2004年-世界发展银行全球_Some_Options_for_Improving_the_Governance_of_State-Owned_Electricity_Utilities_44页_392kb

Summary of "Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-Owned Electricity Utilities"

Core Content

This discussion paper, authored by Timothy Irwin and Chiaki Yamamoto from the World Bank, explores options for improving the governance of state-owned electricity utilities in developing countries without resorting to full privatization. It emphasizes the need for structural changes in the relationship between the government and its electricity companies to enhance performance, accountability, and efficiency.

Main Viewpoints

• Poor Performance of State-Owned Utilities: Most government-owned electricity utilities in developing countries perform poorly due to political interference, lack of transparency, and inefficiency.
• Political Influence: Politicians and officials often use their power to extract benefits from utilities for political purposes, such as transferring resources to influential groups or extracting bribes, rather than focusing on commercial performance.
• Conflict of Interest: Governments face a conflict of interest as both owners and policy-makers, which can lead to biased regulation and poor decision-making.
• Corporate Governance as a Solution: Improving corporate governance—by restructuring the relationship between the government and utilities—can help address these issues. The paper outlines several governance reforms that can be implemented without privatizing the utility.
• Privatization as an Option: While privatization is seen as the most effective solution, it is often politically difficult and not always feasible. The paper acknowledges that privatization can eliminate the conflict of interest and introduce commercial pressures.
• Empirical Evidence: The paper examines the experiences of four countries—Mexico, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Africa—where the state remains a dominant owner of electricity companies, and reviews the effectiveness of various governance reforms.

Key Information

Problems with State-Owned Electricity Utilities

• Common Issues: Excessive staffing, low profitability, limited innovation, and poor customer service.
• Industry-Specific Problems: Monopolistic conditions lead to misaligned pricing, high technical losses, and poor billing and collection practices.
• Political Influence: Politicians and officials may prioritize non-commercial objectives over performance, resulting in inefficient resource allocation and reduced service quality.

Necessary Characteristics of a Solution

• Reduce Political Benefits: Decrease the net benefits politicians receive from using utilities for political purposes.
• Introduce Commercial Pressures: Apply external pressures from private lenders, investors, and market mechanisms to improve performance.
• Alleviate Conflict of Interest: Separate the roles of the government as owner and policy-maker to reduce biased decision-making.

Options for Improving Corporate Governance

• Applying Private-Sector Laws: Subject utilities to private-sector company law to enforce transparency and accountability.
• Legislating New Governance Arrangements: Create legal frameworks that constrain the government's influence over utilities.
• Enhanced Public Reporting: Require utilities to disclose government directives and internal policies related to corruption and theft.
• Instilling a Commercial Culture: Appoint independent directors with business experience to shift the utility's focus toward profitability.
• Private Lending and Credit Ratings: Encourage borrowing from private lenders and credit-rating agencies to introduce market scrutiny.
• Minority Share Listing: Allow a minority of shares to be listed to create market transparency and shareholder monitoring.
• Transparent Social Policies: Strengthen direct subsidies and other efficient mechanisms for resource redistribution.
• Separating Government Roles: Assign policy-making to one ministry and ownership to another to reduce conflicts of interest.

Empirical Evidence

• Private vs. Public Ownership: Studies suggest that private ownership tends to improve efficiency and performance.
• Corporate Governance in the Private Sector: Effective governance structures in the private sector can be adapted for state-owned utilities.
• Corporatization Effects: Evidence from some countries shows that corporatization can lead to better performance and transparency.

Case Studies

The paper analyzes the governance structures of state-owned electricity utilities in four countries:

• Mexico: CFE is a major state-owned utility, regulated by the Ministry of Treasury and the CRE. It follows traditional public-sector norms.
• New Zealand: The government owns three generator-retailers and the transmission company. Corporate governance is modeled after private-sector practices.
• The Philippines: The government owns Napocor and Transco. Governance follows traditional public-sector norms.
• South Africa: Eskom is the dominant utility. Corporate governance is modeled after private-sector practices.

Conclusion

While privatization is the most effective solution to improve performance, it is not always feasible. Therefore, the paper advocates for reforms in corporate governance that can enhance accountability, transparency, and efficiency. These reforms may not be as effective as privatization, but they are still valuable and should be pursued when privatization is not an option.

Annexes and References

• Annexes: Provide detailed information on the governance structures of the four case studies.
• References: Include academic and policy studies that support the analysis and recommendations of the paper.

Figures and Tables

• Table 1: Summary of corporate governance features in the four countries.
• Table 2: CFE's liabilities.
• Table 3: Performance targets from Mighty River Power's Statement of Corporate Intent.
• Table 4: Composition of boards of generator-retailers in New Zealand.
• Table 5 and 6: Credit ratings and recent profitability of New Zealand utilities.
• Table 7: Napocor's net income.
• Table 8: Eskom's real rate of return on total assets.

Box Highlights

• Box 1: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
• Box 2: ASX Corporate-Governance Disclosure Requirements.
• Box 3: Legislative changes in Uganda for state-owned enterprises.
• Box 4: Minority ownership in Pakistan's state-owned gas utilities.
• Box 5: Statement of Corporate Intent for New Zealand state-owned enterprises.