斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-Arms-transfers-to-the-Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo_-Assessing-the-system-of-arms-transfer-notifications-2008–10_12页_367kb

Summary: ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: ASSESSING THE SYSTEM OF ARMS TRANSFER NOTIFICATIONS, 2008-10

I. Core Content

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been subject to a United Nations (UN) arms embargo since 2003, aimed at curbing the flow of arms to non-state armed groups and militias in the eastern regions of the country. In 2008, the UN Security Council lifted restrictions on arms acquisitions by the Congolese Government, including the FARDC, but maintained the requirement for supplier states to notify the Sanctions Committee before delivering arms or related equipment to the DRC. This notification system is designed as a middle ground between a full embargo and unrestricted arms transfers, allowing for some level of international oversight while respecting the DRC's sovereignty.

Despite the formal lifting of some restrictions, the security situation in the DRC remains volatile, with ongoing conflict in eastern provinces like Ituri, Nord-Kivu, and Sud-Kivu. The conflict is fueled by the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW), with both state and non-state actors involved in their distribution. The Congolese national security forces, particularly the FARDC, have also been implicated in the proliferation of arms to rebel groups, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and displacing hundreds of thousands of people.

II. Main Points

• Arms Embargo Context: The UN arms embargo was initially imposed in 2003 to restrict arms to non-state actors in the DRC. It was later modified in 2008 to allow the DRC government to acquire arms but still require supplier states to notify the Sanctions Committee.

• Notification System: The system relies on supplier states informing the Sanctions Committee of planned arms transfers to the DRC. However, the process is often inconsistent, with incomplete or delayed notifications.

• Challenges in Implementation:

  • The DRC's porous borders and unregulated airspace make monitoring difficult.
  • There are reports of arms being transferred without proper notification or with incomplete details.
  • Some states, like China and Sudan, have been identified as having made unnotified arms transfers.

• Role of the Group of Experts: The Group of Experts on the DRC plays a key role in monitoring and reporting on arms transfers, including identifying unnotified deliveries and assessing compliance with the embargo.

• Implications for Other Conflict Zones: The effectiveness of the DRC's notification system has broader implications for the use of similar mechanisms in other conflict zones, as it demonstrates the need for transparency and international cooperation.

III. Key Information

A. Arms Transfers Notified to the Sanctions Committee

• Belgium, China, France, Sweden, and the UK reported notifying the Sanctions Committee of arms transfers in 2008.
• China provided three notifications in 2008–2010, including military training and a delivery of arms in April 2009, though the latter's confirmation remains uncertain.
• Ukraine notified the Sanctions Committee in 2008 of a major arms delivery, which included 20 T-72 tanks, 10,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, and large quantities of ammunition, arriving in March 2010.

B. Arms Transfers Not Notified

• The Group of Experts identified several unnotified or underreported arms transfers to the FARDC.
• China was implicated in multiple unnotified deliveries, including a shipment in September 2008 of 50 tractor trucks and tank-carrying trailers.
• Sudan was reported to have made several unnotified air shipments of arms to the DRC between 2007 and 2008, using FARDC-operated aircraft.
• North Korea delivered over 3000 tonnes of military equipment to the DRC in January 2009, which the FARDC allegedly concealed from port authorities.

C. Recommendations and Observations

• The Sanctions Committee should clarify rules on notification obligations, particularly in cases involving multiple intermediaries.
• Improved transparency is essential for the system to function effectively, including more systematic reporting and verification of incomplete notifications.
• Stockpile management by the FARDC is a critical issue, as poor management contributes to the risk of arms diversion.
• The Group of Experts has recommended that international donors include stockpile management as a condition for support to the DRC's security sector.
• The UN Security Council has emphasized the need for better stockpile security and management, but has not mandated it for donor assistance.

IV. Conclusion

The notification system for arms transfers to the DRC remains an important tool for international oversight, but its effectiveness is limited by inconsistent reporting, incomplete information, and challenges in monitoring. The system's success depends on the full cooperation of supplier states and the Congolese government, as well as improved transparency and accountability in arms transfers. Ensuring the system works as intended is crucial not only for the DRC but also for the broader application of similar mechanisms in other conflict zones.