2014年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Panama_Report_on_Observance_of_Standards_and_CodesFATF_Recommendations_for_Anti_19页_373kb

Panama: Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) – FATF AML/CFT Recommendations Summary

Core Content Overview

This report evaluates Panama's compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). It was prepared by the IMF Legal Department and based on an on-site mission conducted from October 15 to 29, 2012, as well as subsequent information provided by Panamanian authorities. The report highlights areas where Panama's AML/CFT framework is not fully aligned with international standards and outlines key recommendations for improvement.

Main Findings

• Money Laundering Vulnerabilities:
  Panama is vulnerable to money laundering due to its dollarized, open economy, status as an international financial and corporate services center, and role as a transit point for drug trafficking from South America.

  • No comprehensive risk assessment has been conducted by authorities.
  • No statistics on ML investigations, prosecutions, or convictions are available, making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of AML/CFT laws.
  • No terrorism financing (TF) cases have been detected to date.

• Legal Framework Gaps:

  • AML/CFT laws are not fully aligned with the FATF standards.
  • Money laundering is criminalized, but some predicate crimes (e.g., counterfeiting, smuggling) are not covered.
  • Legal persons are not held fully accountable for ML, and no parallel civil proceedings exist for such cases.
  • Terrorism financing is not explicitly covered in the AML Law, and CFT provisions are inconsistent in subsidiary instruments, raising constitutional concerns.

• Insufficient Enforcement and Data:

  • Sanctions for ML and TF are consistent with international standards, but lack of data prevents proper assessment of implementation effectiveness.
  • Confiscation of ML/TF proceeds is limited, and procedures for freezing and seizing assets are inefficient.
  • FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit) has limited access to information on legal persons and arrangements, affecting its analytical and investigative capacity.

• Inadequate Coverage of DNFBPs:

  • Only trustees are fully covered under the AML Law, while casinos, real estate brokers, lawyers, accountants, notaries, and precious metal dealers are not subject to AML/CFT obligations.
  • Resident agents (who must be lawyers) are not covered by the AML Law and have strict secrecy provisions, limiting access to beneficial ownership data.

• Weak Supervision and Resources:

  • Supervisory authorities have inadequate human, financial, and technical resources.
  • On-site inspections and risk-based approaches are not effectively applied in nonbanking sectors.
  • Recordkeeping and customer due diligence (CDD) requirements are limited, especially for bearer share companies and trusts.

• Cooperation Limitations:

  • The FIU has limited cooperation with foreign counterparts, sharing only public data and not all information.
  • Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) are inadequate or not fully operational.

Key Recommendations

• Expand the scope of predicate offenses to include counterfeiting, smuggling, forgery, and piracy in the ML legal framework.
• Strengthen the legal liability of legal persons for ML, including the possibility of civil proceedings.
• Ensure full coverage of CFT obligations in the AML Law and align them with constitutional principles.
• Implement comprehensive and effective mechanisms for the cross-border transport of currency and bearer instruments.
• Improve the FIU’s access to information on legal persons and arrangements, including beneficial ownership data.
• Enhance the FIU’s analytical and case dissemination capacity, including providing sufficient supporting documentation for STRs.
• Strengthen the legal framework for trust and beneficial ownership to allow efficient access by competent authorities.
• Establish operational contacts between the FIU and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to improve national and international cooperation.
• Implement regular reviews of AML/CFT measures to ensure compliance and effectiveness.
• Improve training and oversight for supervisory authorities and financial institutions to address compliance gaps.
• Ensure that all financial institutions and DNFBPs are subject to AML/CFT obligations, including bearer share companies and trusts.
• Enhance the legal framework for international cooperation, including MLATs and MOUs, to facilitate information sharing.

Compliance Ratings

Conclusion

Panama has made progress in implementing AML/CFT measures, but significant gaps remain in its legal framework, supervision, and data collection. The country is vulnerable to ML and TF due to its financial openness, offshore services, and lack of comprehensive oversight. To strengthen its AML/CFT system, Panama needs to expand legal coverage, enhance supervisory capacity, improve information access, and increase cooperation both nationally and internationally.