2010年-世界发展银行全球_Egypt_Arab_Republic_of_-_Food_Subsidies___Benefit_Incidence_and_Leakages_101页_1mb

Egypt's Food Subsidies: Benefit Incidence and Leakages

Core Content

This report, prepared by the World Bank, analyzes Egypt's food subsidy system, focusing on benefit incidence and system leakages. It highlights the significant costs, distribution patterns, and the impact of subsidies on different regions and income groups. The study also presents policy options for reforming the system to improve efficiency and equity.

Main Points

1. Overview of the Food Subsidy System

• History: Egypt's food subsidies were introduced during World War II and have never been targeted.
• Structure: The system includes two main components:
  • Baladi Bread: Available to all for purchase.
  • Ration Cards: Provide fixed monthly quotas of cooking oil, sugar, rice, and tea to eligible households.
• Cost: In 2008/09, food subsidies accounted for 2% of GDP, costing LE 21.1 billion (US$ 3.8 billion), up from 0.9% between 1996/97 and 2000/01.
• Subsidy Rates: Subsidy rates for individual food items increased due to rising international prices, depreciation of the Egyptian pound, and expansion of the subsidy coverage.

2. Benefit Incidence

• Urban Advantage: Urban areas, especially Cairo, received a disproportionate share of subsidies, while Upper Egypt, with a higher proportion of poor, received less.
• Income Distribution:
  • The richest quintile received 12.6% more in absolute benefits than the poorest quintile.
  • In rural Upper Egypt, the richest received 48% more per capita benefits than the poorest.
  • Baladi bread and cooking oil had the highest benefit incidence, with baladi bread being the most significant contributor to poverty reduction.
• Poverty Impact: Food subsidies lifted 9% of Egyptians out of poverty in 2008/09. Without subsidies, the poverty rate would have increased from 20% to 30%.

3. System Leakages

• Total Leakage: In 2008/09, LE 5.5 billion (28%) of food subsidies did not reach intended beneficiaries.
• Leakage by Commodity:
  • Baladi bread: 68% of total leakage.
  • Cooking oil: 20% of total leakage.
  • Wheat flour: 29% leakage, with 13% leakage from direct consumer sales.
• Ration Card Leakages: 26% of subsidies in the ration card system did not reach intended beneficiaries, with Upper Egypt showing higher leakage rates than other regions.
• Cost of Delivery:
  • Cooking oil and baladi bread had the highest delivery costs (LE 1.46 and LE 1.45 per LE 1 of subsidy).
  • Rice and wheat flour had the lowest delivery costs (LE 1.13 and LE 1.15 per LE 1 of subsidy).

4. Policy Options for Reform

• Reducing Leakages:

  • Move subsidies to the end of the supply chain: Purchase bread directly from bakeries at market prices and sell at subsidized prices to reduce incentives for leakage.
  • Smart Cards: Cover 19 governorates by end of 2010; they have reduced procurement leakages by over 40% in some areas. A third-party evaluation is recommended to ensure proper use.
  • Replace with Food Stamps/Coupons: These could reduce leakages and improve cost-effectiveness. They also allow for self-targeting, where only the poor use them, as seen in Jordan.
  • Effective Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): Requires political support and strategic focus rather than costly IT investments. Community empowerment enhances M&E effectiveness.

• Narrowing Coverage:

  • Geographic Targeting: Allocate subsidies based on poverty shares in each governorate to ensure equity.
  • Income-Based Targeting: Use proxy means testing (e.g., in Mexico and Chile) or verified means testing (e.g., in the U.S.) to better target the poor.
  • Self-Targeting: Design subsidies so that they benefit the poor more, such as through home delivery of baladi bread, which removes stigma and transaction costs.
  • Integrated Targeting Systems: Use multiple targeting methods across programs to improve cost-effectiveness and ensure better support for vulnerable households.

Key Information

• Leakage Savings: Eliminating leakages and narrowing coverage could save up to LE 73% of the subsidy cost.
• Scenario Savings:
  • Excluding the richest 40% could save LE 6 billion (30.5%).
  • Excluding the richest 60% could save LE 8.8 billion (44.7%).
• Redistribution Potential: If savings are evenly distributed among the poorest 40%, per capita food subsidies could increase from LE 279 to LE 686 (2.5 times). If targeting the poorest 60%, per capita benefits could rise from LE 258 to LE 468 (1.8 times).

Conclusion

• Egypt's food subsidy system, while effective in poverty reduction, is costly and inefficient due to high leakages.
• The system is regressive, with the poorest often excluded and the richest benefiting disproportionately.
• Reform is necessary and should include phased approaches, targeting improvements, and reforms in delivery mechanisms.
• The study suggests that policy options such as smart cards, food stamps, and improved monitoring can lead to significant cost savings and better targeting.

References and Methodology

• Data Sources: Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES), Egypt Integrated Household Survey (EIHIS), and data from CAPMAS.
• Methodology: Includes benefit incidence analysis, leakage estimation, and cost-effectiveness evaluation across different regions and income quintiles.
• Annex Tables: Provide detailed data on subsidy quantities, costs, leakages, and distribution patterns across governorates and commodities.

Summary

Egypt's food subsidy system, though crucial for political stability, suffers from high leakages and inefficiencies. The report highlights the need for reform to improve targeting and reduce costs, suggesting policy options such as smart cards, food stamps, and geographic/income-based targeting. These reforms could save up to 44.7% of the subsidy budget and significantly increase benefits for the poorest.