外商投资新格局_未来产业与贸易的转型_70页_7mb

> **来源：[研报客](https://pc.yanbaoke.cn)** # The FDI shake-up How foreign direct investment today may shape industry and trade tomorrow Confidential and proprietary. Any use of this material without specific permission of McKinsey & Company is strictly prohibited. Copyright © 2025 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved. Cover image © akinbostanci/Getty Images. All interior images © Getty Images. # McKinsey Global Institute The McKinsey Global Institute was established in 1990. Our mission is to provide a fact base to aid decision making on the economic and business issues most critical to the world's companies and policy leaders. We benefit from the full range of McKinsey's regional, sectoral, and functional knowledge, skills, and expertise, but editorial direction and decisions are solely the responsibility of MGI directors and partners. Our research is currently grouped into five major themes: Productivity and prosperity: Creating and harnessing the world's assets most productively Resources of the world: Building, powering, and feeding the world sustainably Human potential: Maximizing and achieving the potential of human talent - Global connections: Exploring how flows of goods, services, people, capital, and ideas shape economies - Technologies and markets of the future: Discussing the next big arenas of value and competition We aim for independent and fact-based research. None of our work is commissioned or funded by any business, government, or other institution; we share our results publicly free of charge; and we are entirely funded by the partners of McKinsey. While we engage multiple distinguished external advisers to contribute to our work, the analyses presented in our publications are MGI's alone, and any errors are our own. You can find out more about MGI and our research at www.mckinsey.com/mgi. # MGI directors Sven Smit (chair) Chris Bradley Kweilin Ellingrud Sylvain Johansson Nick Leung Olivia White Lareina Yee # MGI partners Mekala Krishnan Anu Madgavkar Jan Mischke Jeongmin Seong # Contents At a glance 3 Introduction 4 CHAPTER 1 FDI promises to mold the industries of the future 9 CHAPTER 2 Multinationals are investing big and increasingly along geopolitical lines 20 CHAPTER 3 How shifts in FDI announcements today may shape industry dynamics tomorrow 30 CHAPTER 4 Shaping economic competitiveness across the world 51 CHAPTER 5 Navigating FDI signals and shifts in a high-stakes environment 62 Acknowledgments 65 Endnotes 66 # At a glance - Foreign direct investment has transformed industries from oil to electronics. Providing initial funding is just the start; cross-border deals that take root also transfer knowledge and spur ongoing domestic investment. Today's patterns of greenfield FDI announcements signal a new shake-up. FDI promises to shape advanced manufacturing, AI infrastructure, and the resources that power them. Since 2022, three-quarters of cross-border announcements have gone to these types of future-shaping industries as well as energy and mining projects—up from about half pre-2020. While not all announcements proceed, historically 60 to 80 percent have. Pledged investment has increasingly followed geopolitical lines. Advanced economies announced more investment into one another—particularly to the United States—but decreased flows to China by nearly 70 percent. China pivoted from net investee to prominent investor in future-shaping industries, boosting announcements to Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa by over two-thirds. Emerging economies attracted investment pledges from across the geopolitical spectrum. - To win globally, multinationals are placing bigger bets. While megadeals over $1 billion represent only 1 percent of cross-border deals, they account for half the total value—a jump from one-third five years ago. New data centers, semiconductor fabs, and battery factories don't come cheap. Stakes are high and change is afoot. If successful, FDI projects announced since 2022 could more than quadruple current battery manufacturing capacity outside China, nearly double the global data center capacity that powers AI, and draw the United States into the circle of top leading-edge semiconductor-producing nations. Patterns like these can help decision makers anticipate the shifting geometry of global trade and the future map of international business. # Introduction Oil. Copper. Semiconductors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has seeded and transformed these and many other global industries. Cross-border investments in the late 19th century forged the global oil industry as money and know-how flowed from the United States and Europe to Baku (present-day Azerbaijan) and Sumatra (modern-day Indonesia), followed by investment around the globe in the 20th century. Similarly, foreign investments shaped mineral-rich economies. For example, Chile's position as a world-leading copper exporter for most of the past 140 years was catalyzed by multinational firms that developed vast open-pit mines and transferred geological, engineering, and operational expertise. Following World War II, foreign direct investment played a critical role in spurring global manufacturing. $^{3}$ South Korea's semiconductor industry first emerged from successive waves of FDI, particularly from US and Japanese multinationals, starting in the 1970s. $^{4}$ FDI fueled China's rise to become a leading manufacturing power as multinational enterprises built factories, transferred knowledge, and nurtured labor and supplier ecosystems. $^{5}$ What can FDI today tell us about global industry in the future? While tomorrow's trade map is still being drawn, patterns may emerge from major companies' announcements of greenfield FDI. These are cross-border investments that create fresh productive capacity such as new mines, factories, and data centers in new places. FDI offers a window to what's coming. Since 2017, the geometry of global trade has been shifting toward geopolitically closer partners, a trend that could accelerate, given new tariffs, security concerns, and more muscular, domestically driven industrial policies. Our analysis of about 200,000 announced FDI projects from 2015 through May 2025 signals that geopolitics will play an increasing role in global trade (see sidebar "Methodology"). While FDI still bridges vast geographic distances, the average geopolitical distance of greenfield FDI announcements since 2017 shrank about two times faster than that of trade (Exhibit 1). 6 # While tomorrow's trade map is still being drawn, patterns may emerge from major companies' announcements of greenfield FDI. What does this mean for economies? Announced projects could more than quadruple battery manufacturing capacity outside China, almost double the global data center capacity that powers AI, and draw the United States into the circle of nations that are the biggest producers of leading-edge semiconductors. These are examples of how FDI may mold future-shaping industries while also rewiring cross-border economic ties. This report explores shifts underway in FDI and offers foresight for decision-makers navigating a high-stakes environment of intensifying global economic competition and shifting geopolitical dynamics. # Exhibit 1 # Geopolitical distance has fallen twice as fast for FDI as for trade. # Greenfield FDI announcements and goods trade indicators, 2005-May 2025 Greenfield FDI announcements² Goods trade # Geographic distance traveled, thousand km, value-weighted average # Geopolitical distance traveled, 0-10 scale, value-weighted average Distance measures the value-weighted average distance. Geopolitical distance measures the value-weighted average partner similarity based on analysis of UN General Assembly voting patterns between 2005 and 2022. Economies without UN representation are excluded. 23-year rolling average. 3For goods trade, this figure represents the change between 2017 and 2024. Source: Using data provided by fDi Markets; UN Comtrade; UN Digital Library; Voeten (2017); World Bank; McKinsey Global Institute analysis McKinsey & Company # Sidebar # Methodology # Tracking greenfield FDI—approach and limitations This report studies the dynamics of how multinationals plan on reconfiguring their footprints and the implications for the future of sectors and economies. Here we describe our approach for doing so, highlighting areas of limitation. # We look at greenfield FDI, a subset of global capital flows aimed at creating new capacity Our analysis focuses on greenfield FDI projects announced in the last decade. These are cross-border investment projects that create net new capacity. Expansions at existing sites are included as greenfield FDI as long as they expand productive capacity. $^1$ Our scope does not include other types of FDI, such as mergers and acquisitions, since these involve changes of ownership rather than changes to productive footprint. Furthermore, since only greenfield FDI announcements are considered, our analysis does not cover any projects developed wholly by domestic companies (regardless of their financing, even if in part from foreign sources). # Our analysis focuses on announcements of greenfield FDI Announcements of FDI provide forward-looking indications of productive capacity creation and can be analyzed at a granular level. That is why this report analyzes companies' stated investment plans, not the actual disbursements of FDI (flows of capital across borders registered in the international balance of payments). Such aggregate flow data can include transactions that do not increase capacity. Disbursements can also include some so-called conduit FDI—counting twice the investment flows that are routed from a source country to a conduit country to a final destination. While international statistical organizations make substantial efforts to remove such double counting, they cannot do so entirely because of data limitations and complex financing structures.[2] That said, announcements are an imperfect metric with important limitations. Companies may either revise up or down how much they ultimately spend, depending on how project implementation unfolds—and in some cases, announce plans that never materialize at all. At the same time, there are no universal norms for what to include in announced project values. Company practices differ, for example, on costs for site preparation (like roads and utilities), furniture and fixtures, software licenses, and patents. Furthermore, companies are generally not required to publicly announce their FDI projects at all (though sometimes disclosure to government authorities is mandatory) and in some cases may choose not to. For these reasons, a dollar announced is not always equivalent to a dollar spent. 3 Still, FDI announcements are reliable indicators of future projects on the ground. Realization rates (that is, percentages comparing the original FDI announcements with the eventual value of projects actually developed) are hard to pinpoint and vary by industry and region, but studies that track projects from announcement to completion, alongside analyses by national statistical agencies of company-reported data, generally find rates above 60 percent.4 For example, a 2025 analysis found that about 80 percent of announced investments in the United States between 2017 and 2020 ultimately materialized, on a dollar-weighted average basis. This is despite high-profile exceptions, such as an electronics factory in Wisconsin.[5] # Our data source for greenfield FDI announcements Analysis of greenfield FDI announcement data in this report used data provided by fDi Markets, from the Financial Times. The data set covers about 180,000 individual records announced between 2015 and May 2025, covering more than 190 economies and all sectors of the economy. Each data record corresponds to a single deal announced by a single multinational company. When reporting the number of deals, we treat each individual production facility (or a completely new large line within a facility) separately. A single corporate announcement can therefore include multiple deals, and of course, the same deal can be discussed in multiple announcements but would only be captured once in our analysis. Based on fDi Markets documentation, each individual record's associated capital investment is derived, as far as possible, using public data like company announcements, filings, and press releases. In the absence of disclosures, fDi Markets estimates figures based on their proprietary algorithm. The data # Sidebar (continued) # Methodology set also assigns a "source economy" and "destination economy" to each record. The source is the country in which the ultimate parent company is headquartered. For multinationals with dual listings or joint headquarters, a single location is assigned—that of the original headquarters. The destination is based on the physical location of the projects to be developed. We have not independently verified this data. # We analyze data by region and country as well as by sector We group economies into eight regions. Three regions represent our group of advanced economies: United States and Canada; Europe, including the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Switzerland, Norway, and a group of other smaller economies that in aggregate account for around 3 percent of FDI in the region; and advanced Asia (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan). We aggregate Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao as part of the China region. Finally, four regions represent our emerging economies: Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa (which also includes Türkiye), sub-Saharan Africa, and emerging Asia (which includes Asia-Pacific excluding economies in advanced Asia and China). Unless explicitly stated, flows within Europe are included in global totals. However, when discussing Europe specifically and comparing it with other regions, intra-European flows are excluded and correspondingly noted. 7 Sectors are established at the deal level rather than at the level of the announcing company. Conglomerates, for example, can announce investments across a broad swath of industries. fDi Markets' taxonomy considers nearly 270 subsectors, which we aggregate into six high-level groups: advanced manufacturing (knowledge-intensive industries including semiconductors, automotive and batteries, pharmaceuticals, and others), communications and software (including data centers in addition to other software services and telecommunications services), energy (including fossil fuels and renewable energy), metals and minerals, basic manufacturing and consumer products (including less knowledge-intensive manufacturing like rubber and plastics or textiles), and operational and professional services (a broad range spanning construction, logistics, and financial and business services). # We adjust for inflation and, to correct for volatility, use two comparison periods We inflation-adjust all numbers to 2024 dollar terms. Then, because annual figures are volatile, we avoid single-year comparisons and instead use time windows. The most recent covers 2022 through May 2025, to make the analysis as current as possible (initial testing of June data, not fully available at time of writing, suggests that including it would keep a broadly constant picture). We compare this with a reference period of 2015 through 2019. We exclude 2020 and 2021 due to COVID-19-related turbulence. For comparability across time periods of different length, all numbers are annualized. For example, for the period from January 2022 to May 2025, we take all values from January 2022 to May 2025 and divide them by approximately $3.4$ . To investigate whether trends of FDI announcements have shifted this year, we also run some analyses on 2025 data alone. To compare them with the 2022-to-2024 interval, we annualize data up to May by scaling it up to a full year. These annualized figures should not be seen as a projection but rather a well-defined way of making data comparable for the purpose of analysis. In general, FDI flows are quite volatile, because large projects can shift overall numbers, as can a host of other factors like commodity prices and exchange rates. This may be even more the case over a period like the first five months of 2025, during which there was considerable uncertainty about tariffs and other cross-border considerations. In fact, 2025 data is lumpier than any other year we've examined. For example, March 2025 corresponds to the highest month of announced greenfield FDI on record, while May 2025 corresponds to the lowest in the last decade, meaning extrapolations from 2025's early months are particularly uncertain. # To estimate potential FDI impact on capacity in a few specific industries, we examine the largest projects in detail To estimate potential capacity increases for some industries—such as batteries and data centers—we examine foreseen capacity for each of at least the largest 20 announcements in that industry. This enables us to derive an initial dollar-to-capacity ratio, which we calibrate with industry benchmarks and then apply across all FDI announcements in that industry. For data centers, for example, we consider dollars per megawatt. # FDI promises to mold the industries of the future Announced FDI flows increasingly target industries that will shape the global economy and the resources that power them. Future-shaping industries include data centers powering artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductor fabrication facilities (fabs), electric vehicle (EV) and battery manufacturing facilities, and a range of other advanced manufacturing from pharmaceuticals to robots (see sidebar "What are future-shaping industries?"). Together, future-shaping industries and resources accounted for three-quarters of greenfield FDI announcements from 2022 through May 2025. In inflation-adjusted, 2024-dollar terms, this was up from around 55 percent during the 2015 to 2019 period—the pre-COVID-19 period we use as a baseline for comparison (Exhibit 2). Such investments could substantially expand the capacity of these industries and shift their global footprint into new locations. Together, future-shaping industries and resources accounted for three-quarters of greenfield FDI announcements from 2022 through May 2025. # Greenfield FDI is increasingly targeting future-shaping industries and the resources that power them. Greenfield FDI announcements by industry, annual average 2015-19 and 2022-May 2025, % of total Note: All $ figures are in terms of 2024 US dollars. 1 Includes business services, construction and real estate, financial services, healthcare, hotels and tourism, leisure and entertainment, and transportation and warehousing. 2 Includes building materials, chemicals, consumer products, food and beverage, glass, paper, plastics, rubber, textiles, and wood. 3 Includes broadcasting, cloud infrastructure, computer programming services, data centers, telecommunications, and video games. 4 Includes aerospace and defense, automotive and batteries, electronics, industrial machinery, medical devices, other transport equipment, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. 5 Includes the extraction and processing of minerals, as well as the production of metal products, such as steelmaking. 6 Includes coal, oil, and gas extraction, transport and processing, renewable energy generation, and production of low-emission fuels such as hydrogen and its derivatives. Does not include solar panel and other equipment manufacturing, which are included in advanced manufacturing. Source: Using data provided by fDi Markets; McKinsey Global Institute analysis # McKinsey & Company This shift reflects the structure of these sectors: They are winner-takes-most, technologically advanced, and capital intensive, so only a handful of global firms have the capabilities to compete. At the same time, governments, eager to host them and reduce reliance on geopolitically distant partners, are deploying powerful carrots and sticks. The result is a surge of announced megadeals (exceeding $1 billion) that drive most FDI growth and shape the global economy. In contrast, annual announced investments in conventional industries have dropped by more than 30 percent. This category includes a wide range of basic manufacturing sectors—including consumer products, food and beverages, and textiles—as well as operational and professional services, a broad category that spans construction, real estate, logistics, and financial services. This year has brought fresh uncertainty. International trade surged into the public spotlight in April 2025, when the United States unveiled large tariffs. Since then, the United States has announced trade deals with multiple countries. Some include pledges of future investment into the United States; details remain pending. Still, uncertainty persists globally, and firms may be waiting to act in hopes of more clarity down the road. # Sidebar # What are future-shaping industries? Future-shaping industries are advanced, knowledge-intensive segments of manufacturing and services. This report reveals that, in many cases, they recently have been recipients of rapidly increasing greenfield FDI announcements. In a separate research effort, MGI identified 18 future arenas that could account for up to a third of total GDP growth by 2040. These arenas include extensions of today's fast-growing sectors such as e-commerce, electric vehicles, and semiconductors; spin-off segments from existing industries such as AI software and services; and emergent new areas such as space. They are often characterized by outsize growth and dynamism as well as "escalatory" investments in frontier technologies where quality improvements result in big gains in market share. Although these lines of research are distinct, we found they are closely connected. Most of the future arenas rely on FDI that is directed into future-shaping industries in some form. Advanced manufacturing sectors such as semiconductors and batteries are the main recipients of FDI, while digital advertising, cloud, and streaming benefit from capital flows into communications and software. The linkage between the arenas of future competition and FDI in future-shaping industries reflect winnertakes-most dynamics. Leading companies in these sectors typically pursue global scale—an objective that requires cross-border investment. Nonetheless, the two concepts are not one and the same, and future-shaping industries in our analysis include additional subsectors such as some consumer electronics and machinery. Conversely, some arenas have received surprisingly limited FDI so far. Few FDI announcements were directed to robotics, for example, during our period of analysis, even though the industry is increasingly viewed as transformative for future production systems. Historically, major robotics firms based in China, Germany, Japan, and the United States have concentrated investments domestically. However, growing global demand is beginning to shift this pattern. Recent announcements include European firms scaling regional production to meet rising demand for AI-enabled industrial robots used in high-volume manufacturing, and for collaborative robots equipped with advanced vision, learning, and adaptive control for sectors like electronics. At the same time, European and Japanese companies are expanding in the United States. Defense is another sector whereannounced greenfield FDI has been limited. Cross-border defense flows most often take the form of government-to-government procurement, foreign aid in equipment transfers, offset obligations, joint ventures, or licensed production, rather than classic "foreign-owned" new plants. US prime contractors generally manufacture domestically. While offsets can involve setting up new facilities, foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) usually provide technology or tooling, partnering with a local entity rather than owning facilities outright. Furthermore, due to the sensitive nature of defense-related products, many defense projects are not reported publicly and therefore are not captured as FDI. Still, recent developments suggest potential change. South Korea has secured multibillion-dollar agreements to co-produce tanks and howitzers with Poland. The European Union has also begun establishing repair hubs and ammunition facilities in and for Ukraine. Moreover, although direct defense sector FDI remains limited, many future shaping industries produce dual-use technologies and components, bridging civilian and defense applications. Semiconductors, shipbuilding, robotics, and AI technologies are just some notable examples, highlighting the fact that FDI in these areas indirectly shapes defense capabilities and strategic considerations. Against this backdrop, so far in 2025, the overall rate of FDI announcements has leveled off amid an even greater global focus on future-shaping industries. Announcements in these areas are on pace to reach $840 billion, versus the $490 billion average annual level between 2022 and 2024, driven entirely by increases in data centers globally and in semiconductor fabs, particularly in the United States. In other major investment areas across advanced manufacturing, resources, and conventional industries, announcements are down, and FDI announcement rates have fallen to 20-year lows across all of China, emerging Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and sub-Saharan Africa (see sidebar “2025 announcements have focused on data centers and semiconductors”). Announcements are, of course, not firm commitments, and not every potential project sees the light of day. Still, past studies have found that FDI announcements reliably predicted capacity creation on the ground, with realization rates between 60 and 80 percent. Our analysis finds that, since 2022, more than half of the largest announced projects in future-shaping industries are under construction or already operational. Among those that have not yet started construction, about half were announced after the beginning of 2025. 9 As a general matter, it is too soon to gauge feasibility and progress of announcements made this year. # The biggest growth in announced investments, including in 2025, is for AI infrastructure and semiconductors Growth in FDI announcements has not been uniform across future-shaping industries and resources. Rather, pockets of rapid growth in some subsectors have been responsible for the bulk of the expansion. For instance, huge growth in AI and even bigger expectations for its future have accelerated cross-border investment in communications and software. Data centers—a key piece of infrastructure needed for AI—have accounted for more than 85 percent of announced greenfield FDI in this sector since 2022, or about $170 billion annually.[10] Momentum escalated in 2025. If the early-2025 pace continues, data center announcements are on track to reach over $370 billion by year end. Advanced manufacturing has accounted for one-quarter of global FDI announcements since 2022. One-third of that share, or about $115 billion annually, has been dedicated to new semiconductor fabs. $^{11}$ Another third went to assembly lines for EVs and new gigafactories for batteries—which are primarily used in automotive manufacturing but increasingly relevant to broader applications. The remainder was directed to other industries, including pharmaceuticals (notably drugs to combat obesity), electronics, and smaller but fast-growing FDI-related areas such as robotics and technologies linked to defense. In the first months of 2025, announcements directed to semiconductors surged threefold, while those for EVs dropped by over three-quarters, all on an annualized basis. As energy- and material-hungry industries expand, resource sectors also are attracting growing investment. In metals and minerals, roughly 50 percent of announced FDI since 2022 (or $50 billion annually) went to projects to extract and refine minerals critical to advanced manufacturing—for example, copper, lithium, and nickel. Most of the other half went to the steel value chain, particularly to newer, lower-emissions steelmaking processes. Energy-related announcements also have risen, but here the evolution over the past several years is more complicated. About three-quarters of the total since 2022, or nearly $330 billion annually, focused on expanding low-emissions technologies, doubling from 2015 to 2019 levels. Within this total, announced investments in established renewable sources, like solar and wind, and in nascent electrolytic hydrogen production have attracted roughly equal shares.\(^{12}$ The remainder, or $\$ 105$billion annually, went to conventional fossil fuel projects, falling from more than $\$ 150$billion in the earlier period. In 2025, the landscape of FDI announcements in energy has shifted meaningfully; announcements in liquified natural gas (LNG) and solar have remained about constant, while those going to low- emissions hydrogen, offshore wind, and oil and gas extraction have all dropped by around $70$percent. Announcements going to both nuclear and enhanced geothermal have more than doubled—but from such a low base that they hardly dent the aggregate energy FDI announcement numbers. # Sidebar # 2025 announcements have focused on data centers and semiconductors Do FDI announcements during the first part of 2025 signal new change? Of course, it is perilous to generalize much from only five months of FDI announcements. Even on an annual basis, FDI announcements are quite volatile, because large projects can shift overall numbers, as can factors like commodity prices and exchange rates. That said, announcements so far this year indicate that some trends are continuing but—at least for the moment—firms have put FDI announcements on hold in many areas. In the first five months of 2025, announced greenfield FDI totaled about $600 billion, which in annualized terms would equate to about the same$ 1.4 trillion observed in the 2022 to 2024 period. Investments in future-shaping industries and resources continue to make up about 75 percent of the total. The similarities end there. Industries of the future played an even greater role, representing 58 percent of the total, up from 35 percent. AI-related projects surged, with announced investments in data centers more than doubling in annualized terms and totaling $150 billion through May. While US hyperscalers drove the boom from 2022 to 2024, investment vehicles in Gulf Cooperation Council economies entered the arena in 2025, announcing multibillion-dollar projects in France and the United States. Annualized announced FDI in semiconductors tripled. Announcements made through May totaled nearly $120 billion, of which $100 billion went to the expansion of the TSMC project in Arizona. Outside of AI and semiconductors, greenfield activity dropped by one-third of 2022-24 levels, totaling about $325 billion through May, as trade policy uncertainty led many investors to adopt a wait-and-see approach. Investments in resources fell by about half in annualized terms for both conventional and low-emissions energy, as well as for metals and minerals. Electronics and EVs experienced similar drops. These declines came as firms from all regions except advanced Asia and the Middle East reduced their outbound FDI announcements. The United States stands out. It has seen over 100 percent growth in annualized announced FDI in every sector except electric vehicles and basic manufacturing. For semiconductors, nearly 90 percent of global FDI announcements through May were directed to the United States, up from about 40 percent between 2022 and 2024. Even for data centers, where global FDI announcements remained robust globally, the United States attracted about 20 percent of the total, up from less than 10 percent over the previous three years. Other advanced economies—including in Europe and advanced Asia—have seen increases in announced FDI but at more modest levels. This has come from the net result of significant drops in many sectors, particularly energy and advanced manufacturing, offset by a relatively small number of large data center projects. This is a shift from the headier period of 2022 to 2024, when FDI announcements were increasing across most categories in many advanced economies. The picture in emerging economies has been starkly different. Annualized FDI announcements through May 2025 in each of the emerging Asia, Latin America, MENA, and sub-Saharan Africa regions are at 20-year lows. In aggregate, FDI announcements across these regions have fallen by 50 percent from their levels during the 2022-24 period, on an annualized basis. Beyond questions about geopolitics, macroeconomics, and technological progress, future FDI flows may depend upon the ultimate form of trade deals between the United States and its partners. Multiple deal announcements made over the past several months have included pledges of future investment. It is not known to what degree FDI versus other forms of investment might be driven by recent announcements without detailed final agreements in place. That said, to get a sense of the order of magnitude, consider that the widely reported values of investment from the European Union, Japan, and South Korea total $1.5 trillion. 3 Compare this with $200 billion, which was the average annual value of FDI announcements into the United States between 2022 and 2024 and just under the value of announcements made to the United States through May 2025. # The shift toward future-shaping industries has occurred across all regions Future-shaping industries and resources have gained importance, and not just for a handful of top-performing economies. This is a global trend, as increasing FDI inflows and outflows are announced across nearly all regions. Advanced economies, MENA and China have, in aggregate, increased investment announcements in these sectors. Announced inflows have gone up everywhere, with the notable exception of China (Exhibit 3). Conventional industries show the converse pattern: Announcements of FDI inflows and outflows are down in nearly every region. Only companies in Latin America and MENA have increased announced outflows, and only by a little. # Exhibit 3 # Future-shaping industries drove growth in inflows and outflows almost everywhere except China. Greenfield FDI announcements, inflows and outflows by region, annual average 2022-May 2025 vs. 2015-19, $ billion Change in outflows, $ billion # Advanced economies Advanced Asia Europe (including intraregional flows) $\bullet$ Europe (excluding intraregional flows) $\bullet$ United States and Canada # Emerging economies Emerging Asia Middle East and North Africa Latin America and Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa $\bullet$ Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR Future-shaping industries and resources Circle size = Total annual average inflows and outflows, 2022-May 2025, $ billion Note: All $ figures are in terms of 2024 US dollars. 1 Advanced Asia includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, China. 2 Emerging Asia includes all Asian economies outside advanced Asia and excludes mainland China. Source: Using data provided by fDi Markets; McKinsey Global Institute analysis McKinsey & Company # FDI could create new hubs for future-shaping industries Announcements suggest that greenfield FDI is emerging as an engine for future-shaping industries. These announcements have grown much faster than total capital investment, creating the potential to boost global capacity and to expand the worldwide footprint of these industries (see sidebar "FDI may be gaining importance relative to domestic investment"). In the case of data centers and EV batteries, announced FDI projects could add roughly as much capacity as existed in 2022. For leading-edge semiconductors, FDI projects could add about 60 percent to 2022 global capacity (Exhibit 4). 13 # Exhibit 4 # FDI could drive growth in future-shaping industries, especially outside today's hubs. # Potential increase in production capacities from announced greenfield FDI projects, multiple 1Considering the 20 largest megadeals in each industry through May 2025, with status assessed in July 2025. For leading-edge semiconductors, the figure given covers the 20 largest megadeals across all semiconductor-related projects. For EV batteries, the figure given covers the 20 largest megadeals across all EV battery-related projects, including EV assembly. Source: Using data provided by fDi Markets; McKinsey Data Center Supply and Demand Model, McKinsey Semiconductor Supply and Demand Model; McKinsey Battery Insights, press search; McKinsey Global Institute analysis McKinsey & Company # Sidebar # FDI may be gaining importance relative to domestic investment Globally, greenfield FDI announcements have grown much faster than total capital investment (exhibit). 1 Across advanced economies, greenfield FDI announcements flowing to future-shaping industries averaged roughly 15 cents for every dollar of capital expenditure since 2022, nearly double the value of the previous period. For resources, a similar pattern played out, since investment in low-emissions hydrogen, low-emissions steel, and unconventional oil and gas projects often require expertise and capital from globally relevant firms. These proportions run even higher for emerging economies, many of which currently do not host an industry's leading firms and, therefore, are less able to domestically mobilize the financial and intangible capital they need. For example, in the communications and software sector, the ratio of greenfield FDI announcements to capital expenditure was more than ten times higher in countries outside the United States and China—which are home to the world's leading technology firms—than it was within those two countries. China has been the major exception to the growing role of incoming FDI for its future-shaping industries and resources. For every dollar decrease in greenfield announcements in future-shaping industries and resources, total investment in China actually grew by more than $10. While the decline of capital inflows from greenfield FDI is somewhat immaterial, the reduced access to know-how and human capital could be more relevant in future-shaping sectors where China still lags some economies. Greenfield FDI announcements in conventional industries in emerging markets have dropped to about four cents on the dollar, down from seven cents. In some regions, the shift has been more pronounced. For example, in consumer and basic manufacturing industries in sub-Saharan Africa, the ratio reached 15 cents on the dollar during the period from 2015 to 2019 but has recently dropped to about four cents. Exhibit # FDI is an increasingly important source of capital for future-shaping industries and their critical resource inputs. Greenfield FDI announcements to total capital expenditure, X:1 ratio 1 Future-shaping industries Resources Conventional industries Note: Development classification based on IMF definitions. China capital expenditure estimates are based on gross fixed capital formation from the World Bank; goods and service segmentation based on fixed asset investment from the National Bureau of Statistics of China; and sector segmentation based on capital expenditure from S&P Global Market Intelligence. Greenfield FDI announcement values are expressed relative to total capital expenditure in the X:1 ratio, so that values close to 0 indicate very low levels of FDI. Source: Using data provided by fDi Markets; Gartner; IEA; S&P Global Market Intelligence; IMF; National Bureau of Statistics of China; World Bank; McKinsey Global Institute analysis McKinsey & Company The impact could be many times higher outside the core hubs where these industries are concentrated today. If all announced projects come to fruition, new FDI-driven data center capacity outside the United States and Mainland China would be nearly twice the total 2022 capacity. For battery manufacturing outside Mainland China, it could be almost four times. And for leading-edge semiconductor capacity outside of South Korea and Taiwan, the FDI-driven increment could be nearly five times total 2022 capacity. In all these cases, FDI-driven projects could account for the majority of total capacity growth outside core hubs up to 2030. It remains uncertain how many of these announced investments will be fully realized, but the direction of travel is clear. The pipeline is progressing in a healthy way: Between one-half and two-thirds of the projects announced in these industries since 2022 are well underway, and many are already live. It remains to be seen what share will succeed; three of the top 20 EV projects have been put on hold, including a project in Canada worth about $10.5 billion and one in Mexico worth about $5 billion.[14] # FDI's potential near-term impact on resources industries is limited to specific segments Greenfield FDI announcements in resources are small compared with total current production capacity, contributing at most an incremental increase of less than 10 percent over 2022 levels. After all, energy and mining are massive, well-established industries. Within specific segments, however, the FDI pipeline could still play a meaningful role. In the case of fossil fuels, approximately 80 percent of conventional energy projects are already under construction or operational (Exhibit 5). Oil and gas firms have over a century of experience in announcing and developing cross-border energy projects, so it is perhaps not surprising that such a substantial percentage are already underway. However, even if all projects came online, their impact on the overall extraction of oil and gas would be modest and add, at most, less than 5 percent to total 2022 extraction capacity. But for LNG capacity, this number could be as high as 25 percent, potentially creating new energy corridors to replace geopolitically sensitive gas pipelines. If announcements come to fruition, FDI also has the potential to play a substantial role in low-emissions projects that are big and generally more complex, including offshore wind and low-emissions primary steel.[15] Most strikingly, announced low-emissions hydrogen projects would increase capacity over 100-fold above current, almost negligible, levels. However, none of the largest 20 electrolytic hydrogen projects announced since 2022 have reached the construction stage.[16] # FDI could reshape some resource segments, despite limited impact on total volumes. Potential increase in production capacities from announced greenfield FDI projects, multiple 1Units of measurement include exajoules (EJ) and gigawatts (GW). 2Considering the 20 largest megadeals in each industry through May 2025, with status assessed in July 2025. The 20 largest projects across the total sector are considered. Source: Using data provided by fDi Markets; Hydrogen Council; International Energy Agency: LNG Global; press search; McKinsey Global Institute analysis McKinsey & Company # Multinationals are investing big and increasingly along geopolitical lines Multinational corporations are making bigger bets on future-shaping industries, driven by competitive urgency and a need to establish themselves as global players in key sectors. These bets are reshuffling geopolitical ties, with multinationals—especially from advanced economies—bringing investment closer to home. # Megadeals are increasingly important for firms in future-shaping industries Megadeals, which are greenfield FDI projects valued at over $1 billion in inflation-adjusted terms, are growing in importance as firms race to compete globally in future-shaping industries. About 200 megadeals annually—representing 1 percent of all deal announcements—now account for approximately half of announced greenfield FDI, a significant increase relative to the previous period, when they accounted for under one-third (Exhibit 6). In fact, this category of big deals drove almost all of the growth in announced FDI in future-shaping industries, as well as about 75 percent of the growth in resources. Megadeals drove almost all of the growth in announced FDI in future-shaping industries, as well as about 75 percent of the growth in resources. # Megadeals fueled growth as FDI shifted toward capital-intensive industries. Value of greenfield FDI announcements, 2015-19 and 2022-May 2025, $ billion Megadeals 1 as a share of all deals, average annual value Change in average annual value, by sector Note: All $ figures are in terms of 2024 US dollars. Greenfield FDI announcements worth more than $1 billion each. Source: Using data provided by fDi Markets; McKinsey Global Institute analysis McKinsey & Company Megadeals have grown in size and frequency, particularly in future-shaping industries, where average deal size has doubled. Megadeals now account for about 60 percent of total announced FDI in resources and advanced manufacturing, as well as 40 percent for communications and software (Exhibit 7). At the same time, the importance of cross-border megadeals is rising, as they reflect the complex, capital-intensive, and highly competitive nature of future-shaping industries. Advanced manufacturing and digital infrastructure require specialized know-how, intellectual property, and highly skilled workforces to build out the infrastructure necessary to translate complex technologies into production. This raises the price tag of these projects, meaning only a few multinationals have the capabilities, financial strength, and risk appetite to develop them. For example, leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing is arguably the most precise production process ever conducted, and a single fab may require an investment of at least $10 billion.[17] Similarly, each gigafactory or multi-hundred-megawatt data center costs upward of $1 billion.[18] Winner-takes-most dynamics in rapidly evolving markets further push multinational organizations toward megadeals. Companies compete to establish global relevance, leading to an escalation in investment sizes. For instance, hyperscalers have engaged in an accelerating global investment race in the communications and software industry for over a decade.[19] Data center announcements have expanded in size by one and sometimes even two orders of magnitude over the past decade; the largest recent announcements are for gigawatt facilities, compared with the previous decade's data centers, built to consume dozens of megawatts.[20] And as data centers got bigger, so did deal sizes in the sector, which roughly doubled in average value. # Megadeals in future-shaping industries and resources are growing in both size and number. Note: All $ figures are in terms of 2024 US dollars. Source: Using data provided by fDi Markets; McKinsey Global Institute analysis McKinsey & Company Resource-related megadeals tend to be more complex projects with higher price tags. Oil and gas, including LNG projects, require significant capital and specialized expertise; for example, the announced LNG terminal in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, has a $17.5 billion sticker price.[21] New, low-emissions projects for hydrogen or steel also require considerable investment and risk, as evidenced by the fact that nearly all announced hydrogen projects are megadeals, but none of the largest projects are yet under construction. Public policy may play a role in the growth of megadeals across industries—or at least in the way they are announced. As economies compete to attract projects, stated incentives offered to firms have multiplied. For example, analysts found that announced FDI incentives reached record highs in 2023, particularly in advanced manufacturing, such as EVs and semiconductors.[22] Of course, not all FDI announcements involve the largest firms. About half of them are not megadeals, and in conventional sectors, roughly 80 percent of all deals are for less than $1 billion. Firms with ambitions to seize opportunities but lacking some of the financial muscle of their large peers can find space to invest. For instance, as megadeals grow, so will the size of their support ecosystems, including component manufacture, infrastructure, logistics, business services, financing, and more. # Multinational firms took different paths in response to geopolitical pressures The rapid evolution of new technologies is not the only change afoot. Geopolitical tensions are higher than they have been in decades, and firms looking to expand abroad are taking note. Greenfield FDI announcements have increasingly tracked geopolitical alignments. Indeed, the geopolitical distance of FDI announcements has dropped by more than 20 percent since just after the global financial crisis—from 3.6 in 2010 to below 3.0 as of 2025 on our ten-point scale.[23] (For more on how we measure geopolitical distance, see sidebar “Defining geopolitical distance.”) Advanced economies' investment in China fell from 10 percent to 2 percent of total FDI announcements by value, while flows among advanced economies increased from 35 percent to 45 percent. These trends reflect the aggregate effect of investment decisions. Among the largest companies, 35 percent decreased the av