霍普金斯大学-挠睡龙尾：我们应该恢复核试验吗？（英文）-2021.5-64页_8mb

Summary of "Tickling the Sleeping Dragon's Tail: Should We Resume Nuclear Testing?"

Core Content

This report examines whether the United States should resume nuclear testing, considering both technical and policy dimensions. It concludes that, under current circumstances, resuming nuclear testing is not advisable due to the lack of a compelling national security need and the potential for significant negative geopolitical consequences, including nuclear proliferation and the reignition of a nuclear arms race.

Main Points

• Metaphorical Context: The phrase "tickling the sleeping dragon's tail" is used to describe the risk of provoking severe consequences through provocative actions, drawing from the 1946 incident involving Louis Slotin and the critical mass experiment, which led to his death due to a nuclear accident.

• International Framework: The United States is bound by several treaties that restrict nuclear testing:

  • Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963): Prohibits atmospheric, underwater, and outer space testing.
  • Outer Space Treaty (1967): Extends the ban to celestial bodies.
  • Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974): Limits underground tests to yields below 150 kilotons.
  • Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976): Bans certain peaceful nuclear explosions.

  These treaties allow only underground nuclear tests at designated sites with yields below 150 kilotons.

• Historical Overview: The US has conducted 1,054 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1992, primarily in the atmosphere and underwater, with a shift to underground testing after the 1963 treaty. Tests served various purposes: weapon development, effects studies, proliferation monitoring, and peaceful nuclear explosions.

• Surprises in Testing: The report highlights how nuclear testing has historically revealed unexpected issues, such as weapon reliability, safety concerns, and environmental impacts. These surprises have often justified the need for testing and have shaped the evolution of the stockpile.

• Stockpile Stewardship: The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) has replaced testing as the primary means of maintaining confidence in the US nuclear arsenal. However, the report expresses concerns about the program's limitations and potential for failure, especially as warheads age and change over time.

• Arguments for Resumption:

  • Underground testing is needed to develop specialized low-yield nuclear weapons.
  • Confidence in the stockpile is eroding.
  • Adversaries could exploit monitoring ambiguities.

• Arguments Against Resumption:

  • Other states may resume testing, increasing global nuclear risk.
  • US nonproliferation leadership could be undermined.
  • Existing weapons are sufficient for current security needs.
  • The SSP provides adequate confidence.
  • Underground tests pose health risks to civilians.

• Conclusion: The report concludes that the US should not resume nuclear testing at this time. However, it acknowledges that future developments could necessitate a reevaluation of this stance.

Key Information

• Test Readiness: The US is not well-prepared to resume testing due to the loss of expertise and infrastructure.
• Recommendations:
  • Relax the interpretation of CTBT limits to align with Russian definitions.
  • Acknowledge the limitations of the SSP and develop mitigation strategies.
  • Revamp the certification process to include an independent review body.
  • Enhance preparedness for future testing by improving the implementation of PDD-15.
• Future Considerations: The report identifies several potential triggers for a reconsideration of the testing moratorium, including a nuclear crisis, the resumption of testing by Russia or China, or the discovery of a common-mode failure in the arsenal.

Final Thought

The report places the decision to resume nuclear testing in the context of conflicting long-term and short-term US national security goals. While the long-term aim is a world without nuclear weapons, the short-term need is to maintain effective deterrence against nuclear-armed adversaries. Resuming testing now would risk undermining the long-term goal without significantly enhancing the short-term one.

Structure of the Report

• Introduction: Defines the scope and importance of the issue.
• Nuclear Testing Overview: Provides a general overview of the history and purposes of nuclear testing.
• US Nuclear Testing: Details the US test program from 1945 to 1992.
• Arguments for and Against Resumption: Presents both sides of the debate.
• Test Readiness: Reviews the current state of readiness for resuming testing.
• Recommendations: Suggests steps to improve preparedness and policy.
• Final Thought: Concludes with a reflection on the broader implications of resuming nuclear testing.

Conclusion

The report advocates for maintaining the current moratorium on nuclear testing, emphasizing the risks associated with resuming such activities and the importance of a robust, transparent, and independent certification process to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile.