斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-The-Non_142页_8mb

Summary of "The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Political and Technological Prospects and Dangers in 1990"

Core Content

The document provides an analysis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1990, focusing on its political and technological challenges and the prospects for its future. It is a SIPRI research report, highlighting the importance of the NPT in maintaining international security and the risks of its erosion.

Main Points

1. Importance of the NPT

• The NPT is the most widely adhered arms control agreement.
• It was established in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
• By 1990, the NPT had 141 parties, with three nuclear weapon states (USA, USSR, UK) acting as depositary governments and France and China not formally joining but adhering to non-proliferation goals.
• The Fourth Review Conference in 1990 will influence the 1995 Extension Conference, which will decide whether to extend the treaty indefinitely or for a set period.

2. Status of the NPT

• Spain, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea joined the NPT in the late 1980s.
• Spain's accession was significant as it closed a gap in the OECD non-nuclear states and strengthened its position in Latin America.
• Saudi Arabia's accession helped close a gap in the Arab world and bolstered the NPT's standing in the developing world.
• North Korea joined in 1985, but has not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, raising concerns about its nuclear activities.

3. Role of the IAEA

• The IAEA is the institutional backbone of the NPT.
• It employs four verification methods: materials accountancy, containment, surveillance, and on-site inspection.
• The IAEA's budget has been held at zero growth for seven years, which may compromise the effectiveness of its safeguards.
• The IAEA faces political challenges, including regional conflicts and pressure from the US over Israel's nuclear status.
• South Africa's potential suspension from the NPT could severely impact the Agency's universality and the NPT's credibility.

4. Threshold Countries

South Asia

• India and Pakistan are developing nuclear capabilities.
• India has produced 200–300 kg of plutonium outside international safeguards and is working on uranium enrichment and tritium production.
• India has an advanced missile programme and has tested the Agni IRBM, which could lead to intercontinental missile development.
• India's military spending and nuclear-capable aircraft suggest a militarized nuclear posture.
• Pakistan has a centrifuge plant capable of producing HEU and is also working on tritium extraction.
• Pakistan's missile capabilities and nuclear-capable aircraft indicate a growing nuclear threat.
• Despite mutual understanding between India and Pakistan, tensions persist, especially in Kashmir, and bilateral inspections have not been accepted by India.

Middle East

• Israel's nuclear capability has been revealed by Mordechai Vanunu, challenging the previous smoke-screen.
• Israel's ballistic missile progress and advanced military aircraft from the US increase its nuclear threat.
• Arab states are now more aware of Israel's capabilities and are considering reconsidering NPT membership.
• The blurring of conventional and nuclear weapons raises pre-emption risks.
• The US's continued support for Israel undermines Arab efforts for non-proliferation.

5. South America

• Argentina and Brazil have improved their nuclear cooperation and confidence-building measures.
• Both countries have ballistic missile programmes and are interested in nuclear-powered submarines.
• Despite old reservations, the political stability and scientific collaboration have improved the non-proliferation environment.
• Accession to the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty remains unlikely due to legal and political concerns.

Key Information

• The NPT regime is in precarious stability.
• The IAEA is crucial for verifying compliance, but its budget constraints and political pressures threaten its effectiveness.
• Threshold countries like India, Pakistan, and Israel are increasing their nuclear capabilities, which could lead to regional arms races.
• South Africa is at risk of NPT suspension due to its HEU stockpile and unsafeguarded facilities.
• Regional conflicts and geopolitical tensions are key drivers of proliferation.
• The 1990 Review Conference is a decisive moment for the future of the NPT and international security.

Conclusion

The NPT's survival into the next millennium depends on consensus among members, improvements in safeguards, and addressing regional proliferation concerns. The lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and the growing capabilities of threshold states pose serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime. The political and technological landscape in 1990 indicates that while some regions are improving, others are deteriorating, and the international community must act decisively to preserve the NPT.