荷兰国际关系研究所-欧盟对叙利亚和伊拉克民用战争的政策和干预（英文）-2021.2-55页_938kb

Summary of "Band-aids, not bullets: EU policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars"

Core Content

This report evaluates the European Union's (EU) institutional policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars (2011–2020), highlighting the EU's strengths and weaknesses in managing high-intensity, existential conflicts. The authors argue that while the EU has made progress in conceptualising and institutionalising a more comprehensive approach to conflict, its practical capabilities remain limited. The report underscores the need for a full-spectrum foreign policy toolkit that includes strategic decision-making, coherent policy implementation, and the ability to deploy limited armed force.

Main Viewpoints

• EU Foreign Policy as a Collective Good: The EU's foreign policy is intended to serve as a European public good, but its effectiveness is hindered by the lack of a unified strategic culture and shared threat perception among Member States.
• Institutional Weaknesses: Despite the creation of new institutions like the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Peace Facility (EPF), the EU lacks the coherence and capability to act effectively in high-intensity conflicts.
• Member State Priorities: The diversity and competitiveness of foreign policy interests among EU Member States limit the EU's ability to act as a unified actor, resulting in a fragmented and often ineffective response to crises.
• Need for Systemic Upgrades: The report recommends two critical upgrades to the EU's foreign policy toolkit: the institutionalisation of dedicated conflict task forces and the development of limited high-end military forces.

Key Information

1. EU Foreign Policy Evolution

• The EU has made significant strides in the past decade, particularly in the development of its foreign policy architecture and understanding of conflict as a cyclical and context-specific phenomenon.
• The Lisbon Treaty (2009) enabled the creation of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and the EEAS, which were key in rethinking the EU's approach to conflict.
• The 2016 EU Global Strategy aimed to enhance the coherence and ambition of EU foreign policy, with the EU Strategic Compass (2020) focusing on security and defence objectives.

2. Syrian Civil War (2011–2020)

• The conflict was marked by high levels of violence and existential stakes, making it a critical case for evaluating EU policy effectiveness.
• The EU's initial response was limited and fragmented, with a lack of strategic coordination and military capability.
• The shift to targeting the Islamic State (2013–2017) saw some institutional improvements, but the EU's engagement remained reactive and not fully integrated.
• From 2017 to 2020, the EU's policies became more about relief and wishful thinking, with limited real impact on the conflict's resolution.

3. Iraqi Civil War (2010–2020)

• The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014 exploited existing social fractures, making the conflict particularly complex.
• The EU's response to IS included support for partner armed forces through the European Peace Facility (EPF) and other instruments.
• After IS, the EU's institutional engagement became more focused on humanitarian aid and stabilisation, but lacked the comprehensive strategy needed to address the conflict's deeper roots.

4. EU Institutional Capabilities

• The EU's foreign policy toolkit includes thematic and geographical policies, strategic forums, country-specific arrangements, and various instruments and mechanisms.
• However, the lack of strategic culture, decision-making structures, and operational coherence remains a major obstacle to effective conflict management.
• The EU is currently unable to project meaningful armed force beyond its borders, even though it has started to develop indirect military support capabilities.

5. Recommendations

• Dedicated Conflict Task Forces: The EU should create task forces with broad authorisation to coordinate political, diplomatic, economic, and military strategies across the bureaucracy.
• Limited Military Forces: The EU should develop limited high-end military forces, possibly through the revival of EU Battlegroups, to support partner armed forces in conflict zones.
• Improved Conflict Analysis: Enhancing the quality and coherence of conflict analysis is essential to ensuring that EU interventions are effective and do not cause unintended harm.
• Strategic Consolidation: Greater strategic consolidation and streamlining of methods and authorities are needed to develop a coherent and integrated approach to conflict management.

Conclusion

The EU's institutional capabilities in managing high-intensity conflicts remain underdeveloped, despite recent efforts to improve its foreign policy framework. The report concludes that the EU must institutionalise full-spectrum decision-making and force deployment modalities to become a more effective actor in conflict situations. The case studies of Syria and Iraq illustrate the challenges of achieving this, given the fragmented nature of EU Member State interests and the lack of a unified strategic culture. The report calls for a more integrated and coherent approach to EU foreign policy, especially in the context of the conflict cycle, to ensure that the EU can respond effectively to crises in its neighborhood.