斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-Missile-Defence-and-the-ABM-Treaty_-A-status-report_10页_327kb

Summary of Mission Defence and the ABM Treaty

Core Content

The document provides an in-depth analysis of the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) program and the associated debate over the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. It outlines the rationale, funding, system design, and challenges surrounding the development of a limited NMD system, as well as the international political implications of the U.S. stance on missile defense. The ABM Treaty, which aimed to limit the deployment of national missile defense systems to preserve strategic stability, is under scrutiny due to the U.S. desire to build a more robust defense capability.

Main Points

U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) Consensus

• A growing consensus in the U.S. supports the development of a limited NMD system to protect against attacks from rogue states, such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran.
• The system is intended to intercept a limited number of long-range missiles, possibly armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
• The U.S. government has expressed a desire to continue negotiating reductions in Russian nuclear forces alongside the NMD program.

NMD Funding and Budgets

• From FY 1998 to FY 2001, U.S. funding for NMD increased significantly, reaching $2,034 million in FY 2001.
• The BMDO budget for FY 2001 was $4.8 billion, with $1.85 billion allocated to NMD-related programs.
• The Clinton administration planned a $10.5 billion investment for NMD from FY 2001 to 2005, while the Bush administration aimed for a substantial increase in the FY 2002 budget.

NMD System Architecture

• The proposed system includes a land-based architecture with multiple elements such as interceptors, radars, and satellites.
• The system is designed to intercept missiles during the mid-course phase of flight, using exo-atmospheric kill vehicles (EKVs) and ground-based interceptors (GBIs).
• The system would include 100 GBIs initially, with plans to expand to 250 GBIs across two sites (Alaska and North Dakota) by the end of the Clinton administration.
• The system relies on X-band tracking radars, upgraded early warning radars, and space-based infrared sensors (SBIRS).

System Costs

• The CBO estimated the cost of the Expanded Capability 1 phase to be $29.5 billion through FY 2015, including $20.9 billion in procurement and $8.5 billion in operations.
• The full ground-based system is estimated to cost $48.5 billion, while the SBIRS-Low satellite system alone would add $10.6 billion.
• Total estimated cost of the system is $59.1 billion, excluding the cost of the SBIRS-Low system.

Programme Problems

• The NMD program has faced significant technical and operational challenges, particularly with the development of the ground-based interceptor missile.
• The Integrated Flight Test Programme has had mixed results, with only one successful test out of five, raising doubts about the system's reliability and effectiveness.
• The U.S. government postponed the authorization of NMD deployment in 2000 due to insufficient data on the system's performance and technical capabilities.

Alternative NMD Systems

• There is growing interest in alternative architectures, such as boost-phase intercept systems and multi-layer defense systems.
• The Bush administration advocated for a more robust, multi-layered NMD system that would include air-, sea-, and space-based components.
• These systems are not permitted under the ABM Treaty, which prohibits the development of such systems unless the treaty is amended or replaced.

Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) Programs

• TMD systems are designed to protect U.S. overseas facilities and troops from short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
• The U.S. has several TMD development programs, including the Navy Area Defense (NAD) and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).
• The U.S. has also collaborated with Israel on the Arrow Weapon System (AWS), which is now operational.

International Concerns and ABM Treaty

• The ABM Treaty is seen as a cornerstone of strategic stability, and its potential amendment or replacement has raised concerns among Russia, China, and other states.
• Russia has strongly opposed any changes to the ABM Treaty, viewing it as a threat to the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD).
• The U.S. has attempted to gain Russian cooperation by offering joint exercises and financial support for Russia's early-warning radar system.

U.S. and Russian Positions

• The U.S. has shifted from seeking amendments to the ABM Treaty to advocating for its complete replacement, as stated by President George W. Bush.
• The Bush administration has indicated a willingness to offer incentives, such as purchasing Russian S-300 missiles, to gain Russian support for a new missile defense framework.
• Russia maintains that the ABM Treaty is still valid and that any changes would undermine strategic stability and the balance of power.

Key Information

• The ABM Treaty, signed in 1972, restricts the deployment of national missile defense systems to prevent the erosion of strategic stability.
• The treaty limits each party to a single ABM deployment area, with no more than 100 interceptors and 100 launchers.
• The U.S. has faced significant technical and political challenges in developing a viable NMD system.
• The U.S. is pursuing a multi-layered missile defense strategy, which includes both TMD and NMD systems.
• The debate over the ABM Treaty is central to the broader arms control agenda, with implications for nuclear stability and global security.

Conclusion

The U.S. NMD program represents a significant shift in the strategic arms control framework, driven by concerns over proliferation and the need for a more flexible and robust defense posture. The potential amendment or replacement of the ABM Treaty has sparked international controversy, particularly in Russia, which views such changes as a threat to the existing balance of power. The debate highlights the tension between deterrence and defense in the post-Cold War era, and the need for a cooperative, multilateral approach to address these new security challenges.