2006年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Initiative_for_Heavily_Indebted_Poor_Countries_20页_389kb

Summary of the HIPC Initiative and Sunset Clause Issues

I. Introduction

This document addresses the concerns raised by the Boards of the IMF and IDA regarding the implementation of the HIPC Initiative's sunset clause, which is set to take effect at the end of 2006. The staff proposes that the sunset clause be allowed to take effect and that countries assessed to have met the income and indebtedness criteria based on end-2004 data be grandfathered. This approach would ensure that these countries continue to have access to debt relief under the HIPC Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), even if they do not start qualifying programs before the deadline. Additionally, the document discusses the possibility of a permanent exit from the Initiative for countries that choose not to participate.

II. Background

• The HIPC Initiative was established in 1996 with a sunset clause to ensure that the Initiative is not seen as permanent and to encourage reform.
• The sunset clause has been extended four times, with the latest extension scheduled to take effect on December 31, 2006.
• As of end-2004, 14 countries were identified as meeting the income and indebtedness criteria. Of these, 11 might wish to be considered for debt relief, while three (Bhutan, Lao PDR, and Sri Lanka) have opted out.
• Afghanistan and Myanmar are not yet included due to insufficient data, but an assessment for Afghanistan is expected soon.

III. Key Issues for Consideration

A. Moral Hazard and Free Riding

• Maintaining access for identified countries could lead to moral hazard, where countries may borrow more in anticipation of future debt relief.
• Establishing a cutoff date for debt subject to relief could discourage creditors from participating and create new borrowing incentives.
• Alternative mechanisms, such as strict limits on non-concessional borrowing and financing assurances from other creditors, are already in place to mitigate these risks.
• Staff does not recommend further tightening of rules, as it may exclude countries with significant debt to non-Paris Club and commercial creditors.

B. Perceived Permanence of the Initiative and Incentives

• The sunset clause was intended to prevent the Initiative from being seen as permanent and to encourage reform.
• However, repeated extensions have reduced its perceived effectiveness.
• Even if the sunset clause is implemented, the Initiative will not be closed, as some countries can still reach the decision and completion points without a deadline.
• Staff does not recommend setting a new deadline for all pre-decision point countries, as it would create additional challenges and may be perceived as unfair.

C. Possible Further Limits on Country Coverage

• Some Directors have suggested formally excluding countries that have expressed no interest in participating.
• From the IMF's perspective, current intent cannot be used to disqualify a country from HIPC relief.
• The eligibility criteria should be based on objective indicators, not on current intentions.
• Staff recommends postponing the consideration of an exit strategy and allowing countries to opt out at a later stage if needed.

D. Costs of Providing Debt Relief

• Grandfathering the 14 countries that met the end-2004 criteria would add approximately US$21.9 billion to the total HIPC debt relief costs.
• IDA's share is estimated at US$3.1 billion, while the IMF's share is US$2.5 billion.
• Including MDRI costs, the total potential cost would be US$87.6 billion.
• The costs remain uncertain due to factors such as debt levels, discount rates, and future economic performance.

IV. Recommendations

• The sunset clause should be allowed to take effect at the end of 2006.
• Countries that have met the income and indebtedness criteria based on end-2004 data should be grandfathered.
• This approach ensures equitable treatment and allows countries to proceed with the HIPC process at their own pace.
• Staff recommends discontinuing semi-annual statistical updates and relying on annual progress reports to inform the Boards.
• Efforts to address moral hazard and free riding should continue, including monitoring and reporting on debt sustainability and financing assurances.