卡内基国际和平基金会-Afghan-Elections-Where-it-Went-Wrong-and-What-to-Do_7页_218kb

Summary of "AFGHAN ELECTIONS: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?"

Core Content

This testimony by Gilles Dorronsoro, a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, analyzes the state-building and security challenges in Afghanistan following the 2009 elections. It highlights the structural weaknesses of the Afghan government and the inefficacy of current international strategies, particularly the reliance on external support and the misallocation of resources.

Main Views

1. Fragmentation of the Afghan Government

• President Hamid Karzai lacked a political base in Afghanistan and relied on a narrow group of allies to fill key administrative positions.
• This led to political fragmentation, as local powers were undermined and replaced with unqualified allies.
• The central government has failed to establish effective institutions at the district level, which are essential for governance and security.

2. Weakness of Security and State Structures

• The Afghan government lacks functional security structures, particularly police and judicial systems.
• Corruption and inefficiency are widespread, with many police officers underpaid and untrustworthy.
• The Afghan National Army (ANA) is not yet capable of operating independently, and its effectiveness remains low despite better training.
• The International Coalition (IC) is not actively engaged in the fight against the Taliban, leading to a lack of security in key areas like Kunduz.

3. Taliban's Exploitation of the Vacuum

• The Taliban have filled the administrative and security void by establishing their own system of governance.
• They have gained influence in regions where the government has no real presence, particularly in the South and East.
• Local leaders are rearming due to the perception that the state cannot protect them, undermining state-building efforts.

4. Redefining Institution-Building

• The Afghan state has historically relied on foreign support, making it a "rentier state."
• The IC should focus on building a few critical institutions rather than spreading resources thinly.
• Security should be the primary objective of the Coalition, with the ANA, police, and judiciary as key priorities.

5. Abandoning Failed Policies

• The Coalition should reconsider its focus on drug eradication and development aid.
• Drug production is deeply rooted in the Afghan economy and cannot be eradicated through foreign efforts.
• Development should be concentrated in strategic areas where the government has control, not as a primary goal.

6. Reconsidering the Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

• PRTs are ineffective in state-building and are a long-term liability.
• They take the place of Afghan institutions, marginalizing local actors.
• PRTs are not successful in changing public perception and are often associated with civilian casualties and humiliation.

7. Centralization vs. Decentralization

• A federal system is not advisable, as it could lead to ethnic tensions and fragmentation.
• The government must maintain a strong, centralized control over strategic areas, including the North.
• The integration of militias into the ANA has been a failure, with local leaders still exerting de facto control.

8. Misallocation of Development Resources

• Resources are being wasted in the most insecure and unstable regions.
• The PRTs, led by major troop contributors, have been responsible for inefficient aid distribution.
• The Coalition must shift aid to areas with greater control and accountability, not to war-torn regions.

Key Information

• Political Fragmentation: Karzai's reliance on personal allies has led to a lack of local representation and increased fragmentation.
• Security Apparatus: The ANA and police are weak and ineffective, with the ANA still unable to operate independently.
• Taliban Influence: The Taliban are expanding their control and influence through the absence of a functioning state.
• Drug Economy: Drug production is a major source of income for both the Taliban and Afghan officials, making eradication a difficult and counterproductive goal.
• Development Mismanagement: Aid is poorly allocated, often going to areas with no government presence and contributing to the war economy.
• PRTs: These teams are not effective in preparing for a Coalition withdrawal and undermine Afghan institutions.
• Centralization Strategy: A strong, centralized state is necessary for stability, particularly in strategic regions like the North.

Conclusion

The testimony calls for a shift in strategy, emphasizing the need for a more realistic approach to institution-building, security, and resource allocation. It argues that the Coalition should focus on strengthening the Afghan security apparatus, centralizing control in strategic areas, and redirecting development aid to regions where the government has actual influence. This would be a more sustainable path to long-term stability and the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces.