2003年-世界发展银行全球_Location_Decisions_and__Nongovernmental_Organization_Motivation___Evidence_from__Rural_Bangladesh_27页_266kb

Summary of "Location Decisions and Nongovernmental Organization Motivation: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh"

Core Content

This paper investigates the location decisions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in rural Bangladesh, analyzing whether these decisions are driven by altruistic motives or by the need to maximize funding opportunities. It uses data from the 1995 and 2000 rounds of the Bangladesh Household and Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) and the Community Information Schedule of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) to assess the determinants of NGO program placement.

Main Views on NGO Motivation

Two primary models are proposed to explain NGO location decisions:

1. Opportunistic Model: This model suggests that NGOs are motivated by the need to secure funding. Donor contracts and the desire to demonstrate success to funders significantly influence their location choices. NGOs may prefer areas where they can showcase their effectiveness and attract more resources, even if these areas are not the most impoverished.

2. Benevolent Model: This model assumes that NGOs are driven by altruistic goals, such as poverty reduction and improving community well-being. According to this view, location decisions should be based on indicators of community need, such as poverty levels or access to services.

Key Findings

• NGO Coverage and Intensity: There was a significant increase in both the intensity and coverage of NGO programs in rural Bangladesh between 1995 and 2000. The percentage of rural communities with at least one NGO program rose from 48% in 1995–96 to 91% in 2000. The average number of NGO programs per community also increased, from 0.9 to 2.8.

• Brand vs. Other NGOs: Brand NGOs (those identified in the 1995–96 survey) had a coverage rate of 39% in 1995 and 84% in 2000, while Other NGOs increased from 18% to 48% over the same period. Brand NGOs still dominated in terms of program intensity, but Other NGOs showed faster growth.

• Sectoral Expansion: Credit and education programs saw the most significant growth. BRAC and Grameen Bank were the most active in these sectors, with BRAC expanding its credit programs sevenfold by 2000. Other NGOs also expanded in credit and education, indicating a broader trend.

• Location Decisions: NGOs did not target the poorest communities based on need. Instead, they established new programs in communities that previously had no NGO presence. This suggests that location decisions were not primarily driven by community need but by other factors, such as the opportunity to demonstrate success and attract funding.

• No Duplication of Efforts: NGOs did not appear to be concerned with duplicating efforts of other NGOs. This implies that competition among NGOs was not a significant factor in their location choices.

• Donor Influence: The analysis supports the idea that donor contracts and the desire for broad coverage significantly affect NGO location decisions. Donors may prioritize reaching a wide number of communities, which in turn influences the choices of NGOs to avoid areas where their impact might be diluted.

Data and Methodology

• Data Sources: The study uses data from the HIES and BBS Community Information Schedule to measure the presence and types of NGO programs in rural communities. It also incorporates data on political influence and election results to control for other factors.

• Variables Used:

  • Poverty and Literacy: Estimated using household and community data.
  • Remoteness: Measured by travel time to local government offices.
  • Political Influence: Assessed by whether local council members resided in the community.
  • Vote Shares: Used to determine political affiliations and influence.

• Sample Size: A total of 252 communities were surveyed in each round. Of these, 248 had data in both years, allowing for panel data analysis. Missing values reduced the sample size by about 20% in each regression.

Conclusion

The findings suggest that NGO location decisions in Bangladesh are influenced more by the desire to achieve broad coverage and secure funding than by a strict focus on the most impoverished communities. While NGOs claim to be altruistic, their behavior aligns more with the opportunistic model, where the need to demonstrate success and attract donor support plays a central role. This has implications for both the design of donor contracts and the understanding of NGO incentives in development contexts.