战略与国际研究中心-Assessing-the-Affordability-of-the-Army-s-Future-Vertical-Lift-Portfolio_37页_2mb

Summary of Assessing the Affordability of the Army's Future Vertical Lift Portfolio

Core Content

The report Assessing the Affordability of the Army's Future Vertical Lift Portfolio by Rhys McCormick, Gregory Sanders, and Andrew P. Hunter evaluates the Army's strategy and financial viability for modernizing its vertical lift capabilities through the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) initiative. FVL is a critical component of the Army's "Big Six" modernization priorities, designed to replace legacy rotorcraft and enhance the force's ability to operate in complex, multi-domain environments.

FVL includes five capability sets, but the report focuses on two main programs: Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) and Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA). These programs are intended to replace the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache, respectively, while also supporting the development of Future Unmanned Aircraft System (FUAS) and the Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA), which serve as enablers for the entire FVL portfolio.

The Army is employing non-traditional acquisition methods, such as the use of Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and the Middle Tier of Acquisition for rapid prototyping, to accelerate the development and fielding of FVL platforms. These methods have allowed the Army to move from concept to prototype in under a year, significantly faster than the traditional acquisition process.

Main Views and Key Information

1. FVL Acquisition Approach

• The Army's FVL initiative is part of a broader modernization strategy aimed at achieving tactical overmatch against near-peer competitors like China and Russia.
• FVL is designed to replace the legacy rotorcraft fleet, which includes the UH-60 Black Hawk, AH-64 Apache, CH-47 Chinook, and UH-72 Lakota.
• FARA (capability set one) is being developed to replace the Apache in the scouting mission, but not as a full replacement. It is intended to fill a capability gap created by the retirement of the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior.
• FLRAA (capability set three) is a more mature design, informed by the Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator (JMR-TD) program, which has been running since 2011.
• The Army plans to down-select to two prototypes for FARA and conduct a final fly-off for production award in FY 2020.
• FLRAA is expected to follow a more traditional acquisition path, with a competitive demonstration and risk reduction phase before final selection.

2. Affordability of FVL

• The report assesses whether the Army can afford to pursue both FARA and FLRAA while maintaining its other modernization priorities.
• CSIS developed a vertical lift modernization tool to evaluate the financial impact of FVL over time, considering changes in platform design and cost scenarios.
• The baseline scenario shows a decline in vertical lift modernization funding from $3.63 billion in FY 2019 to $2.47 billion in FY 2026, with a slight increase in O&S costs as legacy aircraft are replaced.
• If both FARA and FLRAA are procured, the total funding required increases significantly in the short term but stabilizes over time as the legacy fleet is retired and FVL programs mature.
• O&S costs are expected to be the largest portion of FVL life cycle costs, with estimates suggesting they will be more than 40 times greater than R&D costs and more than two times greater than production costs.
• The report warns that operating and support (O&S) costs could rise sharply if not managed effectively, particularly due to the higher O&S costs associated with FLRAA compared to the UH-60 Black Hawk.

3. Cost Risk Management

• The Army must manage cost risk through its prototyping efforts, especially with respect to O&S costs.
• The use of modular open system architecture (MOSA) and unmanned systems like FUAS are intended to reduce long-term costs and improve interoperability and technological insertion.
• O&S cost scenarios suggest that even with a 25% increase in O&S costs, the Army's FVL portfolio remains affordable within historically viable modernization funding levels.
• The report emphasizes the importance of budget predictability and sustainable funding to ensure the long-term viability of FVL programs.

4. Long-Term Implications

• The Army's modernization budget is cyclical, with peaks followed by declines.
• From FY 1951 to FY 2018, the average modernization budget (R&D and procurement) was $35.04 billion in FY 2018 dollars, but it is projected to decline over the next few years, falling below this average by FY 2022.
• The Aviation portfolio accounts for a significant share of modernization funding, with procurement funding making up the majority.
• The report concludes that while the Army can afford FVL programs in the short term, long-term affordability will depend on effective cost management, budget predictability, and sustainable acquisition practices.

Conclusion

The FVL initiative represents a bold step in the Army's modernization strategy, aiming to enhance its vertical lift capabilities and support the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept. While the Army has successfully accelerated the development of FARA and FLRAA using non-traditional acquisition methods, the long-term affordability of these programs remains a concern. The report highlights the importance of managing O&S costs, leveraging modular design, and maintaining budget predictability to ensure the FVL portfolio can be sustained over the next two decades. The findings suggest that with proper oversight and risk management, the Army's FVL program is affordable within historically viable modernization funding levels.