2016年-世界发展银行全球_Payment_by_Results_in_Development_Aid___All_That_Glitters_Is_Not_Gold_24页_285kb

Payment by Results in Development Aid: All That Glitters Is Not Gold

Core Content

Payment by Results (PbR) is an emerging approach in development aid where funds are disbursed based on verified progress against pre-agreed performance indicators. While it is seen as a promising tool to improve aid effectiveness by aligning payments with outcomes, the article cautions against over-reliance on PbR due to its limitations and potential for misleading results.

Main Points

• Definition and Mechanism: PbR is a conditional aid disbursement model where the recipient is rewarded based on measurable outcomes. Examples include payments for increased primary education enrollment or vaccination rates.

• Adoption by Donors: Several major donors, including the UK, the World Bank, GAVI, and the European Commission, have implemented PbR in various forms. However, the empirical evidence supporting its effectiveness is limited.

• Theoretical Framework: The article draws on insights from contract theory, behavioral economics, and development economics to analyze PbR. It highlights three key components of PbR agreements: the agent (recipient), the measure (indicator), and the principal (donor).

• Agent Characteristics: Recipients (agents) may perceive PbR differently due to:

  • Risk aversion: They may discount potential rewards due to uncertainty and volatility.
  • Loss aversion: They may require higher rewards to offset potential losses.
  • Time discounting: Short-term oriented agents may find PbR less attractive due to delayed returns.
  • Control aversion: Agents may react negatively to perceived distrust or excessive monitoring.

• Performance Measures: The article emphasizes that:

  • A single performance measure is often a proxy for the actual goal.
  • The measure must remain correlated with the underlying goal after it is incentivized.
  • Poorly designed measures can lead to illusory gains or fool's gold outcomes, where success is reported but not genuine.

• Strategic Ambiguity: Donors may benefit from maintaining some ambiguity in the selection of performance measures to avoid distorting incentives. This can lead to broader reforms rather than focusing solely on measurable indicators.

• Adverse Selection: PbR can lead to adverse selection in competitive environments, where better-informed agents (e.g., NGOs) may win contracts not because of better performance but due to superior knowledge of the system.

• Multitask Model: This model highlights the challenge of aligning a single performance measure with a donor’s complex goals. It shows that PbR may incentivize actions that are easy to measure but have little impact on the ultimate objective.

Key Insights

• PbR is not universally applicable and should be used strategically, particularly in contexts where the recipient has low alignment with the donor’s goals.

• The quality of the performance measure is critical to the success of PbR. Poorly aligned measures can lead to misaligned incentives and inaccurate performance reporting.

• Verification costs are a practical challenge in PbR, and while they may improve data reliability, they are often high and difficult to manage.

• Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives can interact in complex ways. Extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation, especially when the agent is already motivated by the goal.

• The multitask model suggests that PbR may lead to suboptimal behavior if the measure does not accurately reflect the true goal. For example, focusing on dropout rates may improve completion but harm learning outcomes.

Conclusion

While Payment by Results offers a novel approach to improving aid effectiveness, its success depends heavily on the quality of the performance measure and the characteristics of the recipient. PbR is not a panacea and should be applied with caution. The article calls for more empirical research and careful design of performance indicators to ensure that PbR truly incentivizes the desired outcomes and does not lead to misleading success or unintended consequences.