2003年-世界发展银行全球_Costa_Rica___Financial_Sector_Assessment_35页_7mb

报告摘要

Costa Rica has historically experienced strong output growth and low macroeconomic volatility, with an average yearly output growth of 3.5% over the past two decades.
Inflation has been relatively moderate (around 23%) compared to Latin American standards.
Output and real exchange rate volatilities are lower than in most Latin American countries.
Sovereign bond ratings are among the best in the region.
The stable policy environment and integration into the global economy have supported this performance.
However, trend GDP growth has declined since the early 1990s, with a temporary boost in the late 1990s due to Intel's investments, followed by a decline since 2000.

The financial sector is relatively deep, with gross assets reaching 72% of GDP in June 2001.
Banks dominate the sector, accounting for 77% of financial assets, while investment funds (mutual and pension) have grown rapidly (10.4% of financial sector assets).
Offshore banking is significant, with offshore banks holding about 24% of total banking system assets.
Offshore banks mainly serve domestic residents and are licensed abroad but operate within Costa Rica.
The growth of offshore banking has slowed due to reduced reserve requirements, regulatory concerns, and competition from mutual funds and public banks.
Financial dollarization is increasing, with 45% of onshore deposits and 50% of loans denominated in dollars.
Public banks hold 75% of total deposits, indicating a highly concentrated financial system.
The public sector has a monopoly in insurance and dominates the pension and mutual fund industries.

The onshore banking system appears healthy based on prudential indicators, with high capital-to-risk-weighted assets (CAR) ratios (14% for public banks, 16% for private banks).
Non-performing loans (NPLs) are around 5% for public banks and 1.5% for private banks, with no clear trend.
The reported high provisions coverage (80% for public banks, 110% for private banks) may not fully reflect true risk, as many loans are reclassified during inspections.
Dollarization increases the banking system's vulnerability to shocks, limiting the effectiveness of monetary policy.
High interest rate spreads in colón (around 12 percentage points) reflect uneven regulatory and tax treatment, market segmentation, and the use of currency for price discrimination.
Banks are indirectly exposed to interest rate and exchange rate risks, particularly through dollar-denominated loans to non-dollar earners.
Liquidity in the onshore banking system is high but declining, with uneven distribution across institutions.
The short maturity of deposits (75% have less than three-month maturity) and lack of deposit insurance for private banks increase the risk of funding difficulties during turbulence.
A credit crunch could lead to a sharp rise in NPLs, especially due to the reliance on revolving credit lines and the lack of a robust bank resolution framework.

The segmented and opaque nature of the money market limits effective day-to-day liquidity management.
Interest rate volatility remains substantial, influenced by central bank lending practices and the absence of an active liquidity policy.
The central bank focuses on long-term instruments (e.g., 6-month bills), which blurs the distinction between monetary policy and public debt management.
A lower inflation rate would improve monetary management by reducing uncertainty in real interest rates and limiting dollarization incentives.
Recapitalizing the central bank is essential for sustainable inflation control and to eliminate its operating losses.
Strengthening the primary fiscal surplus is necessary to achieve this recapitalization without worsening public debt sustainability.
Enhancing communication between the central bank and the market, including clearer explanations of policy goals and tools to assess expectations, is recommended.
Developing an active open market intervention capacity based on liquidity forecasts would help stabilize money market interest rates.

The regulatory framework, centered around CONASSIF, has structural and resource limitations that hinder effective prudential oversight.
CONASSIF has strong legal powers but is structured more like a consultative body than an executive one.
The supervisory agencies (SUGEF, SUGEVAL, SUPEN) lack voting power and legal authority to set priorities.
There is a need to strengthen the legal and operational framework for prudential supervision to ensure consistency and effectiveness.

Joint Supervision of Offshore Banks: SUGEF has signed MOUs with several countries to supervise Costa Rican offshore banks, including Panama, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic.
Capital Requirements: A new Capital Adequacy Norm was approved, requiring holding companies to maintain capital equivalent to 20% of onshore non-bank intermediaries' assets, with potential reductions if voluntary onsite inspections are accepted.
Risk Management: Technical assistance from the Federal Reserve and OCC helped improve SUGEF's risk assessment capabilities. A new regulation on credit risk from dollar lending to non-dollar earners is expected to be approved soon.
Accounting Standards: A new chart of accounts effective January 1, 2003, aligns with International Accounting Standards.
Anti-Money Laundering: New "Know Your Customer" guidelines were issued in December 2001 to enhance compliance with AML standards.

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