2013年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Review_of_the_Policy_on_Debt_Limits_in_Fund_47页_1mb

Summary of the Review of the Policy on Debt Limits in Fund-Supported Programs

Core Content

This document reviews the Fund's debt limits policy in Fund-supported programs and proposes reforms to enhance its effectiveness. The policy, initially established in the 1960s, has been in place for decades and has evolved with the changing economic circumstances of low-income countries (LICs). The 2009 reform aimed to improve flexibility for LICs in accessing non-concessional resources while maintaining debt sustainability. However, the review identifies challenges in implementation and suggests a unified framework for all members.

Main Viewpoints

1. Policy Overview and Objectives

• The debt limits policy was introduced in the late 1960s to support adjustment goals, ensure fiscal and external sustainability, mitigate liquidity risks, and facilitate debt resolution.
• The policy differentiates between concessional and non-concessional borrowing, with concessional flows excluded from debt limits due to their presumed low risk to debt sustainability.
• This exclusion led to a bifurcation in the policy, treating LICs and non-LICs differently, and resulted in varying roles of debt limits across GRA and PRGT-supported programs.

2. Debt Trends in LICs

• The external debt outlook in LICs has remained stable since the 2009 reform.
• In 90% of LICs, the risk of debt distress has improved or remained stable, with significant improvements in HIPCs due to debt relief.
• However, five early HIPCs experienced increased debt accumulation, mainly driven by concessional borrowing.
• Non-HIPCs and early HIPCs have seen a rise in external debt-to-GDP ratios, with the median increasing by about 5 percentage points.

3. Implementation Issues

• The policy has generally met its goal of providing flexibility, but implementation has been complex and sometimes distorted investment and financing decisions.
• The exclusion of concessional borrowing from debt limits has not been supported by strong evidence, and the 2009 reform did not address this issue.
• The use of a declining discount rate has led to a reduction in the grant element of loans, which has affected the assessment of concessionality and led to project abandonment or modifications.

4. Proposed Reforms

• Abolish the binary distinction between concessional and non-concessional borrowing.
• Establish a unified debt limits framework for all countries, setting limits in nominal terms based on the volume of contracted or guaranteed debt.
• Introduce an indicative target on the average concessionality of new financing to preserve incentives for concessional borrowing.
• Delink the capacity dimension from the debt limits policy and address it directly in the structural component of the program.
• Standardize the discount rate across all Fund tools and policies, resetting it to a long-run average level close to its original value for the LIC DSF, to avoid unwarranted fluctuations.

Key Information

5. Debt Limits in LIC Programs

• In PRGT-supported programs, debt limits are quasi-universal, and concessionality is systematically considered.
• In GRA programs, debt limits are less common, and fiscal performance criteria are used more frequently.
• Concessional borrowing is unconstrained in 80% of LIC programs, with only 20% of programs capping it.
• Debt limits, when present, are not tied to specific projects and are often based on the country's debt vulnerabilities and capacity.

6. Compliance and Modifications

• Compliance with debt-related conditionality has generally been good.
• There has been a high and increasing number of requests to modify external debt performance criteria (PCs).
• Modifications were mainly aimed at increasing non-concessional borrowing limits, often due to changes in the discount rate that affected the grant element of loans.

7. Impact of Discount Rate Changes

• The declining discount rate has reduced the grant element of loans, leading to reclassification of concessional loans as non-concessional.
• This has resulted in arbitrary outcomes and numerous requests for waivers or modifications.
• Several projects were abandoned or delayed due to these changes, including those in Guinea, Senegal, Togo, and others.

Conclusion and Next Steps

The review concludes that the current policy, while providing some flexibility, has not fully addressed the challenges of implementation and has not supported the exclusion of concessional borrowing from debt limits. The proposed reforms aim to create a more coherent and effective policy by:

• Removing the binary distinction between concessional and non-concessional borrowing.
• Setting nominal debt limits based on the volume of debt.
• Establishing a unified discount rate across all Fund instruments.
• Delinking capacity from the debt limits policy and integrating it into the structural aspects of programs.

The paper represents the first stage of the reform process. If approved, a second paper will follow with specific proposals based on feedback and stakeholder consultations.

Issues for Discussion

• Whether the current framework for excluding concessional borrowing from debt limits is still valid.
• The role of the discount rate in determining concessionality and its impact on program implementation.
• The feasibility of establishing a unified debt limits framework and the implications for fiscal and debt sustainability.

Figures and Tables Summary

• Figure 1a and 1b: Show that the risk of debt distress has improved or remained stable in most LICs, with more pronounced improvements in HIPCs.
• Figure 2a, 2b, 2c: Illustrate the stability of external debt-to-GDP ratios in LICs and the rise in some countries, particularly early HIPCs.
• Figure 3 and 4: Highlight the rising public debt in advanced and emerging economies and the role of fiscal limits in curbing debt accumulation.
• Text Table 1: Demonstrates the change in external debt ratios across program and non-program LICs.
• Text Table 2: Shows compliance with debt limits performance criteria, with a high number of modifications and waivers.
• Text Table 3: Provides examples of how changes in the discount rate affected project implementation.

Annexes Summary

• Annex I: The Concessionality Matrix in LICs, which classifies countries based on debt vulnerabilities and capacity.
• Annex II: Recent evolution of external debt in early HIPCs, showing the impact of concessional borrowing.
• Annex III: Interaction between debt and fiscal performance criteria in PRGT-supported programs.
• Annex IV: Debt and fiscal limits in programs with emerging market countries.