战略与国际研究中心--Closing-the-Gap--The-Euromissiles-and-President-Carter-s-Nuclear-Weapons-Strategy-for-Western-Europe-1977_20页_111kb

Summary of "Closing the Gap"

Core Content

The document analyzes the U.S. President Jimmy Carter's support for the deployment of Euromissiles (long-range theater nuclear missiles) in Western Europe as part of NATO's strategy to counter the Soviet Union's SS-20 nuclear missile deployments. The focus is on the three primary reasons behind the Carter Administration's decision to proceed with the deployment, despite internal skepticism about its military necessity.

Main Points

The Context of the Threat

• The Soviet Union deployed SS-20 missiles within striking distance of Western Europe, raising concerns about the credibility of NATO's deterrence strategy.
• NATO's "flexible response" strategy, which aimed to deter Soviet aggression at all levels, was perceived by Western European leaders, especially West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, as vulnerable due to the lack of a matching long-range nuclear capability.
• Strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union meant that neither side would be willing to use strategic nuclear weapons against the other, but this did not eliminate the perceived gap in the deterrence spectrum.

The Double-Track Decision

• In December 1979, NATO approved the "double-track decision," which included:
  • Deploying 108 Pershing II-XR and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe.
  • Initiating arms control talks with the Soviet Union on theater nuclear forces (TNF).
• This decision was designed to address Western European concerns and strengthen NATO's deterrence posture.

Key Reasons for Euromissile Deployment

1. Reassuring NATO Allies

• Carter and his advisors, including Brzezinski and Aaron, supported Euromissile deployment to reassure Western European allies that NATO's deterrence strategy was credible.
• They believed that the perception of a gap in deterrence could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, where Western Europe's insecurity would make them more vulnerable.
• By deploying Euromissiles, the U.S. aimed to demonstrate solidarity with its allies and show that NATO had the capability to respond to Soviet aggression in kind.

2. Preventing Soviet Intimidation

• The Soviets were seen as potential users of SS-20s not just for military strikes, but also as tools of political coercion.
• Western European leaders feared that the Soviets might use the SS-20 threat to compel political concessions, leading to a process akin to "Finlandization" — where Western Europe would become more neutral.
• Carter and his advisors wanted to prevent this by ensuring that the Western Europeans felt secure and thus less susceptible to Soviet pressure.

3. Bargaining Leverage for Arms Control

• Carter and his team believed that the deployment of Euromissiles would provide NATO with leverage in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.
• The idea was that only by having a credible threat of their own would the Soviets be willing to engage in talks to reduce their SS-20 forces.
• The deployment was intended to be a "complement to, not a substitute for," modernization efforts, and would help create a more favorable political climate for arms control discussions.

Conclusion

• The deployment of Euromissiles was primarily a political and psychological move, aimed at rebuilding European confidence in NATO's deterrence strategy.
• While some American officials, like Brzezinski and Aaron, did not believe a real gap existed in NATO's deterrence capabilities, they recognized the importance of addressing Western European concerns to maintain Alliance cohesion.
• The decision was part of a broader strategy to ensure that the Soviets would not exploit Western Europe's vulnerability and that NATO would remain a unified and credible alliance.

Key Information

• Euromissiles: 572 long-range theater nuclear missiles to be deployed in Western Europe by 1983.
• SS-20s: Soviet long-range theater nuclear missiles that posed a significant threat to NATO.
• Strategic Parity: The balance of nuclear capabilities between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
• Flexible Response Strategy: A NATO doctrine allowing for escalation from conventional to nuclear warfare.
• Finlandization: A term used to describe the possibility of Western Europe becoming more neutral due to Soviet pressure.
• Double-Track Decision: A NATO policy combining missile deployment and arms control talks.

References

• Interviews and documents from David Aaron and Zbigniew Brzezinski.
• Notes from bilateral and multilateral meetings between the U.S. and Western European allies.
• Strategic analyses and reports from the National Security Archive and other sources.