2018年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_How_to_strengthen_the_European_Semester_29页_1mb

Summary of "How to strengthen the European Semester?"

Core Content

The paper "How to strengthen the European Semester?" by Cinzia Alcidi and Daniel Gros discusses the evolving role and effectiveness of the European Semester in coordinating economic and fiscal policies among EU member states. It highlights the need to shift the focus from top-down economic policy coordination to a model that emphasizes national ownership of reforms, in order to improve the enforcement of EU rules and legitimacy of the process.

Main Views

The European Semester was introduced in 2010 in response to the euro area debt crisis, with the aim of coordinating economic policies and preventing macroeconomic imbalances. It involves the European Commission issuing country-specific recommendations (CSRs) based on the analysis of member states’ budgetary and economic plans.

• Economic policy coordination remains important, especially during crises, due to the potential for cross-country spillovers. However, as the economy stabilizes, the incentives for coordination weaken.
• Structural reforms have become a central theme of the Semester, but their implementation is often inefficient and uneven.
• The multiannual approach to reforms is suggested as a way to better assess progress, especially for long-term reforms that require more than one year to implement.
• The EU budget is not an effective tool to condition reforms, as it is difficult to assign value to reforms and measure their implementation with precision.

Key Information

1. Evolution of the European Semester and CSRs

• The number of CSRs has decreased significantly since 2015, from 253 to 166.
• The focus of CSRs has shifted from fiscal policy to structural reforms, including labor market, social, and innovation policies.
• The multiannual perspective is increasingly emphasized to better evaluate the long-term impact of reforms.

2. Implementation of CSRs

• The implementation rate of CSRs is generally low, with most recommendations showing limited or no progress.
• Fiscal policy CSRs have the highest implementation rate, while pensions and market reforms have the lowest.
• The UK is an exception, showing relatively better implementation, despite not being part of the euro area.

3. National Ownership and Institutions

• National ownership is crucial for the success of the Semester, as it reduces the perception of externally imposed rules.
• National fiscal councils and productivity boards should be involved in the elaboration of CSRs to enhance national ownership.
• These institutions must be perceived as independent to maintain credibility and avoid being seen as politically driven.

4. Challenges and Future Directions

• The Commission's role should remain focused on technical support and coordination during crises, not on enforcing reforms.
• Ex-ante conditionality exists in some EU funding programs, but linking the EU budget to reforms is complex and potentially problematic.
• The future of the Semester may involve a stronger emphasis on multiannual reforms and structural coordination, but the effectiveness of these changes is still uncertain.

Recommendations

• The European Semester should be restructured to promote national ownership and reduce the perception of top-down control.
• National independent institutions should be integrated into the Semester process to improve the quality and implementation of reforms.
• A multiannual assessment of CSRs should be implemented to better reflect the time needed for structural reforms to take effect.
• The Commission should focus on providing support and guidance, rather than imposing conditions or enforcing reforms.

Conclusion

While the European Semester has played a key role in economic governance, its effectiveness in delivering reforms has been limited. The paper calls for a more decentralized and nationally driven approach, supported by independent institutions, to improve the legitimacy and impact of the Semester. It also cautions against placing high expectations on the process, given the low implementation rates and the complexity of reform monitoring.