战略与国际研究中心-Preparing-for-a-Deep-Defense-Drawdown_-The-Defense-Drawdown-Working-Group-DDWG-and-the-Cost_17页_567kb

报告摘要

Summary of "Preparing for a Deep Defense Drawdown: The Defense Drawdown Working Group (DDWG) and the 'Cost-Capped' Methodology"

Core Content

The document outlines the formation and activities of the Defense Drawdown Working Group (DDWG), a group of 30 defense and budgeting analysts convened by Clark Murdock and Kim Wincup of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The DDWG was established to address the deep defense drawdown that the Department of Defense (DoD) is expected to face due to the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 and the associated sequester mechanism. The BCA imposed a $1 trillion cap on national security and domestic spending over 10 years, with a sequester of $1.2 trillion over 9 years if a "grand bargain" was not reached. The DoD's budget is projected to drop from $735B (post-9/11 peak) to $510B by 2021, representing a 31% reduction.

The DDWG's main objective is to develop a cost-capped methodology for planning a deep defense drawdown. This approach emphasizes discipline in budgeting, ensuring that the DoD can only spend what it can afford, and prioritizes modernization over maintaining end-strength. The methodology is structured around a supply and demand balance, where the DoD first defines the 2021 Affordable Force Baseline and then explores various strategic options based on different security priorities.

Main Points

Budgetary Constraints: The BCA caps and sequester mechanism are expected to lead to a significant reduction in the DoD budget, with the top line dropping from $735B to $510B over 10 years.
Internal Cost Inflation: The DoD is also facing internal cost inflation, which weakens the purchasing power of the defense dollar and reduces the funds available for modernization.
Cost-Capped Methodology: The methodology is designed to first determine affordability, then build the force from the bottom up, focusing on institutional force, common core capabilities (CCC), and strategic options.
Tradeoffs: A key tradeoff is between end-strength and modernization. To maintain modernization at pre-9/11 levels, the DoD would need to reduce active-duty personnel by 455,000.
Institutional Force: This refers to the portion of the defense budget allocated to supporting institutions (military services, OSD, etc.), typically around 32% of the budget.
Common Core Capabilities (CCC): These are minimum essential capabilities required for the DoD to function in the 2021 security environment. The CCC includes capabilities for counterterrorism, homeland defense, project power in A2/AD environments, and a nuclear deterrent.
Discretionary Capabilities Trade Space: After accounting for institutional costs and CCCs, the remaining budget can be used for tailored capabilities under different strategic options.
Bankable Savings: The document stresses the importance of real, earned savings rather than projected or claimed savings. These savings can be used to buy back capability and should be separately managed through a dedicated cost-reduction office.
Strategic Options: Several strategic options are proposed, including a 2021 Affordable Force Baseline, Asia-Pacific emphasis, Middle East emphasis, Homeland Defense Centric, Kinetic Strike, and Global Pol-Econ-Mil (PEM) Competition.

Key Information

The 2021 Affordable Force Baseline is defined as having 845,000 active-duty personnel and $167B for modernization (in FY2013 constant dollars).
Modernization is prioritized over end-strength, with the belief that the DoD must hollow out from within to meet future security challenges.
The cost-capped approach is sequential and transparent, starting with defining the affordable force, then identifying must-have capabilities, and finally exploring strategic options.
The DDWG has met almost monthly since January 2012 and has provided critical feedback to refine the methodology and strategy options.
The final report is expected to be released in mid-January 2013 and will include recommendations for the DoD to implement the cost-capped approach.

Structure of the Methodology

The methodology is divided into supply and demand components:

Supply Side

Define the Affordable Force Baseline:
- Project the topline over the planning period (BCA cuts).
- Project internal cost inflation.
- Trade end-strength to "buy back" investment dollars for modernization.
Institutional Force:
- Allocate 32% of the budget to supporting institutions.
- This includes 30% of active-duty manpower and 35% of modernization funds.
Common Core Capabilities (CCC):
- Identify the minimum essential capacities for the DoD.
- These include capabilities for counterterrorism, homeland defense, project power, and nuclear deterrence.
- An Innovation Account is suggested to fund military innovation and maintain technological superiority.
Discretionary Capabilities Trade Space:
- After accounting for institutional and CCC costs, the remaining budget is used for tailored capabilities under different strategic options.

Demand Side

Paint a Picture of the 2024 Security Environment:
- Develop a demand-centric view of military capabilities.
- This is a living document that should be regularly updated.
Identify Implications for Defense:
- Convert the demand for military capabilities into metrics used on the supply side.
Identify the Common Core of Capabilities:
- Establish a baseline of must-have capabilities to address future security challenges.

Conclusion

The DDWG's work is essential in helping the DoD navigate the complex tradeoffs between end-strength, modernization, and strategic priorities in an era of austerity. The cost-capped methodology is a disciplined and transparent approach to budgeting, ensuring that the DoD can only spend what it can afford and prioritize capabilities that are essential for the future security environment. The methodology is designed to raise awareness of the internal cost inflation and force a more realistic assessment of the DoD's budgetary constraints.