2012年-世界发展银行全球_Reputation_Matters___Spillover_Effects_in_the_Enforcement_of_US_SPS_Measures_39页_1mb

Summary of "Reputation Matters: Spillover Effects in the Enforcement of US SPS Measures"

Core Content

This working paper investigates the role of reputation in the enforcement of US sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, particularly through the lens of import refusals. The authors use a novel dataset on US import refusals from 1998 to 2008 to analyze how past compliance or non-compliance with SPS regulations affects current enforcement decisions. The study highlights the importance of reputation effects in shaping the outcomes of import refusals and explores how these effects can be sector-wide and geographically spillover.

Main Findings

• Reputation Matters: A country's own history of compliance with SPS measures significantly reduces the likelihood of import refusals. Specifically, the odds of at least one import refusal in the current year increase by more than 300% if there was a refusal in the preceding year, after controlling for other factors.

• Sector Reputation Spillovers: There are cross-product spillovers in the enforcement of SPS measures. A product is more likely to be refused if closely related products from the same country have also been refused in the past.

• Neighbor Reputation Spillovers: The reputation of neighboring countries also influences the enforcement of SPS measures. If a similar product from a neighboring country has been refused, the likelihood of a refusal for the same product from the exporter's country increases.

• Path Dependence: The enforcement process appears to be path-dependent, meaning that past violations can shape current enforcement decisions, even when controlling for other variables. This suggests that reputation is a key factor in the allocation of enforcement resources.

• Policy Implications: The findings emphasize the need for sector-based approaches to upgrade standards systems and the potential benefits of regional cooperation in improving SPS compliance. They also highlight the importance of reputation in shaping trade outcomes for agricultural products, especially for middle-income countries.

Key Contributions

• First Empirical Evidence of Reputation Effects: The paper provides empirical evidence of reputation effects in the enforcement of SPS measures, which is a novel contribution to the literature.

• Three Reputation Effects: It identifies and tests three distinct reputation effects:

  1. Own Reputation Effect: A country's own past compliance with SPS measures.
  2. Sector Reputation Effect: Refusals for one product are influenced by the historical performance of related products in the same sector.
  3. Neighbor Reputation Effect: Refusals for a product are influenced by the historical performance of the same product in neighboring countries.

• Methodological Innovation: The authors use a conditional fixed effects logit model and a negative binomial model to test the relationship between reputation and import refusals, allowing for cross-country, cross-product, and through-time variation.

• Policy Relevance: The study has important implications for Aid for Trade and standards upgrading in developing countries, suggesting that comprehensive sector approaches and regional cooperation can enhance compliance capacity and market access.

Methodology Overview

• Data Sources:

  • A new dataset on US import refusals for 1998–2008.
  • Trade data from UN-Comtrade via the World Bank’s WITS platform.
  • Per capita GDP data in PPP terms from the World Development Indicators.
  • Effectively applied import tariffs from UNCTAD's TRAINS database.

• Variables:

  • Dependent Variables:
    • RefusalsDum_ikt: A dummy variable indicating whether there was at least one import refusal for a given country-product-year combination.
    • Refusals_ikt: A count variable indicating the number of import refusals for a given exporter-product-year combination.
  • Independent Variables:
    • Own Reputation: Lagged import refusals for the same country-product combination.
    • Sector Reputation: Lagged refusals for related products within the same HS2 chapter.
    • Neighbor Reputation: Lagged refusals for the same product from neighboring countries.
    • Import Volume: Lagged import values.
    • Tariffs: Effectively applied import tariffs.
    • Per Capita GDP: As a proxy for exporter capacity.

• Model Specification:

  • The authors use conditional fixed effects logit and negative binomial regression models to estimate the impact of reputation on import refusals.
  • They include fixed effects for country, product, and time to control for other factors.

Conclusion

The study underscores the central role of reputation in the enforcement of SPS measures in the US, particularly through import refusals. It identifies three key reputation effects and suggests that policy makers should consider sector-based strategies and regional cooperation to improve compliance and reduce trade barriers for developing countries. The findings also contribute to the broader Aid for Trade and technical assistance discussions by emphasizing the importance of reputation in shaping enforcement outcomes.