战略与国际研究中心-The-Uncertain-Metrics-of-War-Against-ISIS_314页_20mb

Summary of "The Uncertain Metrics of the 'War' Against ISIS in Iraq and Syria"

Core Content

This report analyzes the challenges and uncertainties in measuring the "war" against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, emphasizing that metrics alone cannot fully capture the complexity of the conflict. It highlights the limitations of data collection, reporting, and visualization in understanding the true scope and impact of the conflict.

Main Points

• Metrics and Narratives: Metrics are useful for identifying broad patterns but cannot replace detailed narratives. They often reflect the "fog of war" due to uncertainties in data collection and interpretation.

• Data Sources and Limitations: The report relies on unclassified material and the START (Global Terrorism Database) for analysis. It notes that official data from the U.S. Department of Defense is often outdated and not fully transparent.

• Visual Representation: Many maps and graphics used to depict the conflict, including those from the U.S. military, show large "blobs" of territory, which may mislead by emphasizing empty desert areas rather than the actual focus on population centers and key supply lines.

• Impact on Civilians: The report underscores that civilian casualties in Iraq are largely due to sectarian and ethnic violence, while in Syria, the Assad regime is responsible for over 90% of such casualties.

• ISIS as a Part of a Larger Trend: While ISIS is a significant threat, it is not the sole source of Islamist extremist violence. It is one of several groups, and its defeat may not end the broader pattern of terrorism in the region.

• Terrorist Activity and Casualties:

  • From 2002 to 2015, ISIL-related groups carried out over 4,900 attacks, resulting in more than 33,000 deaths and 41,000 injuries.
  • ISIL-related attacks were significantly more lethal than non-ISIL attacks, with an average of 7.3 deaths per attack.
  • Attacks by ISIL and its affiliates were also more likely to involve hostages and coordination among multiple events.

• Weapons Used: ISIL disproportionately used explosives (80%) in its attacks compared to global trends, with firearms and "melee" weapons used less frequently. Chemical weapons were reported to be used more in 2016.

• Uncertainty in START Estimates:

  • The START database provides a range of estimates for ISIS involvement, not point estimates, due to the difficulty in attributing attacks.
  • In 2015, the U.S. State Department reported that ISIS was responsible for 21.3% of global terrorist deaths, while the START database estimated it as 1,219 incidents or 20.4% of total MENA attacks.

• ISIS Affiliates:

  • The most active affiliates in 2014-2015 included Boko Haram, Sinai Province, and Tripoli Province.
  • These groups were responsible for the majority of attacks and deaths, with some having a longer history of extremist activity before pledging allegiance to ISIS.

• Regional and Global Impact:

  • In the MENA region, ISIS was responsible for 29% of attacks and 56% of deaths in 2015.
  • Globally, ISIS was responsible for 9% of attacks and 21% of deaths in 2015, indicating its significant but not dominant role in global terrorism.

• Assessment of ISIS's Decline:

  • U.S. military claims indicate progress, such as the liberation of over 25,000 square kilometers and the attrition of about 25,000 enemy fighters.
  • However, the report suggests that the actual number of ISIS fighters may be lower than previously estimated, and that the group may still be active in recruiting and mobilizing local populations.

Key Information

• Geographic Focus: Most combat occurs in populated areas, not vast unpopulated regions, which are often overrepresented in maps.
• Credibility of Data: There is a need for more transparent and accurate reporting, as many metrics are subject to interpretation and "spin."
• Future Implications: Even if ISIS is defeated, it may lead to renewed conflict between ethnic and sectarian groups, and the broader region may remain unstable.
• Alternative Metrics: Better metrics should link air and land operations, civilian impact, and casualties, while also capturing the full range of asymmetric and terrorist attacks.

Conclusion

The report concludes that while there are indications of progress against ISIS, the metrics used to assess this progress are often misleading and incomplete. A more nuanced and transparent approach to data collection and reporting is essential for a better understanding of the conflict and its long-term consequences.