2009年-IMF国际货币组织全球_IMF_Governance_39页_722kb
报告摘要
IMF Governance Summary
I. Introduction
The IMF governance reform has become a key issue due to growing concerns over the institution's relevance, effectiveness, and legitimacy. These concerns have intensified during the global financial crisis, highlighting the need for more robust structures to ensure accountability and political engagement. The April 2009 IMFC communiqué emphasized the importance of governance reforms beyond quotas, urging the Executive Board to report on the topic and consider broader reforms to enhance the Fund's strategic decision-making process.
This paper does not propose new ideas but synthesizes the analysis and reform proposals from various reports, including those from the Eminent Persons Group (Trevor Manuel), the IEO, and other stakeholders. It focuses on the core governance issues, such as the allocation of responsibilities, the size and composition of the Executive Board, management selection, and voting rules. Quotas, while a critical issue, are addressed separately.
II. Political Engagement and Accountability at the IMFC
Current Structure
The IMFC, though advisory, is seen as having a significant role in setting the Fund's work agenda. However, it lacks decision-making authority and is not a forum for substantive negotiation. As a result, key debates and policy coordination often occur outside the Fund's framework, in bodies like the G-7 and G-20, which have broader membership.
A Ministerial-Level Council
Several reports suggest the activation of a ministerial-level Council, as outlined in Schedule D of the Articles of Agreement. The rationale includes:
- Strategic Decisions: A Council would be responsible for core issues such as early warning, crisis response, multilateral consultations, and the establishment of new facilities.
- Re-configuration: The Council should reflect economic realities and mirror the Executive Board's composition, implying a potential restructuring of the Board.
- Size: A size of around 20 chairs is recommended, which aligns with the number envisaged in the Articles and can be adjusted with an 85% majority vote.
- Legitimacy and Voting: Decisions should involve the full membership, with the possibility of split voting among Councillors to reflect individual member views.
- Participatory Leadership: A troika model of past, current, and future heads is suggested, with regular rotation and transparent selection processes.
Counterpoints
While the Council could enhance legitimacy and accountability, there are concerns about its practicality and potential impact on the Executive Board. Critics argue that the Council might weaken the Board by shifting decision-making authority away from it, especially for smaller members who rely on their resident Executive Directors for representation. However, most reports suggest that a more strategic role for the Board could actually strengthen it.
An alternative is to reform the IMFC itself, enhancing its role and effectiveness without activating the Council. This would involve improving its advisory capacity, increasing its political engagement, and ensuring that it reflects the broader membership.
III. Voice and Action in the Executive Board
Role and Responsibilities
The Executive Board is responsible for conducting the "business of the Fund" and is composed of both appointed and elected Executive Directors. It plays a central role in policy formulation and implementation, as well as in administrative decisions.
Delineation of Responsibilities
The Board and the Managing Director have separate but closely related powers. While the Board has the authority to make policy decisions, the Managing Director handles the operational aspects. The delineation of these roles has evolved through specific decisions and practices, rather than formal interpretations.
Size and Composition
- Size: The Executive Board currently has 24 members, up from its original 12. There is no consensus on the optimal size, with some arguing that a reduction to 20 chairs would improve effectiveness.
- Composition: The five largest shareholders appoint their own Executive Directors, which is a major constraint on the composition. This has led to concerns about over-representation of certain regions, particularly Europe, which currently holds 8 chairs compared to 2-5 for other regions.
- Emerging and Developing Countries: While they hold a fair share of seats, the heavy workload of some Executive Directors limits their ability to effectively represent their constituencies. Civil society advocates for a more even distribution of representation.
IV. Voting Majorities
- Special Majorities: The current 85% threshold for special majorities is seen as a barrier to effective decision-making. Proposals include reducing this threshold to enhance inclusivity and responsiveness.
- Double Majority Voting: Some reports suggest adopting double majority voting to ensure broader consensus and legitimacy in key decisions.
V. Management Selection and Staff Hiring
- Open System: There is a demand for an open system in selecting the Managing Director, without regard to nationality.
- Staff Diversity: Enhancing diversity among staff is seen as essential for reflecting the Fund's global mandate and improving its institutional culture.
VI. Fund Mandate
- Shift from Exchange Rate Focus: The Fund's mandate should broaden from a focus on exchange rate policies to include a wider range of financial and economic issues.
- Jurisdiction over Capital Flows: Establishing the Fund's jurisdiction over capital flows is proposed to enhance its role in global financial governance.
- Mandate and Culture: A broader mandate would allow for more diverse approaches and improve the Fund's legitimacy and effectiveness.
VII. Next Steps
- The staff will prepare a more pointed paper for discussion in September, based on the Board's views and specific recommendations.
- A separate supplement from civil society will be issued to provide unfiltered access to their concerns regarding accountability, transparency, and feedback mechanisms.
- The reform of quotas and voting power is on a separate track, but governance reforms should be considered as a package to ensure coherence and effectiveness.
Key Reforms and Proposals
| Key Governance Reforms | Proposed by Reports |
|---|---|
| Activation of a Ministerial-Level Council | Manuel, IEO, G20 |
| Reform of the IMFC | Manuel, IEO |
| Smaller Executive Board | Manuel, IEO |
| Double Majority Voting | Manuel, IEO |
| Reduction of Special Majority Threshold | Manuel, IEO |
| Open Management Selection | Manuel, IEO, Civil Society |
| Staff Diversity | Manuel, IEO, Civil Society |
| Broader Mandate | Manuel, IEO, UN/Stiglitz |
Measures Needed to Implement Reform Proposals
| Reform Area | Required Actions |
|---|---|
| Council Activation | Formal amendment to the Articles of Agreement |
| IMFC Reform | Enhanced advisory role and more political engagement |
| Board Size Reduction | Agreement by the Board of Governors on a new size |
| Voting Rule Changes | Adoption of double majority voting and lower threshold |
| Open Management Selection | Transparent and inclusive selection process |
| Staff Diversity | Improved recruitment and representation policies |
| Mandate Expansion | Legal and institutional changes to include broader financial issues |
Conclusion
The paper outlines the core governance challenges facing the IMF and proposes various reform options, including the activation of a ministerial-level Council, reform of the IMFC, and changes to the Executive Board's size and composition. These reforms aim to enhance political engagement, accountability, and effectiveness, while addressing concerns over representation and institutional culture. The implementation of these reforms will require careful consideration of the trade-offs and the need for a coordinated approach.
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