Kurdish areas.
• Federalism and Federation: Avoid rushed definitions of Kurdish regions; instead, focus on stable accommodation and fair representation.
• Security and Stability: Reduction of Iranian influence, and stabilization of mixed areas like Baghdad, Ninewa, and Diyala.
• Iraqi Force Development: A clear plan for Iraqi forces to take over security responsibilities, with a gradual reduction of U.S. combat forces.
• US Strategic Overwatch: Transition to a role of strategic overwatch rather than direct combat involvement.

Iraqi Progress and Challenges

• Legislative Progress: Some laws have been passed, including the Amnesty Law, Pensions Amendment, and De-Ba'athification, but implementation remains a challenge.
• Provincial Elections: The law is under review, and the process is slow.
• Hydrocarbons Package: Disagreements remain on the central government's control over oil resources.
• Force Development: Iraqi forces are underdeveloped, with significant shortages in personnel, non-commissioned officers, and equipment.
• Budget and Funding: Iraq must take on more responsibility for its own development and security, but U.S. aid will still be necessary for several years.

U.S. Strategic and Budgetary Planning

• Lack of Public Plans: The Bush Administration has not provided a realistic or public plan for the future of the war, leading to confusion and lack of accountability.
• Unrealistic Timelines: The U.S. has not set clear, achievable timelines for force reduction and Iraqi self-sufficiency.
• Cost Implications: The U.S. presence in Iraq is costly, with estimated annual costs of $25 billion and one-time costs of $4–$8 billion.
• Future U.S. Role: The author suggests that the U.S. should aim to reduce its combat forces to 10–15 brigade equivalents by 2010–2011, with a full transition by 2012.

Conclusion

The document concludes that while the U.S. has a moral obligation to support Iraq, it must do so in a way that prioritizes Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance. The U.S. should not wait for a perfect plan but should instead push for conditions-based strategies that are both realistic and transparent. It also stresses the importance of continued U.S. involvement in shaping Iraq's political, security, and economic future, but only as long as Iraq demonstrates progress and independence.