战略与国际研究中心-Dealing-With-the-Growing-Afghan-and-US-Tensions-That-Are-Losing-the-War_12页_179kb

Summary of "Dealing with the Growing Afghan and US Tensions That Are Losing the War"

Core Content

This document outlines the critical challenges and tensions between the United States, its allies, and the Afghan government during the transition period from foreign-led military operations to Afghan-led security. The author, Anthony H. Cordesman, highlights the risks of an accelerated withdrawal and the lack of readiness among Afghan security forces, which threaten the success of the transition and the stability of Afghanistan.

Main Views

The document emphasizes the following key points:

• Tensions and Fears: Both sides face significant tensions. Afghan leaders fear abandonment and perceive a lack of respect for their culture and religion. The US and its allies are concerned about corruption, governance, and the effectiveness of Afghan forces.

• Transition Challenges: The transition from coalition to Afghan-led security is at risk due to the premature withdrawal of US and ISAF forces and the lack of readiness among Afghan security forces.

• Military Readiness: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are not yet capable of fully assuming security responsibilities. The Afghan Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) face significant operational, training, and administrative shortcomings.

• Impact of Force Reductions: Rapid withdrawal of coalition forces reduces the effectiveness of ANSF and increases the vulnerability of foreign advisors and aid workers to insurgent attacks.

• Airpower and Night Raids: Reducing airpower and discontinuing night raids will severely limit the ability to counter insurgent activity, especially in high-risk areas. These tactics are essential for maintaining control and minimizing civilian casualties.

• Detention Facilities: Transferring detention facilities to Afghan control is premature and risks increased abuse, corruption, and the release of insurgents, which undermines security efforts.

• Police Development: The development of the ANP is hampered by insufficient training, equipment, and governance. The lack of effective civil service and justice systems further weakens the legitimacy and effectiveness of the police.

• Ethnic and Political Divisions: President Karzai's actions, such as disbarring the Critical Infrastructure Police, exacerbate ethnic divisions and reduce the cohesion of security forces.

• Private Security Forces: The reliance on private security companies (PSCs) is problematic, but the attempt to disband them rapidly is also risky, as it may lead to instability and the rise of new, corrupt militias.

Key Information

1. US and ISAF Withdrawal Concerns

• The US and ISAF are planning major force reductions in 2012, which will occur during a critical campaign season.
• This reduction leaves the ANSF unprepared to replace coalition forces, especially in high-risk areas.
• The lack of sufficient airpower and ground forces will increase the risk of insurgent resurgence and loss of control over key regions.

2. Night Raids and Civilian Impact

• Night raids are more effective in capturing insurgents and reducing collateral damage.
• Discontinuing them will allow insurgents to regain control of rural areas and threaten the security of government and aid efforts.
• The current reliance on night raids is necessary to maintain the balance of power and ensure the safety of civilians and foreign personnel.

3. Detention Facilities Transfer

• The transfer of detention facilities to Afghan control is not yet viable due to the risk of abuse, corruption, and the potential for insurgents to use these facilities for training and indoctrination.
• The current system, while flawed, provides better accountability and oversight than an Afghan-run system.

4. Afghan Military Readiness

• The Afghan Army (ANA) is still in need of support in areas such as logistics, intelligence, and close air support.
• Attrition rates remain high, especially among the ANP, and the force is not yet ready to operate independently.
• The ANA is projected to reach 195,000 personnel by October 2012, but this is not sufficient for full operational capability.

5. Afghan Police Forces

• The ANP faces significant challenges in training, equipment, and logistics.
• The police are still heavily dependent on coalition support, especially in contested areas.
• The lack of effective governance and justice systems weakens the legitimacy of the police and hampers their ability to provide security.

6. Ethnic and Political Divisions

• The disbandment of the Critical Infrastructure Police has worsened ethnic tensions, particularly in non-Pashtun regions.
• These divisions could lead to post-withdrawal power struggles and weaken the central government's authority.

7. Private Security Forces

• PSCs are responsible for securing many ISAF and civilian sites, but they are often corrupt and poorly supervised.
• Rushing to disband these forces without proper alternatives may lead to increased insecurity and the rise of new, independent militias.

8. Funding and Training Gaps

• The US and its allies are reducing aid funding for ANSF development, which is critical for long-term stability.
• The current training and advisory efforts are insufficient to meet the needs of the ANSF, especially as coalition forces withdraw.

9. Impact on Transition

• The rushed transition process is likely to fail due to the lack of readiness among Afghan forces.
• A successful transition requires time, sustained support, and a comprehensive plan that includes governance and justice reforms.

Conclusion

The document concludes that the current transition strategy is flawed and unsustainable. The premature withdrawal of US and ISAF forces, combined with the lack of readiness among Afghan security forces, will likely lead to a breakdown in security and stability. A successful transition requires a longer timeline, more funding, and a commitment to reforming governance and the justice system, as well as maintaining effective support for the ANSF. Without these measures, the risk of failure and the return of Taliban control increases significantly.