战略与国际研究中心-Trends-in-US-Defense-Spending,-Procurement,-and-Readiness_-The-Widening-Strategy_59页_193kb

Summary of Trends in US Defense Spending, Procurement, and Readiness (1998)

Core Content

This document, authored by Anthony H. Cordesman for the CSIS in April 1998, provides a detailed analysis of the trends in US defense spending, procurement, and readiness from 1945 to 2002. It highlights the significant decline in defense spending post-Cold War and the misalignment between strategic goals and resource allocation.

Main Points

1. Decline in Defense Spending

• National Defense Spending as a Percent of GNP:

  • From 6.2% in FY1985, it dropped to around 3.5% in FY2002.
  • This is the lowest defense effort since the Great Depression.

• National Defense Spending as a Percent of Federal Budget:

  • Peaked at 28.1% in FY1987, it fell to approximately 12.5% in FY2002.
  • This represents a substantial reduction in the proportion of the federal budget allocated to defense.

• Spending Cycles:

  • There are distinct cycles in defense spending, often influenced by political and budgetary decisions.
  • The "Rolling Get Well" concept, where defense spending was expected to rise in future years, was repeatedly deferred, with funding levels remaining flat or decreasing.

2. Procurement and RDT&E Cuts

• Procurement Spending:

  • There has been a consistent real decline in procurement spending since the end of the Cold War.
  • The FY1998 procurement budget was $42.6 billion, which was $11.3 billion below the FY1995 plan.
  • The cumulative loss in procurement funding from FY1996 to FY1998 was $18 billion compared to the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) plan.

• RDT&E Spending:

  • Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) spending also declined in real terms.
  • The FY1998 RDT&E budget was $3,399.3 million, a decrease of $238.8 million compared to the original request.

3. The "Rolling Get Well" Concept

• The concept of increasing defense spending in the future was repeatedly deferred to the next administration.
• The FY1997 and FY1999 budgets "flatlined" budget authority (BA) and shifted the burden of budget outlays (BO) to future administrations.
• The outlay lag in procurement means that budget authority is not immediately translated into actual spending, further delaying the "Rolling Get Well" effect.

4. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Procurement Strategy

• The QDR (May 1997) did not provide meaningful solutions but instead introduced concealed cuts and new strategic goals.
• Key procurement goals were reduced:
  • JSTARS from 19 to 13 aircraft.
  • F-22 from 438 to 339 aircraft.
  • F/A-18E/F from 1,000 to 548 aircraft.
  • JSF from 2,978 to 2,852 aircraft.
  • V-22 from 425 to 360 aircraft.
  • THAAD deployment delayed to after 2004.
• The QDR emphasized "focused modernization" and the "revolution in military affairs," but the actual funding for these initiatives was insufficient or delayed.

5. Readiness and Deployment Issues

• Despite promises of constant activity levels, readiness was compromised due to underfunding and over-deployment.
• The FY1998 budget showed a significant shortfall in procurement and readiness-related spending.
• The document warns of a retention crisis and the increasing costs of ongoing military operations.

Key Information

• Budget Authority (BA) vs. Outlays (BO):

  • There was a persistent gap between BA and BO, with BO often lagging behind BA.
  • This gap was used to defer the financial impact of defense spending to future administrations.

• Congressional Influence:

  • Congress increased funding for the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program but did not allocate resources for new theater defense systems.
  • The BMD funding in FY1998 was increased, but procurement for other systems was cut or postponed.

• Strategic Goals and Realities:

  • The QDR outlined ambitious goals but failed to provide the necessary funding.
  • The focus on "revolution in military affairs" and "information superiority" was not supported by adequate budget allocations.

• Future Procurement Plans:

  • The FY1998 budget included plans to procure advanced systems such as the Apache Longbow, Hellfire missiles, and the RAH-66 Comanche.
  • There was a shift towards more agile and digitized systems, with reduced emphasis on legacy systems.

• Military Construction and Modernization:

  • Military construction spending remained relatively constant.
  • The modernization of the Navy included the procurement of the 10th Nimitz-class carrier and the development of new submarines.

Conclusion

The document highlights a significant gap between US defense strategy and the actual funding and procurement capabilities. Despite the "Rolling Get Well" concept, defense spending and procurement have continued to decline, leading to underfunded readiness and a lack of modernization. The QDR, while outlining new strategic directions, failed to address the underlying budget constraints and misaligned procurement with the joint vision for the future. This has led to a situation where the US military is not adequately prepared for future threats and challenges.