1997年-BIS国际清算银行__Group_of_Ten_-_The_resolution_of_sovereign_liquidity_crises_69页_374kb

Summary of the Group of Ten Report on the Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises

Core Content

The Group of Ten (G-10) report, prepared under the auspices of the Deputies, outlines a comprehensive framework for addressing sovereign liquidity crises in the context of a rapidly evolving financial landscape. The report was initiated in response to an invitation from the Group of Seven (G-7) Heads of State and Government in Halifax in 1995 and was developed by a Working Party comprising representatives from G-10 countries and experts from international organizations.

The report emphasizes that sovereign liquidity crises are becoming more frequent and severe due to the increased reliance on private debt instruments, particularly bonds, and the broader, more interconnected nature of global financial markets. It also highlights the need for a flexible, case-by-case approach to crisis resolution that prioritizes market discipline and cooperation among debtors and creditors.

Main Views and Key Information

I. Framework

• Changing Environment: The international financial environment has undergone significant changes over the past decade, driven by financial and technological innovation and the liberalization of cross-border capital flows.
• Capital Flows: There has been a substantial increase in net portfolio investment flows to developing countries, especially in the form of bonds and securities, compared to the 1980s.
• Investor Composition: Institutional investors, such as emerging markets mutual funds, have become more prominent, while commercial banks' role has diminished.
• Mexican Crisis Example: The 1994/95 Mexican crisis demonstrated the potential scale and speed of liquidity crises, particularly when they involve large amounts of short-term, dollar-indexed debt.

II. Conceptual Methods for Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Crises

• Bankruptcy and Formal Arrangements: International bankruptcy procedures are not considered feasible or appropriate for resolving sovereign liquidity crises in the current and foreseeable future.
• Market Solutions: Market discipline and solutions should be the primary mechanism for addressing liquidity issues.
• Existing Practices: Current flexible, case-by-case procedures are appropriate and should be built upon. These include the practices of the Paris and London Clubs.

III. Improving the Environment for Handling Crises

• Prevention: Prevention of crises should be the top priority, including improved surveillance and market discipline.
• Debt Data: Better quality and transparency in external debt data are essential for effective crisis management.
• Financial System Strengthening: Strengthening financial systems in debtor countries is necessary to reduce the risks associated with liquidity crises.
• Contractual Underpinnings: Contractual provisions such as collective representation, qualified majority voting, and sharing clauses should be developed to facilitate crisis resolution.
• Coordination and Communication: Improved coordination and communication among stakeholders are crucial.
• Early Action: Early action by debtors is important to avoid escalation and reduce the impact of crises.

IV. Crisis Handling

• Adjustment and Financing: A combination of economic adjustment and financing is essential for resolving crises.
• Role of Actors: The debtor, creditors, and the official community (including multilateral institutions and national authorities) all have roles in crisis resolution.
• Payment Suspension: Temporary suspension of debt payments may be necessary in exceptional cases but should be non-confrontational and not interfere with secondary markets.
• IMF Lending Policies: The IMF should consider extending its lending policies to support adjustment programs in cases of liquidity crises, while maintaining strict conditionality.
• Cooperative Strategy: A cooperative and non-confrontational strategy is recommended to promote resolution of liquidity crises.

Key Principles for Crisis Resolution Procedures

• Foster sound economic policies.
• Minimize moral hazard for both creditors and debtors.
• Work with the grain of the market and avoid interference with secondary debt markets.
• Limit contagion effects.
• Support credible and sustainable actions.
• Ensure fair burden sharing among creditors.
• Strengthen the ability of governments to resist taking on private sector liabilities.
• Be flexible and applicable to various cases.
• Promote cooperation and non-confrontation.
• Build on existing contractual and institutional arrangements.
• Use existing practices and institutions, modified as needed.

Conclusion

The report concludes that while no single pre-set procedure can be suitable for all sovereign liquidity crises, a framework based on the above principles is necessary. It also stresses the importance of market-led processes in developing contractual provisions that facilitate cooperation and consultation. The official community, including the IMF, should support such initiatives while maintaining a focus on promoting strong adjustment and ensuring prudence and conditionality in its lending policies.