斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-Transit-and-trans_12页_273kb

Summary of "Transit and Trans-shipment Controls in an Arms Trade Treaty"

Core Content

The document discusses the importance of including transit and trans-shipment controls in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to prevent illicit and destabilizing arms transfers. While the ATT has primarily focused on export and import controls, transit controls are equally critical as a large proportion of arms transfers pass through third countries, where they are more vulnerable to diversion.

Transit controls allow states to monitor, verify, permit, deny or seize arms shipments passing through their territory. This is important for both national interests and international peace and security, as it helps prevent the involvement of states or their citizens in illegal arms trade.

Main Points

• Illicit Arms Transfers: Arms can be mislabelled and routed through multiple states to evade transfer controls, as shown in a case study from the UAE.
• International Legal Basis: Several international instruments, such as the UN Guidelines for International Arms Transfers and the CIFTA Convention, provide guidance on transit controls, though they do not explicitly require them.
• Licensing and Authorization: Some states require transit licences and use the same criteria as for export licences. Others use simplified procedures or notification-only systems.
• Enforcement Mechanisms: Transit controls are enforced by customs, border, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Effective enforcement requires interagency cooperation, information sharing, and secure communication systems.
• Need for Common Standards: The lack of common international standards for transit controls leads to uneven enforcement and deterrence of rigorous controls due to concerns over trade impacts.
• Role of ATT: An ATT could help standardize transit controls, enhance international cooperation, and improve risk assessments by requiring states to implement legislation, procedures and resources for controlling transit and trans-shipment.

Key Information

• Case Study: In 2011, the UAE seized 16,000 handguns and ammunition worth over $4 million that were mislabelled and re-routed through several states. Some individuals were charged and sentenced, but international cooperation remains limited.
• International Instruments:
  • The UN Firearms Protocol (2001) and CIFTA Convention (1997) require written authorizations for transit.
  • The ECOWAS Convention (2006) and Nairobi Protocol (2004) also include transit control measures.
• Best Practices: Some states use armed escorts, customs clearance certificates, and systematic data collection to enhance transit security.
• Challenges:
  • National discretion in implementing transit controls leads to inconsistent practices.
  • Bureaucratic burdens and trade concerns deter states from imposing strict controls.
  • Limited international cooperation hampers the ability to hold all involved parties accountable.

Recommendations for ATT

• The ATT should include clear requirements for transit and trans-shipment controls.
• It should promote information exchange between states to improve diversion risk assessments.
• It should encourage public reporting on the implementation of transit controls.
• It should provide guidance and model legislation to help states improve their national practices.
• It should establish a system for international assistance in designing and implementing transit controls.

Conclusion

Including transit and trans-shipment controls in the ATT is essential for enhancing the effectiveness of arms transfer regulation. It would not only help prevent illicit transfers but also demonstrate the treaty's relevance to all states, not just major exporters. By establishing common standards and enforcement mechanisms, the ATT can support a more coherent and comprehensive global system for arms control.

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